

Theorizing Neoliberal Urban Development

A Genealogy from Richard Florida to Jane Jacobs

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Jane Jacobs was one of the most important figures in defining the “urban crisis” of the 1960s and 1970s. In the narrative of the crisis, Jacobs, a seasoned critic and activist, became the face of resistance to Robert Moses’s destructive urban renewal and highway policies in New York City. This widely shared view of Jacobs, however, ignores how intellectuals utilize her theories to propagate neoliberal urban economic development practices, much less the seeds of such thinking in her writings. That work extolled the virtues of urban living, but the seminal *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) lacked a social program and a concrete vision for the city of the future, and has served as a primer on the gentrification that has increasingly priced out the lower and working classes of U.S. cities. That book, combined with her *The Economy of Cities* (1969), established a new way of thinking about urban rehabilitation and economic development and laid the groundwork for Richard Florida’s recent reinterpretation of her theories.

The fluidity of Jacobs’s politics, as represented in her writings and personal life, has aided in that reinterpretation. Even though Jacobs has been associated with the Left—given her opposition to both top-down planning and the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the burgeoning libertarian Right warmly embraced *Death and Life* because of its conservative argument and critique of the welfare state. As cities became associated with politics and values distinct from suburban or rural districts, Jacobs evolved into an icon of urban progressivism. Her association with the

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antiestablishment Left undoubtedly contributed to this image. Yet within a decade of its publication, William F. Buckley Jr. was placing selections of *Death and Life* in his canon of twentieth-century conservative thought.¹ Jacobs imagined empowered communities and “organic” neighborhood development, modeled on her beloved Greenwich Village but not easily replicated. The state’s role would be severely limited, intervening only to ensure the availability of investment for housing rehabilitation and renovation.

Furthermore, Jacobs personally forecast an emergent form of neoliberal urban development: neighborhood rehabilitation and resettlement by a pioneering upper class. Her profile of older, predominantly working-class neighborhoods with solid housing stock, like Greenwich Village or Chicago’s Back of the Yards, increased the demand for such “authentic” places and subsequently disrupted the sense of community she celebrated. Class and racial demographics gradually shifted to predominantly professional and white as working-class ethnics and blacks became priced out. By the 1980s critics were speaking of white flight back into cities, leading to the recent urban renaissance that many argue unfairly pushes the poor to the fringe and away from services once available in the city. Moreover, Jacobs contributed to the tarnishing of government programs like public housing and urban renewal, and the state’s once proactive role in subsidized and affordable housing development has since subsided. Historic preservationists, too, consistently invoked Jacobs in order to preserve the facades of individual structures and the form of whole neighborhoods, a classification that also drives up construction costs and real estate prices in formerly diverse neighborhoods.² It is no coincidence that this style of urban resettlement coincided with the entrenchment of neoliberal political economy; in fact they have proved mutually beneficial.

The regeneration of cities in recent years has, in many ways, validated Jacobs’s arguments. Recent reconfigurations of her major works on community and economic development, however, recast those arguments to the benefit of the neoliberal state and at the expense of its urban subjects. In the last decade, Richard Florida, an acknowledged disciple of Jacobs and current professor of “Business and Creativity” at the University of Toronto, has effectively quantified and fused the findings in *Death and Life* and *Economy of Cities* into his influential “creative-class” theory of urban economic development. According to Florida, former industrial cities, in order to revitalize their economies, must adapt to the needs of the creative class, a broad consortium ranging from high-tech entrepreneurs to the starving visual artist. The creative class rejects the conformity and banality of suburban living, preferring instead the difference, diversity, spectacle, and amorphous authenticity of city life. Creative-class magnets possess certain places—bars, clubs, coffee shops, and work-out facilities—within or near inspiring residential neighborhoods where creative-class members can congregate and cultivate their creativity. Cities must also feature a culture that adheres to Florida’s “three T’s”: technology, talent, and tolerance (i.e.,

diversity in race, sex, gender, and sexuality). Despite a variety of alternatives proposed by scholars and planners alike, Florida successfully marketed his theories and himself and has since operated as a sought-after consultant for metropolitan areas ravaged by recent shifts in the nation's political economy. He has had a tremendous impact on how cities have developed in the past decade.

Neoliberalism is a global phenomenon, with advocates in “education (the universities and many ‘think tanks’), in the media, in corporate boardrooms and financial institutions, in key state institutions (treasury departments, the central banks), and also in those international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) that regulate global finance and trade.” As David Harvey notes, “neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse.”³ Yet, the global network of neoliberal ideology and policy features localized points of origin. Harvey points out that the urban crisis, particularly its manifestation in 1970s New York City, provided an “iconic case” for the neoliberal reorganization at the national level—a style of redevelopment that has since been documented by historians and political scientists.⁴ If anything, these works explain how neoliberal ideas, policies, and programs, at least in the United States, were borne out of the local testing grounds of urban America. In fact, the origins of neoliberal urban development may be traced back to the collaboration between the state and financial institutions during the New Deal and in the groundbreaking public-private partnership of urban renewal (Title 1 of the 1949 Housing Act). A genealogy from Florida to Jacobs’s anti-statist argument highlights the evolving relationship between the state, global capitalism, and urban economic development since the 1960s.⁵ According to Harvey, cultural- and tourist-focused development, creative freedom “promoted by the city’s powerful cultural institutions,” political tolerance for identity politics, and the “diversified consumerism” of gentrification played a role in the city’s neoliberal transformation since the 1970s.⁶ Richard Florida has interpreted this transformation and merged it with Jacobs’s theories in order to cast himself as a key public advocate—operating effectively as the figurehead of a creative-class think tank no less—of emergent neoliberal economic development trends.

The emergence of Jane Jacobs and her antiestablishment politics

At the close of the 1960s, William F. Buckley Jr. wrote, “Jane Jacobs would never classify herself as a conservative . . . [but] she argues a thesis concerning the city which is conservative by general understanding, an oversimplification of which is that there are profound human and aesthetic satisfactions to be had in a city that grows as it is disposed to grow, free of the superimpositions and the great allocations of the planners.” Jacobs certainly would not have classified herself as a conservative, but with a vision at once liberal—celebrating diversity and the commonly understood dreadful city—and at the same time, as Buckley pointed out, conserva-

tive, Jacobs established a political and economic fluidity that allowed successors to manipulate her theories however they saw fit—making nearly any kind of urban development, even the kind of projects she fought against, seem “Jacobsesque.” More problematic, the weak state her work portended further ensured inequitable development in the years to come, and opened the door for municipal neoliberal redevelopment policy.⁷

Recent scholarship has complicated Jacobs’s place in the narrative of urban renewal. In the classic depiction, Jacobs, the writer and activist, was pitted against Robert Moses, the untouchable New York bureaucrat orchestrating the city’s redevelopment regime and stand-in for the planning establishment. Moses wholly transformed New York into a sterile modernist dystopia that favored car-loving commuters and relegated the poor to the barren streetless superblocks where Moses built his housing “barracks.” Investigative reporting and Robert Caro’s massive biography solidified the image of the authoritarian Moses indubitably responsible for New York’s “fall” in the 1960s and 1970s.⁸ Contemporary historiography has revised this narrative, arguing that the time has come for a reevaluation of Moses’s work, and these histories have ultimately validated the power broker’s common refrain: the ends justified the means.⁹ Samuel Zipp, in a widely hailed epic, argues that Moses’s urban renewal program saved New York from the fate of Rust Belt–like decline and ensured that the city remained a global financial and cultural capital. In an important revelation, Zipp writes that street-level opposition to Moses in New York City predated Jacobs’s activism and writing. Her place in the annals of urban renewal was more the consequence and not the cause of Title 1 resistance.¹⁰

