Migrant Transnational Participation: How Citizen Inclusion and Government Engagement Matter for Local Democratic Development in Mexico

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Abstract
Contemporary debates on the relationship between migration and development focus extensively on how migrant remittances affect the economies of sending countries. Yet remittances also produce dynamic political consequences in migrants’ origin communities. Income earned abroad creates political opportunities for migrant groups to participate in the provision of public services in their hometowns. Focusing on organizational variation in partnerships across time and space, this article examines the conditions under which the transnational coproduction of public goods between organized migrants and public agencies at origin shapes democratic governance. I argue that local citizen inclusion and government engagement interact to determine four different types of coproduction: corporatist, fragmented, substitutive, and synergetic. Using four comparative case studies based on fieldwork in three Mexican states, I trace central mechanisms to organizational forms of coproduction and describe how emergent variation affects democratic governance and state–society relations. I show how transnational forces, when collaborating with local social and political institutions, can profoundly affect democratic development.

Keywords
international migration, democracy, development, political participation, Mexico

Throughout the “third wave” of democratization, many countries across the globe decentralized authority to lower tiers of government to provide public goods more efficiently and effectively to the citizenry. In emerging representative democracies, decentered authority to local government, sometimes coupled with competitive elections, putatively makes local government more responsive to citizens’ needs and preferences (Bird 1993; Blair 2000; Oates 1972). The unevenness with which decentralization and democratization spreads across space and time in a political system, though, often results in under-provision of public services and citizen disengagement; political authorities have more resources and autonomy...
for social spending, but public institutions are frequently besieged by entrenched patron-client networks and corruption, blunting the efficacy of elections as formal instruments of political accountability (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Besley and Coate 2003; Bohlken 2016; Falleti 2005; Giraudy 2010; Grindle 2007; Larson and Ribot 2004; Ndegwa and Levy 2004; Smith and Revell 2016).

This disjuncture has prompted researchers to assess the transformative potential of new institutional arrangements for deepening local democracy and improving development outcomes for the citizenry. This research finds that strengthening direct forms of citizen voice leads to more participatory decision-making and social mechanisms of citizen control (Baiocchi 2001; Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Ruiz-Euler 2014; Fox and Aranda 1996; Fung and Wright 2003; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2000; Wampler 2007). Emphasizing a more active notion of citizenship, Gaventa (2004:29) argues that harnessing citizen agency through the use of local knowledge and resources leads to citizens becoming “makers and shapers” rather than simply “users and choosers” of services designed by others. Studies of citizen participation in democracy also find greater inclusion produces more equity and efficiency in public service delivery (Ackerman 2004; Evans 1996; Goldfrank 2011; McNulty 2011; Ostrom 1996; Pritchett and Woolcock 2004; Tendler 1997). Increasing civic and political engagement may not be enough though. Another strand of research highlights how improving institutional design in tandem with more citizen involvement brings about a more responsive state apparatus (Evans 1996; Heller 2001). Creating new spaces for interactions between citizens and the state has, in some conditions, improved the quality of democracy and government performance (Cleary 2010; Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Grindle 2007).

But what happens to processes of governance when extraterritorial citizens and their voluntary associations participate in core functions of the state, such as public goods provision? As labor migrations continue apace, and people, capital, and information move across territorial borders, how does migrant participation in local development affect state–society relations? International migration provides many immigrants a modicum of social mobility, allowing them to send a portion of their savings home to family and friends through migrant remittances. Migration is also a social process: migrant networks aid the formation of “little colonies” of immigrants from the same place of origin (Fitzgerald 2008; Massey et al. 1987).

For some migrants, this concentration of paisanos in the destination country provides opportunities to organize and participate in hometown associations (HTAs). HTAs are voluntary civic associations, based on shared membership in a common place of origin, that send collective remittances to invest in development projects back home (Alarcón 2002; Faist 2008; Fox and Bada 2008; Goldring 1998; Moya 2005; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Trager 2001). Mobilizing remittances from outside the territorial polity to collectively engage in public goods provision, migrant social groups are participating as active members of the political community despite exit. More than simply acting as a safety valve, international migration can shift the nature of state–society interactions and democratic governance.

Despite a large literature studying migration and development, we still know very little about how organized migrants participate in and affect local democracy through development initiatives. Global remittances sent through formal channels reached $581 billion in 2014, so it is not surprising that analysts have examined the effects of remittances on poverty, economic growth, and income inequality, as well as their role in mitigating the adverse effects of economic shocks and natural disasters (Adams and Page 2005; Kapur 2004; World Bank 2014; Yang 2011). The growing body of sociological and political science research that does assess political consequences marshals evidence for both “good” and “bad” effects on democracy (Burgess 2005; Fox and Bada 2008; Goldring 1998; Levitt 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Portes 1999; Smith 2006). This influential
research has brought the political effects of emigration into sharper focus, but we still lack work that theorizes and examines the conditions under which migrant cross-border participation is more likely to yield democratic development. This article moves beyond focusing on how much remittance money is sent to attend to the range of ways that relations between migrants, political authorities, and local residents are upended, complicated, reinforced, and improved by the collective action of migrant social groups—groups whose ability to act collectively is materially conditioned by access to resources earned abroad, but rooted and shaped by the local social-institutional context in which projects are carried out.

I analyze migrant hometown development through a coproduction framework and a process-oriented approach. Coproduction refers to complementary inputs contributed by public and private actors to coordinate and supply public goods in collaboration (Evans 1996; Ostrom 1996). Most coproduction research studies domestic agents, but I look beyond the territorial nation-state to reveal how migrant and political actors organize service provision across the transnational public–private divide. The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants, a federal social spending program that matches the collective remittances of migrant HTAs at the local, state, and federal levels of government for local public goods provision, provides a fruitful avenue for studying transnational coproduction processes. I analyze how and why transnational coproduction organizationally varies across space and time and assess how the emergent variation produces distinct political outcomes in four municipalities in the Mexican states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Zacatecas. I selected the comparative cases from a nationally representative original survey of Mexican HTAs; I then conducted fieldwork to explore each of these cases in the United States and Mexico between 2009 and 2011.

In emerging democracies like Mexico, where local bureaucracies frequently lack capacity and institutional memory, and civil society has been anaesthetized by long periods of authoritarian rule, there is skepticism that democratic governance can do anything, even if most everyone favors democracy (Young 2000). This study highlights how transnational collective action creates new venues for the articulation and practice of civic and political participation. So often, as Schmitter (2004) notes, dimensions of democratic quality in countries undergoing or recently experiencing transition are analyzed according to the best practices of consolidated or advanced democracies instead of standard benchmarks. This study brings to light how actually existing local democracies function during periods in which inclusiveness and contestation are in flux (Dahl 1971), and how globalizing processes