Since Jacobs’s death in 2006, a spate of memorials, memoirs, and interdisciplinary scholarship has sought to solidify her place as the herald of urban rebirth. While historians and social scientists complicate her legacy, popular works serve as a corrective to the recent reevaluations of Moses. Anthony Flint and Roberta Brandes Gratz reify the narrative of postwar New York redevelopment as a great struggle between the powerful and seemingly unstoppable forces of top-down planning embodied by Moses versus the organic bottom-up paradigm embodied by Jacobs. Flint and Gratz cast Jacobs as the hero and effectively attribute the city’s recent rebirth to both her literal and her ideological victory over Moses in the 1960s.¹¹ The Rockefeller Foundation, which funded her early work, has similarly canonized Jacobs and honors her legacy through the annual Jane Jacobs Medal. The two prizes, honoring “those whose creative uses of the urban environment build a more diverse, dynamic and equitable city,” have been awarded to an assorted group of urbanists, from community planners to high-profile actors operating within the public-private partnership model. The range of honorees testifies to Jacobs’s broad but confused legacy.¹²

Jacobs’s fluidity was a product of the changing political winds of the 1960s. She played a significant role in the backlash against urban renewal that began in

the late 1950s. This movement against welfare-state planning transcended the simple dichotomy of U.S. politics, featuring critiques from the New Left (the Port Huron Statement), the “vital center” of the postwar liberal consensus (*The Exploding Metropolis*), and the libertarian Right (Martin Anderson’s *The Federal Bulldozer*).¹³ Jacobs’s critique against planning and urban renewal incorporated themes from each faction, from the community empowerment aims of the New Left to the anti-statist critique of Anderson. Yet Jacobs was solidly part of a broad liberal–New Left coalition reacting against an amorphous establishment that consisted of not only authoritarian planners like Robert Moses, but architects of the postwar welfare state, southern segregationists, cold war imperialists, the military-industrial complex, and corporate CEOs seeking a new liberal—in the classical sense—restructured economy.¹⁴ Jacobs and others channeled this discontent into vocal opposition of the Vietnam War, free speech movements on U.S. campuses, and a near global revolutionary moment in 1968. Jacobs, for her part, participated in these protests and even relocated to Toronto to protect her family from the draft. According to Harvey, the movements of the 1960s saw an intrusive state in need of reform, “and on that, the neoliberals could easily agree.”¹⁵

In the early 1960s, Jacobs transformed urban theory and the image of U.S. cities, and eventually unseated the dominant paradigm of postwar planning.¹⁶ Enamored with urban design, New York, and Greenwich Village upon arriving from Scranton, Pennsylvania, circa 1934, Jacobs traveled swiftly up the ladder of cultural criticism following World War II. Prior to the war she wrote for *Vogue* and the *Herald Tribune* as well as trade publications like *Iron Age*. With few credentials in architecture, she was hired in 1952 by *Architectural Forum*, then arguably the country’s foremost middlebrow authority on design and urbanism. On assignment in Philadelphia, Jacobs took a transformative tour of the city, guided by the local renewal czar, Edmund Bacon. To demonstrate the purpose of Philadelphia’s renewal effort, Bacon took Jacobs to an aged section of downtown with vibrant street life, noting without irony that the area was next in line for the bulldozer. At the orderly “after” example Jacobs took note of the emptiness and boredom. “Where are the people?” she asked Bacon. This question served as the basis of what would become *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*.¹⁷

On the streets of New York, as the narrative goes, Jacobs backed up her written critique with action, and thus developed a reputation as an urban activist. When Moses unveiled designs to bisect Greenwich Village’s beloved Washington Square Park with a freeway on-ramp, Jacobs helped organize the opposition that ultimately sank the plan. She utilized the pages of downtown’s alternative press, the *Village Voice* in particular, and astutely enlisted local housewives and children in the protest that resulted in a public relations nightmare for Moses. In the “blighted” West Village, Jacobs pioneered urban resettlement—what would later be known as the process of gentrification—investing in and rehabilitating a home on Hudson

Street.¹⁸ When the city drew up renewal plans for the area—some suggest Moses wanted payback for the Washington Square defeat—the Jacobs-led opposition not only successfully defeated Moses, but also developed an alternative community plan. Finally, the dramatic fight against Moses’s Lower Manhattan Expressway—which would have destroyed the now opulent SoHo neighborhood—solidified the superhero image of Jacobs waging a war against authoritarian redevelopment.¹⁹

Not unlike this activist persona, Jacobs developed a contrarian reputation at *Architectural Forum*, suggesting at every opportunity that urban renewal and the modern aesthetic it prized proved detrimental to the fate of cities. The journal shared the establishment’s love affair with Moses and urban renewal, and Jacobs stunned co-workers by questioning the efficacy of Title 1. She further enhanced her profile with a scathing speech to the Conference on Urban Design at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design in April 1956. The institution was firmly wedded to the modern aesthetic, commissioning works by Le Corbusier and Minoru Yamasaki—the latter of the late Pruitt-Igoe Houses in St. Louis and the World Trade Center in New York. Walter Gropius taught at the school as well, and to an audience of their admirers Jacobs excoriated planning, urban renewal, and their modern inclinations. She cited statistics on the displacement of people and small businesses as a contingency of urban renewal, and emphasized the importance of street life—an element that Le Corbusier and his adherents eagerly dismissed. The speech received a surprisingly warm reception, including one from attendee William H. Whyte, the editor of *Fortune*, who asked Jacobs to contribute to the magazine’s forthcoming special series on U.S. cities.²⁰

The article “Downtown is for People” explored themes that would later transform the way the civic-minded conceptualized the function of cities. Jacobs fleshed out the argument against modern design principles, including how planning, with its emphasis on order, eliminated the street and thus the commercial establishments and crowds that came with it. Planners, she noted, were intent on removing the “hustle and bustle of downtown”—in other words, the people—and replacing it with sterile, monumental, orderly emptiness. The article also revealed an early affinity for large-scale planning if properly envisioned, including Victor Gruen’s landmark plan for downtown Fort Worth. While Gruen’s soon-thwarted plan, unlike the dominant downtown design schemes of the era, preserved much of Fort Worth’s existing urban form, it represented a massive overhaul of the cityscape in order to transform the area into a large pedestrian mall, not to mention make room for sizable perimeter parking garages. Jacobs praised the plan for its attention to density, as well as its design elements, noting that the “excellent Gruen plan includes, in its street treatment, sidewalk arcades, poster columns, flags, vending kiosks, display stands, outdoor cafés, bandstands, flower beds, and special lighting effects.” This brief passage endorsed, in part, elements modeled on the City Beautiful movement,

one of the many schemes Jacobs later criticized. More importantly, it demonstrated a faith in the state to accomplish aesthetically appealing city planning.²¹

Jacobs also called for greater citizen participation in the planning process and greater planner participation in urban life. She insisted that the profession forgo presumed expertise and omniscience for a walk around the city, observing how it functions and consulting with the public on redevelopment. (As a testament to Jacobs's legacy, academics like Michael Sorkin and Sharon Zukin have recently retraced these steps in their search for the authentic.)²² Rather than arguing that cities were in decline and that clean-slate renewal was their salvation, Jacobs found certain urban neighborhoods doing fine by themselves. Ultimately, the article sent shock waves through the planning and architectural establishment. Jaws dropped at the critique of Moses's massive Lincoln Center, a much beloved project in architectural circles that implemented modern design principles. More importantly, Jacobs enunciated a new economic and organizational vision for city planning. In place of the authoritarian master planner, communities should participate in the planning process, banks should open up investment in blacklisted districts to spur rehabilitation of older urban form, and the state, rather than bulldozing neighborhoods, should be a distant partner facilitating these processes.²³

With a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, Jacobs commenced work on *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, exploring these themes at greater length. In particular, she established an enduring image of the modern city, a product of welfare-state planning, as ugly, empty, and uninhabitable. In the 1960s, city planners admired the decentralization that birthed the profession, as turn-of-the-century reformers emphasized the segregation of uses, or zoning, as the governing paradigm in planning. By mid-century, zoning for residential, commercial, and manufacturing was de rigueur, and only in older U.S. cities did nineteenth-century urban form and design persist. With New York City's Stuyvesant Town, built in concert with the city in the 1940s, multifamily housing took on a new design influenced by the utopian vision of Le Corbusier, one that enhanced the amount of fresh air and natural light that apartments received.²⁴ Accordingly, Jacobs condemned this new mode of living that sacrificed urban life. Tower-in-a-park construction, while offering more light and air than its predecessors, did little more than showcase the conceit of architects and master planners. The buildings shouted, "'Look what I made!' Like a great, visible ego it tells of someone's achievement. But as to how the city works, it tells . . . nothing but lies." Designed to make urban living functional, decentralized apartment towers, from Jacobs's point of view, resulted in urban dysfunction and disorder.²⁵

Instead, city neighborhoods were to emulate Greenwich Village and the like in size and street life. These select examples ensured order through citizen cooperation. Crime was a part of urban life, Jacobs admitted, but the sidewalk's reputation

as a site of random crime was a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more people fear the street, the less likely they are to use the sidewalk, and limiting pedestrian traffic threatened public safety. For Jacobs, it was not the police department that patrolled an area and eradicated crime; rather it was the neighborhood that patrolled itself through passersby, watchful eyes taking in the scene from above, and commercial establishments that generated traffic day and night. The White Horse Tavern, a working-class saloon adjacent to her Hudson Street home, proved an exemplar. Its long hours, large windows illuminating the sidewalk, and patrons subconsciously keeping watch on the corner ensured the safety of amblers outside. This was how cities functioned, Jacobs argued: informal networks of citizens that garnered trust through contact on the sidewalk and protected one another in moments of distress. In contrast to the strong community bonds planners envisioned in their housing and urban design, Jacobs emphasized that weak social ties were essential to the health of the neighborhood and the city.²⁶

Also in contrast to the utopian, one-dimensional vision of modern order, *Death and Life* established an image of the ideal city as diverse in both class and use. Jacobs correctly pointed out that segregating uses limited the utility of the city as a whole. Sites of commerce became ghost towns after quitting time; residential districts witnessed similar desolation during the day. By insisting on single-use zones, master planners contributed to the decline of once-great cities and threatened the existing security forged in mixed-use neighborhoods. The economically and socially diverse Greenwich Village, in Jacobs's mind, served as a leveler and created a sense of community and trust among residents and visitors alike. The round-the-clock street traffic in the neighborhood—"the ballet of Hudson Street" as Jacobs called it—also served the area microeconomically: "The continuity of this movement (which gives the street its safety) depends on an economic foundation of basic mixed uses. The workers from the laboratories, meat-packing plants, warehouses, plus those from a bewildering variety of small manufacturers, printers and other little industries and offices, give all the eating places and much of the other commerce support at midday." In the street ballet one had a choice between being a participant or an observer; pioneers like Jane Jacobs wished to do both. To her, these neighborhoods represented the last authentic places in an increasingly fabricated modern landscape.²⁷

Death and Life, however, effectively demonstrated that only a finite quantity of authentic neighborhoods and urban experiences remained. Jacobs suggested that the state could and should play a role in the development and preservation of such places, working with financial institutions to encourage investment in these formerly risky and credit-blacklisted neighborhoods, not unlike the policies that fostered mass suburbanization after the war. Yet by offering no vision of how class diversity could be preserved, she left the state and capital to interpret the Jacobs-inspired landscape for her. This lack of vision also allowed later historic preservationists to liber-

ally interpret and perhaps overstate the aesthetic value of the neighborhoods Jacobs surveyed, pushing the state to safeguard complete “historic districts” that utilized zoning to uphold the look of certain city blocks and block groups while driving up costs and rents—not to mention limiting the rights of property owners—with said designation. In turn, *Death and Life* functioned as a primer on gentrification, where soon-to-be-priced-out industrial service workers catered to the whims of upper-middle-class migrants rehabbing the aged housing stock. Manhattan’s West Village industry never modernized, displacing dock work and manufacturing concerns to neighboring boroughs and New Jersey. The Village working class, as in similarly fashionable urban neighborhoods since, swiftly disappeared as well.

Jacobs’s theory on urban development, then, was devoted to the proposition of alternative planning principles: mixed uses as opposed to segregating residential, commercial and industrial zones; more streets and sidewalks rather than eliminating the street in favor of the plaza; infill rather than displacement; and diversity rather than order. She noted that much of what makes cities so attractive was already there—communities must nurture their own neighborhoods and the state should remain relatively hands-off. This stood in contrast to the ideology of Moses and others who spoke of the chaos and sickness of city life, and then went to work to impose order on disorder. Glaringly missing, however, was a—for lack of a better term—plan for how the impressionable features of great U.S. neighborhoods might be imprinted on dying sections of cities ravaged by renewal. On the one hand, Jacobs’s message subsumed the inherent paternalism of the planning establishment. On the other, her planning theory appeared astonishingly market-driven compared to the massive public funds and corporate welfare invested in Title 1.

Neoliberalism and the creative economy of cities

Jane Jacobs’s *The Economy of Cities* creatively rethought economic development in the same way *Death and Life* considered urban redevelopment, and it has proved just as influential. Prior to its publication, the accepted narrative of human economic history understood that developments in agriculture begat the clustering of clans and thus cities. According to Jacobs, however, it was urbanization that begat agriculture and productive innovation in the evolution of economies. The salient development of the Neolithic Age, then, was “sustained, interdependent, creative city economies that made possible many new kinds of work, agriculture among them.” This, in turn, was relevant for contemporary cities, for “a city grows by a process of gradual diversification and differentiation of its economy, starting from little or nothing more than its initial export work and the suppliers of that work.” In essence, Jacobs put forth the argument that the clustering of population in dense cities, along with competition wrought by free enterprise, spurred creative innovation that contributed not only the economy at large, but the growth and sustainability of the city as well. *The Economy of Cities* found an audience among leading social scientists

and a home in an age when creative innovation—particularly in the realm of information technology—reached a fever pitch.²⁸

In the wake of these publications, once-great U.S. cities underwent a dramatic transformation. First came the urban crisis, which crippled industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest. This “death” of cities resulted from a variety of devastating structural forces, including the steady decline of manufacturing and high-wage unskilled employment, a movement of industrial and commercial capital to the South and Southwest, a fleeing tax base and tax revolts emanating from the suburbs that strained social services to the point of near bankruptcy in the 1970s, and a cultural narrative that imagined cities as dangerous and uninhabitable. New York City’s population fell by 1 million during these years; Detroit proper lost a third of its residents. As the country emerged from this crisis the neoliberal economy took shape: globalization, deindustrialization, and a shrunken welfare state.²⁹

At some point during the 1970s, at the nadir of the urban crisis, intrepid pioneers (i.e., middle-class whites who could choose to live elsewhere) started resettling the city. Artists and young men and women, attracted to low rents and the allure of urban grit, gravitated to the rundown and empty areas of cities like New York where cutting-edge art and music converged on the downtown scene. These settlers established vibrant communities, organically filling the vacuum left by the new economic order of deindustrialization and capital’s migration to the south and west—a process aided by the state no less. Neighborhoods like the newly christened “East Village,” a more hip, rundown version of Greenwich Village, and SoHo, a neighborhood of unique cast-iron construction nearly destroyed by the planned Lower Manhattan Expressway, became the epicenter of the urban revival. In Reagan-era New York, the real upper middle class, also working downtown in the financial district, began residing in once-industrial loft warehouses. Political and economic elites and investment bankers, as it were, “reconstructed the city economy around financial activities, ancillary services such as legal services and the media . . . and diversified consumerism (gentrification and neighborhood ‘restoration’ playing a prominent and profitable role).”³⁰ Places like New York, which featured an already dynamic economy and creatively adapted to the emerging financial sector, managed to stave off bankruptcy. Yet industry-specific cities in the midst of deindustrialization were thrown into a desperate search for techniques and strategies to salvage and sustain their economies.

Scholars and critics have called the most recent evolution of capitalism any number of names: postindustrialism, postmodernism, late capitalism, and neoliberalism, and in recent decades, sociologists and demographers have considered the utility of space and place in the unbound and intangible economy. Since Joseph Schumpeter, social scientists have understood capitalism’s need for “creative destruction,” and, as David Harvey once wrote, “capitalism is always grounded somewhere.” In an increasingly globalized economy and “network society,” however, capital can repro-

duce and access itself virtually anywhere. Sociologist Manuel Castells argues that power cloaks itself in micronetworks where capital and information are exchanged. “The more a society is democratic in its institutions, the more elites have to become clearly distinct from the populace.” To this end, “elites form their own society . . . retrenched behind the very material barrier of real-estate pricing . . . [and an] interpersonally networked subculture.”³¹ Harvey, Castells, and other sociologists offered pessimistic forecasts for the economic rehabilitation of older cities in the international neoliberal milieu, which clustered in a select few “global cities”—to use Saskia Sassen’s term—like New York, London, Tokyo, and Dubai. According to Castells, “globalization stimulates regionalization,” and “major metropolitan centers still offer the greatest opportunities for the personal enhancement, social status, and individual self-gratification of the much-needed upper-level professionals, from good schools for their children to symbolic membership at the heights of conspicuous consumption.” Despite his critique of neoliberalism, Castells’s observation emerged as a regular model for economic development in U.S. cities.³²

After years of obscurity within the academe, Richard Florida became the face of neoliberal economic development by addressing the question of urban growth in the postindustrial age. Whereas industrialists once constructed factories in their hometowns or in the vicinity of markets and sound transportation, capitalism’s current mutability threw cities onto the front lines of a bidding war over mobile firms and labor, typically offering up devastating tax incentives that ensured few community benefits. In response to the changing capitalist landscape, Florida focused on a contingent element of the analysis of Sassen and Castells, not to mention Jacobs: place still matters. In 2002, Florida proposed a theory dependent on market-driven redevelopment projects aimed at a city-loving creative class. Content with the phasing out of industrial production, Florida saw the creative class as rejecting the conformity and banality of suburban living for the authenticity of urban life. To attract this class, cities must possess certain sites of creative production as well as a socially liberal culture that adheres to Florida’s three T’s: technology, talent, and tolerance.³³

The notion of weak social ties, which Jacobs linked to model urban communities, was central to Florida’s neoliberal project. Harvey notes that in neoliberalism, “while individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed to choose to construct strong collective institutions (such as trade unions) as opposed to weak voluntary associations (like charitable organizations).”³⁴ Florida’s initial creative-class work entered a public sociological conversation about the changing dynamic of social relations at the dawn of the new millennium. Robert Putnam’s landmark study, *Bowling Alone* (2000) lamented the loss of strong social ties in middle-class, ethnic communities fostered by welfare capitalism. Of course these communities, wrought by a postwar industrial machine, had long declined due to the shifting economy, deindustrialization, and a weakening of social ties. Florida’s *The Rise of the Creative*

Class (2002) functioned as a counternarrative to Putnam's tale of decline. Borrowing from Jacobs's insistence that informal social networks defined the most vibrant neighborhoods, Florida argued that weak social ties were preferable for urban economic development. Instead of cultivating social capital as Putnam suggested, cities needed to attract and nurture the creative class (if they were not there already) by catering to their consumer-driven desires. These millennial works, along with David Brooks's *Bobos in Paradise* (2001), signaled a critical pop-cultural moment where the question of space and place in the neoliberal economy seemed of utmost importance. Yet for Florida, the lamentations of Putnam and Brooks appeared regressive at best, with fraternity and tight-knit community consigned to the past.³⁵

Urban theorists in the academe, pushing back against the tide of neoliberal urban development, urge stronger social ties in the pursuit a more "just city." Scholars like Harvey, Susan S. Fainstein, and the late Henri Lefebvre have sought the empowerment of the powerless toward a collective goal of fair political and economic outcomes. The Florida neoliberal model assumes a trickle-down effect, a lifting of all boats—an assumption that all but ignores the underserved sector that accommodates creative-class desires. Urban social justice, just-city, or "right to the city" theorists also trace a genealogy to Jacobs. As Fainstein writes, "participation in public decision making is part of the ideal of the just city." Yet its adherents also seek direct cooperation with the state in these outcomes, whether in the case of neo-Marxist models like Harvey's or, in the less orthodox sense, an "entrepreneurial state that not only provides welfare but also generates increased wealth."³⁶ Just-city models portend democratic participation in the public sphere, which stands in stark contrast to the political fluidity Florida cultivates for himself. Not surprisingly, just-city theorists are consigned to the academe, planning schools, and bureaucracies, while Florida reigns as the public face of planning and urban economic development—the mantle once held by Jacobs.

The Rise of the Creative Class asserted two vital truths about U.S. cities at the dawn of the new century, both inspired by Jacobs: sustainable cities spurred creativity and innovation, and innovators are attracted to a certain place. In Florida's view, the more creative minds clustered in a specific metropolitan area, the more economically vital said metropolitan area. Examining cities and regions both qualitatively and quantitatively, Florida and his team of researchers found that creative and innovative environs ranked high in talent, technology, and tolerance. First, metropolitan areas that managed to attract the best and brightest were more likely to maintain that population. The most intelligent in the arts, science, and technology appeared drawn to cities featuring a rich and unique urban form—organically developed neighborhood systems in Jacobs and Florida parlance—alternative forms of transportation, and the proper places to initiate contact with like-minded talent. College towns and global cities like New York, San Francisco, Chicago, and Seattle were particularly attractive to talent. Second, metropolitan areas with significant

technological infrastructure were also havens of the creative class. Once again this spoke to the popularity of college towns — technology and talent built in — but also included metropolitan research corridors like Silicon Valley, the North Carolina Research Triangle, Route 128 outside of Boston, and Florida’s most iconic creative city, Austin, Texas, which featured substantial technological infrastructure, attracted talent through the University of Texas, and possessed a vibrant cultural scene — as opposed to the just-city movement that admires equitable places like Amsterdam.

Talent and technology were obvious attributes for economic development — the neoliberal pioneer naturally seeks out authenticity, spectacle, and capital. Florida’s true intervention was the “Tolerance Index,” an update of Jacobs’s illustration that diversity sustains lively urban neighborhoods. Cities featuring a more tolerant social and political culture, he argued, attracted members of the creative class. Socially conservative metropolitan areas, intolerant in matters of race, gender, and sexuality, tended to rank low in Florida’s metrics, and this intolerance prevented such places — often bastions of the old industrial age — from prospering economically. Seeking to quantify a region’s diversity, the Tolerance Index measured everything from the percentage of gays living in an area to “the number of writers, designers, musicians, actors and directors, painters and sculptors, photographers and dancers” (the “Bohemian Index”) to the number of immigrants in a region. What it measured, then, was a city or region’s commitment to social liberalism — an easy sell to a Left weaned on identity politics. Tolerant cities like San Francisco and Madison, Wisconsin, according to Florida’s analysis, featured expanding creative economies while aged relics of the millworker and organization man, like Buffalo, New York, hemorrhaged population and kept enlightened innovators away. Together, the three T’s provided an undefined economic model for troubled cities to follow.

While scholars like Harvey, Castells, and Sassen critiqued the political economy of neoliberalism, Florida, concealing its inherent economic inequality, raised the profile of its cultural project. According to Harvey, neoliberalism’s use of individual freedom against an interventionist state “had to be backed up by a practical strategy that emphasized the liberty of consumer choice, not only with respect to particular products but also with respect to lifestyles, modes of expression and a wide range of cultural practices.”³⁷ With his theory of a mobile and expansive creative class, Florida asserted that catering to emergent lifestyle and cultural choices would salvage once-dying cities. Moreover, establishing an image of political fluidity, not unlike Jacobs, proved central to raising the profile of neoliberalism’s cultural side. Florida labeled himself “a political independent, fiscally conservative, socially liberal, and a believer in vigorous international competition and free trade,” and noted how he “voted for and served under Democrats, Republicans, and independents.” Florida’s creative-class cultural program indeed provided fodder for critique from the limiting dichotomy of U.S. politics: the Left loves his social politics but questions his market-driven approach, the Right vice versa. This convenient façade,

like the state masquerading as powerless in the neoliberal economy, conceals the creative-class theory's problematic political economy.³⁸

As *The Rise of the Creative Class* faced a strong backlash from the Left and Right, Florida painted himself as a political independent and an enemy of the entrenched partisanship. For the Left the problem was economic: no matter how much stock Florida placed in the creativity of the working class and service sector, his theory lacked a plan to enhance the economic standing and workplace freedom of the masses serving creative elites. Given the increasing polarization of wealth and the creative-class model's obsession with consumption, this was a legitimate critique. Florida acknowledged, yet challenged, this criticism with an oft-repeated cautionary tale of his father, a longtime Newark factory worker, who long regretted his failure to follow his creative dream. Cultural intolerance—the senior Florida wished to cut and style hair—and “Taylorized” rigidity certainly stifled working-class creativity, but the creative-class lifestyle and landscape is overly dependent on unskilled service workers. Even if the retail and service sectors adopted the policies of corporate behemoth Best Buy—Florida's common example—and encouraged input from the floor staff on company policy, the working class would remain subservient to the whims of capital and consumers. Echoing Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology* (1962), Florida dismissed this critique as regressive, arguing that it clung to a neo-Marxist vision of economics that ignored the realities of the postindustrial creative economy. Florida stayed the course on his neoliberal message: nurture the creative economy and it will lift all boats.³⁹

In contrast, the Right's criticism, according to Florida, was cultural. “My theory of economic growth has generated considerable controversy. Social conservatives have gone apoplectic over my finding that places with high concentrations of gays and bohemians tend to have higher rates of innovation and economic growth.” He wrote of appearing on talk shows and facing questions regarding his sexuality and accusations of destroying “family values” if not “Judeo-Christian civilization.” Highlighting the views of a few intolerant conservatives provided a useful smokescreen for the creative-class theory's economic implications. With more and more Americans moving back into cities, Florida's research validated the increasing marginalization of racial, sexual, and religious intolerance. Diverse cities expanded, demonstrating that a majority of Americans were willing to live alongside citizens racially, ethnically, religiously, and sexually unlike themselves. Moreover, soothsayers of the dreadful urbanism have been around as long as cities, and will continue to decry urban life as long as it persists. Instead, cultural conservatives were convenient straw men providing a dubious balancing weight to the “partisan” economic critique, while concealing the fact that the libertarian Right failed to take issue with the political economy of creative-class planning. Florida's allusions to the inevitable decline of manufacturing and unions, his insistence on Jacobsesque organic urban rehabilitation and revitalization, his critique of the welfare state, his inability to

articulate a fair framework of service sector employment, and his arguments against the visible hand of municipal development all fit squarely within the vision of individual entrepreneurial freedom and privatization hailed by libertarians and neoliberals alike.

Seemingly immune to this criticism and awash in success, Florida set to work defending and popularizing the creative-class model, and reconfiguring the global economy to fit the mold of this new elite class. *The Flight of the Creative Class* (2005) recast the innovative arguments of his previous book for the international stage. In effect it functioned as a cautionary tale about a U.S. brain drain that paradoxically fused nationalism with globalization. Florida argued that the United States risked hemorrhaging talent to European and Oceanic upstarts like Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, and, closer to home, Canada—Toronto, of course, was the late home of Jacobs and the city that Florida’s creative entourage would decamp to in 2007. Ultimately, the book sought to secure the country’s position as leader in the neoliberal economy by reiterating the politically fluid themes of Florida’s earlier work—cultural tolerance combined with public-private partnerships that allow the creative economy to prosper with limited interference.⁴⁰

Just as *Rise of the Creative Class* retold *Death and Life* for the neoliberal age, *Flight of the Creative Class* relied heavily on the arguments Jacobs put forth in *The Economy of Cities*. Citing the Chicago School economist Robert Lucas, Florida insisted that cities, particularly dense urban areas, were more productive than low-density suburban areas because economies featuring exceptional creative energy grow exponentially when localized and consolidated. Lucas termed the augmenting function of cities “Jane Jacobs’s externalities,” arguing that “urbanization (and the density that accompanies it) is a key element of innovation and productivity growth.” Florida utilized this point in *Rise of the Creative Class* in order to spur innovation in economically ravaged U.S. cities, but in *Flight of the Creative Class* the message was more perilous. Since shortsighted municipal managers prevented the adaptation of his model, U.S. cities were destined to lose out to “global talent managers” (London, Amsterdam, Toronto, and Sydney) and “global Austins” (Bangalore, Tel Aviv, Singapore, and Taipei). According to Florida, the creative-class model resonated with these places as they tailored themselves to the global neoliberal economy. The argument was equal parts neoliberalism and neoconservatism, functioning as a call to salvage the declining U.S. economic empire.⁴¹

More than anything, Florida’s follow-up was an answer to the “squelchers”—a term borrowed straight from Jacobs—or “political, business, and civic leaders who divert and derail human creative energy by posing roadblocks, acting as gatekeepers, and saying no to new ideas, regardless of their merit.” For Florida’s neoliberal project to succeed, these political and economic leaders must commence investment aimed at the creative class—there is no time or room for critique, and their action is necessary. In the mythic struggle for postwar New York City, Robert Moses was the

classic squelcher. He name-called, blackmailed opponents, and stifled the debate whenever possible. Florida's squelchers may have included some civic leaders, but in reality the squelchers he cited were critics who, in the tradition of Jane Jacobs, raised serious questions concerning the viability of the creative-class model. In this sense, Florida subsumed the mantle of Moses by seeking to silence the voices of protest. Florida found squelchers limiting the inevitable transition from industrial and financial to creative and service economies, just as Moses once complained that people like Jacobs could not comprehend the future. With *Flight of the Creative Class* Florida appeared unwilling to debate the practical limits of his economic model.⁴²

Riding the tide of unprecedented economic growth in the 2000s, Florida also assumed the role of self-help guru for urban economic development—a Tony Robbins of the creativity group, proclaiming that inside each of us there is a creative person waiting to get out. Florida took this to an absurd level in his pre-recession volume, *Who's Your City?* (2008). Designed to help recent graduates and creative types choose their next place, the book attempted to keep the creative-class question relevant. Its publication prompted interviewer Charlie Rose to ask, “Don't you think we've milked [the creative class] for about as much as we can, Richard?” (To which Florida responded in his typical good-natured manner, “I hope not, Charlie. I hope not.”)⁴³ *Who's Your City?* recycled Florida's now redundant themes: the importance of place (“where?” is the most important question facing creative workers rather than “what” and “who with”); the creative sector dominates the current economy as it will in the future; the creative class's housing and transportation needs contrast with the desires of previous generations; a college education is invaluable if not essential for competing in the creative marketplace; neither political party understands the values of the creative class; labor is as fluid and mobile as global capital; and Jacobs's argument in *The Economy of Cities* is essential to our understanding of why place still matters and why cities are economic incubators.⁴⁴ In contrast to the academic boilerplate of previous writings, *Who's Your City?* spoke directly to the reader and functioned as a creative-class guide to the neoliberal galaxy.

Florida's innovative work in the past decade relied on the quantification of Jacobs's qualitative findings, fusing theories of place and economic development elucidated in *Death and Life* and *Economy of Cities*, and tapping into the zeitgeist of the neoliberal era. Armed with a marketer's template and a salesman's savvy, Florida was transformed by these three books into the most popular urban thinker since Jacobs. As head of the “Creative Class Group,” Florida leads a team of “next-generation thinkers” who are “developing pioneering strategies for business, government, and community competitiveness,” and personally commands upward of \$35,000 and high-end amenities for speaking engagements.⁴⁵ Languishing cities of the old industrial economy willingly paid, and government and business leaders—those who would make the requisite public-private partnerships required to attract the creative class—met with Florida and his team in cities like Cleveland,

Toledo, Baltimore, Greensboro, Green Bay, Des Moines, Hartford, and Rochester. Victims of urban renewal schemes in the fifties, sixties, and seventies, these cities tailored new infrastructure toward the creative class and initiated contemporary City Beautiful-like improvements such as branding neighborhoods and historic preservation. They also developed marketing campaigns advertising a commitment to social tolerance. As Harvey notes, in seeking to “create a good business climate”—so central to the neoliberal project—“the state assumes much of the risk while the private sector takes most of the profits.”⁴⁶ Indeed, Florida claims no responsibility as these locales continue to hemorrhage population and productive employment, insisting that he merely observes trends.

Monitoring the landscape, Florida has offered up a few model cities and techniques in recent years, including New York City, the initial urban laboratory of both Jacobs and Florida. Although Florida criticized Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s early tenure for being overly focused on top-down development (aimed at an ultimately failed Olympic bid), he has come around on the corporate-CEO-turned-politician.⁴⁷ Florida now holds Bloomberg, as well as Newark Mayor Cory Booker, as leadership models for ailing municipalities to follow. He is particularly fond of their ability to transcend political labels, noting that their work is “not ideologically driven; it’s about making the city work pragmatically.”⁴⁸ Florida lauded Bloomberg and the mayors of Chicago, Amsterdam, and London—cities with few problems adapting to global neoliberal trends—for “tak[ing] the lead on everything from new approaches to education, crime, gun control and smoking bans to environment and climate change—even bringing [*sic*] modern management techniques to government” (emphasis added).⁴⁹ Florida further argues that “growing a creative ecosystem is an organic process,” and that each place features unique assets that will allow it to grow organically. Shunning concrete and translatable policy recommendations and adhering to this “no one-size-fits-all” corollary, Florida insists that loosely defined creative management techniques—running the gamut from regulatory policy (e.g., smoking bans and environmental planning) to public-private partnerships (e.g., “new approaches” to education)—will solve urban woe.⁵⁰ Such recommendations are hardly a road map and do little to change the fact that Florida literally sells his model as replicable in the marketplace of economic development strategy.⁵¹

Conclusion: Florida’s Great Reset and the Neoliberal Fix

In 2008, the bottom fell out of the U.S. economy, sending the country and the globe into an economic depression that it has grappled with since. As it turned out, U.S. economic supremacy was not built on a foundation of limitless technological innovation, but rather a house of cards wrought by a socially intolerant financial sector and its creative manipulations. In his most recent book, *The Great Reset* (2010), Florida fails to recognize his own culpability in the decade’s market surge (e.g., the “creativity” of derivatives traders, the creative class’s obsession with overpriced

housing in chic urban neighborhoods, the futility of industrial production, or the risky investments on the part of entrepreneurs and civic guardians desperately trying to adapt to the creative wave). While noncreative workers bear the brunt of the Great Recession, it is hard to deny that Florida's creative-class cheerleading played at least a small part in the crash. Either that, or the collapse proved Florida's theory wrong—perhaps creativity and the creative class had nothing to do with unprecedented economic growth witnessed in the 2000s. Perhaps the creative-class model was just a ruse after all, obscuring the continued dominance of the market by the decidedly uncreative financial, insurance, and real estate sector of the economy.

The Great Reset represents a distinct turn in the creative-class model's relationship with the state, but Florida remains headstrong in the belief that investing in creative infrastructure is the ticket to economic salvation. Once a prophet, he now colors himself a historian, likening the current economic crisis to the great crashes of the 1870s and 1930s. In each case, he notes, a "spatial fix" transformed the way Americans lived. It follows, then, that "the great reset" will result in its own spatial fix. Oddly, Florida borrows the term from David Harvey who, as one critic points out, "coined the phrase in the 1970s to describe the physical manifestations of capitalism, globalization, and neoliberalism."⁵² As Harvey argues, "globalization is the contemporary version of capitalism's long-standing and never-ending search for a spatial fix to its crisis tendencies."⁵³ The allusion to a junkie's "fix" was intentional, but Florida corrupts the idiom and applies his own "to put right again" meaning, and thus ignores Harvey's point that neoliberal global expansion, led by the United States, is merely capitalism's most recent adjustment to its many failures. Suggesting that the "Great Reset will likewise take shape around a new economic landscape and a whole new way of life that is in line with the emerging economic and social realities of our time," Florida misappropriates the macroeconomic term to talk about spatial microeconomics.⁵⁴

Florida envisions an altered post-depression landscape, akin to the dramatic rise of the suburbs after World War II and the Great Depression, but resulting from neoliberal policies rather than a proactive welfare state. According to Florida, home ownership, given its place in the crash, will become less important. The government, he insists, will play a limited role, because change does not "result from top-down policy or programs, though government can encourage or discourage them by what it does or does not do." At the same time, the state should be streamlined and parceled off into public-nonprofit partnerships, because "having taught public policy students for the better part of three decades, I've seen a long-running trend away from traditional government work, which many young people perceive as overly hierarchical and bureaucratic." According to Florida, "public service- and cause-oriented students tend to gravitate toward smaller-scale, more flexible nonprofits, where they believe they can have more immediate impact." Undoubtedly, this change has resulted from an increasingly poor image of government function

and employment in the past three decades by the likes of Jacobs and Florida, among other neoliberals, libertarians, and neoconservatives. More importantly, policy students continue to be steered in that direction by professors situated along the increasingly blurry line between business school and schools of public policy (e.g., Florida was once a PhD student in urban planning, now he is a professor of “Business and Creativity”).⁵⁵

Politically and economically, *The Great Reset* is fluid to the point of contradiction, which says something about the place of the creative-class model in the postcrash economy. Florida insists that top-down policy will not work, yet calls for a new New Deal—that is, the salvaging-capitalism element of the New Deal. Although the state is not a panacea, he implies that its partnership, in neoliberal terms, with free enterprise can provide the fix necessary to end the recession. His recommendations include a greater investment in education and transforming federal mortgage policies, and he makes one policy proposal—albeit one borrowed directly from the Obama administration—suggesting that a high-speed rail system *could* salvage Rust Belt cities by making long-distance commuting more feasible and place seemingly less important.⁵⁶ Indeed, high-speed rail—already sabotaged by radical “tea-party” governors—would provide employment for areas ravaged by unemployment, maintain vital tax-bases, and likely spur economic development in Rust Belt communities. But *The Great Reset’s* inherent contradictions speak to Florida’s own junkie-like fix, so wedded as he is to urban neoliberalism and the creative-class model’s relevance.

This ultimately speaks to the major problem with Florida’s theories, if not Jacobs’s: the lack of progressive vision and the lack of a sustainable, replicable model for urban economic development. The two theorists shared much in common: both used cities, and urban form in particular, to talk about economic development, and their progressive social and cultural politics mask their more potent economic politics. Each managed to tap into their respective zeitgeist, and while they are brilliant and truly innovative thinkers, their theories, though grounded in pragmatism, have failed to translate effortlessly across space and place. Jacobs and Florida specialized in observation, examining how cities work and economies develop, but they failed to provide a coherent and adaptable vision for said development. Instead they couched their conclusions in catchwords that put the onus on communities rather than themselves. In the end, community development and creative development functioned and continue to function as convenient facades for old-fashioned capitalist creative destruction, ensuring the accommodation of the expanding global neoliberal economy with great social costs. Indeed, revealing the fluid politics and market-driven approach to urban redevelopment and economic development within the works of Florida, especially, clarifies the oft-confusing web of neoliberal thought and policy at the local level.

While Jacobs and Florida deserve credit for highlighting the vibrant and

dynamic life of the city in the face of unmitigated sprawl and narratives of urban decline, the time has come for a reexamination or reconsideration of their work, if not a reassessment of the planning profession and its purpose in the twenty-first century. As neoliberal networks of private capital work with the state to ensure their mutual interests, the lower orders will continue to suffer and sacrifice the social justice once found in great U.S. cities. In the realm of planning there is a need for a coherent vision ensuring that citizens from all walks of life continue to participate in the street ballet that Jacobs adored—not simply service the whims of elite ballet participants. These citizens, as well as the state, must be empowered to enact change that enhances their interests, even at the expense of private capital. As noted, urban theorists have presented visions of a more just and democratic city that seeks to do just that, empowering the lower and working classes to shape urban experience; these theorists simply lack the profile of Richard Florida.⁵⁷ These are steps toward a more fair, vibrant, and truly liberating urban vision, one for which Jacobs and Florida provided no master plan.

Notes

1. See Jane Jacobs, “The City: Some Myths About Diversity,” in *Did You Ever See a Dream Walking?* *American Conservative Thought in the Twentieth Century*, ed. William F. Buckley Jr. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 338–54. For more on Buckley’s fondness for Jacobs, see: Robert Fishman, *Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); and Anthony Flint, *Wrestling with Moses: How Jane Jacobs Took on New York’s Master Builder and Transformed the American City* (New York: Random House, 2009).
2. On the question of equity and the practice of historic preservation, see, for example: Shanita Anderheggen, “Four Decades of Local Historic District Designation: A Case Study of Newport, Rhode Island,” *The Public Historian* 32 (2010): 16–32.
3. David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2–3.
4. *Ibid.*, 44–45. Examinations of neoliberalism in New York City during this period include: Robert Fitch, *The Assassination of New York* (New York: Verso, 1993); Kim Moody, *From Welfare State to Real Estate: Regime Change in New York, 1974 to the Present* (New York: New Press, 2007); and Jonathan Soffer, *Ed Koch and the Rebuilding of New York City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
5. On public-private partnerships and their place in U.S. urban history see Gregory D. Squires, “Partnership and the Pursuit of the Private City,” in *Urban Life in Transition*, ed. Mark Gottdiener and Chris Pickvance (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1991), 123–40.
6. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 47–48.
7. William F. Buckley Jr., “Contemporary Challenges and the Social Order,” in Buckley, *Did You Ever See a Dream Walking?* 213–20; and Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).
8. Robert Caro, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (New York: Vintage Books, 1975); Fred J. Cook and Gene Gleason, “The Shame of New York,” *Nation*, October 31, 1959, 261–321. See also: James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

9. Hilary Ballon and Kenneth T. Jackson, eds., *Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).
10. Samuel Zipp, *Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in the Cold War* (New York: Oxford USA, 2010).
11. Flint, *Wrestling With Moses*; Stephen A. Goldsmith and Lynne Elizabeth, eds., *What We See: Advancing the Observations of Jane Jacobs* (Oakland, CA: New Village Press, 2010); Roberta Brandes Gratz, *The Battle for Gotham: New York in the Shadow of Robert Moses and Jane Jacobs* (New York: Nation Books, 2010); Michael Sorkin, *Twenty Minutes in Manhattan* (New York: Reaktion Books, 2010); Sharon Zukin, *Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places* (New York: Oxford, 2010). In a rather scathing review of Flint's *Wrestling With Moses*, Samuel Zipp called it "something of a cut-and-paste affair, owing much to Robert Caro's biography," situating Jacobs—all but absent in *The Power Broker*—in the narrative of Moses's downfall. See: Samuel Zipp, "Living for the City," *Nation*, April 5, 2010, 33–36.
12. The Rockefeller Foundation, "Jane Jacobs Medal," www.rockefellerfoundation.org/what-we-do/where-we-work/new-york-city/jane-jacobs-medal (accessed March 28, 2011).
13. SDS's notion of participatory democracy was inherently tied to urban problems and community development, particularly in underserved black neighborhoods languishing in the early urban crisis. SDS, "The Port Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society, 1962," www.h-net.org/~hst306/documents/huron.html (accessed March 28, 2011). *The Exploding Metropolis*, which Jacobs contributed to, served as a moderate critique of urban renewal policy at a time when few critics were willing to offer one. While the grassroots groundswell against urban renewal intensified throughout the 1950s, Jacobs's and William H. Whyte's considerations of the design problems as well as problems with the implementation of the policy in the late 1950s were relatively fresh in the realm of criticism. The Editors of *Fortune*, eds., *The Exploding Metropolis: A Study of the Assault on Urbanism and How Our Cities Can Resist It* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958). Martin Anderson critiqued the federal government's involvement in the remaking of U.S. cities. Anderson's work highlighted the costs and benefits of the program for U.S. taxpayers and certainly served as an influential text for the burgeoning libertarian Right of the era. Martin Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer: Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964).
14. Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*, revised ed. (New York: Bantam, 1993). On the collaboration of corporate power to alter the nature of the postwar economy, see Kim Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009).
15. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 42.
16. Perhaps the most pragmatic discussion of this shift is in architectural history. See Robert A. M. Stern, Thomas Mellins, and David Fishman, *New York 1960: Architecture and Urbanism between the Second World War and the Bicentennial* (New York: Monacelli Press, 1995).
17. Flint, *Wrestling With Moses*, 4–20.
18. On gentrification and urban pioneers, see Neil Smith, "Gentrification, the Frontier and the Restructuring of Urban Space," in *Gentrification of the City*, ed. Neil Smith and Peter Williams (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986).
19. These struggles govern the narrative of Flint, *Wrestling With Moses*.
20. *Ibid.*, 18–26. William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956).

21. Jane Jacobs, "Downtown Is for People," in Editors of *Fortune*, *The Exploding Metropolis*, 145–46. On Victor Gruen, see M. Jeffrey Hardwick, *Mall Maker: Victor Gruen, Architect of an American Dream* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). On Daniel Burnham and the City Beautiful movement, see Richard E. Foglesong, *Planning the Capitalist City: The Colonial Era to the 1920s* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
22. Sorkin, *Twenty Minutes in Manhattan*; Zukin, *Naked City*.
23. Jacobs, "Downtown Is for People."
24. Le Corbusier, *The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning* (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1929); Fishman, *Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century*.
25. Jacobs, *Death and Life*, 23, 15. Writing two years later, but from the perspective of a conservative academic economist, Martin Anderson also noticed the message of modernist design: "These buildings symbolize the progress of the urban renewal program, and in most cases they are the main justification for it. The city planners, the mayors, the urban renewal officials, and others connected with urban renewal can all point their fingers toward the material masses rising skyward and say, 'Look, I helped destroy the slum and built that'" (emphasis added). Anderson, *The Federal Bulldozer*, 91.
26. Jacobs, *Death and Life*.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Jane Jacobs, *The Economy of Cities* (New York: Random House, 1969), 36, 129.
29. There is an extensive historiography of the urban crisis, but the following offer a primer on the political economy and culture of the period: Robert A. Beauregard, *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003); Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit*, Princeton Classic ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
30. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 47.
31. David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 78; Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, vol. 1 of *The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2000), 77.
32. Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 5; Castells, *The Rise of Network Society*, 409–416.
33. Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class . . . And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
34. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 69.
35. David Brooks, *Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There* (New York: Touchstone, 2001); Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*; Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
36. Quotes from: Susan S. Fainstein, "New Directions in Planning Theory," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 35 (2000): 451–78. See also: Susan S. Fainstein, *The Just City* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010). On social justice and the city see: David Harvey, "Social Justice, Postmodernism and the City," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 16 (1992): 588–601; David Harvey, "The Right to the City," *New Left Review*, no. 53 (2008): 23–40. On the "right to the city" see: Henri Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities*, trans. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (New York: Blackwell, 1995). For an excellent overview of contemporary theory and practice regarding the just city see: Peter Marcuse et al., eds., *Searching for the Just City: Debates in Urban Theory and Practice* (New York:

- Routledge, 2009), which features contributions from Susan Fainstein, David Harvey, and Peter Marcuse, among others.
37. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 42.
 38. Richard Florida, *The Flight of the Creative Class* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 41–42. The description of the Creative Class Group comes from Creative Class, “Meet the Team,” creativeclass.com/creative_class_group/team/ (accessed March 28, 2011).
 39. Paul Maliszewski, “Flexibility and Its Discontents,” *Baffler*, no. 16 (2004): 69–79. For an example of this critique see the “Creative Class Debate” series from *Next American City*. Issue 7, “Kids and Cities,” *Next American City*, January 2005, americancity.org/magazine/issue/107/.
 40. Florida, *The Flight of the Creative Class*, 38.
 41. *Ibid.*
 42. Richard Florida, “The Great Creative Class Debate: Revenge of the Squelchers,” *Next American City*, July 2004, americancity.org/magazine/article/the-great-creative-class-debate-revenge-of-the-squelchers-florida/.
 43. Quoted in Alec MacGillis, “The Ruse of the Creative Class,” *American Prospect*, January 4, 2010, 12–16.
 44. Richard Florida, *Who’s Your City? How the Creative Economy Is Making Where to Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
 45. Details of Florida’s speaking fees come from MacGillis, “The Ruse of the Creative Class.”
 46. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 77.
 47. For this critique of Bloomberg see: Jonathan Mandell, “Is New York the Cultural Capital of the World?” *Gotham Gazette*, October 2005, www.gothamgazette.com/article/arts/20051020/1/1624.
 48. Quoted from interview transcript at Big Think, “Upgrading Power People,” bigthink.com/ideas/18243 (accessed March 28, 2011).
 49. Creative Class Group, “Articles,” May 2008, www.creativeclass.com/rfcgdb/articles/Richard%20Florida.pdf.
 50. Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, xx-xxiii.
 51. On the tremendous influence and application of creative-class strategy in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, see: Jeffrey Zimmerman, “From Brew Town to Cool Town: Neoliberalism and the Creative City Development Strategy in Milwaukee,” *Cities* 25 (2008): 230–42.
 52. Greg Lindsay, “Richard Florida’s Creative Destruction, Spatial Fix and the Great Reset,” *Fast Company*, May 5, 2010, www.fastcompany.com/1637457/richard-floridas-creative-destruction.
 53. David Harvey, “Globalization and the ‘Spatial Fix,’” *geographische revue*, no. 2 (2001): 23–30.
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 56. *Ibid.*
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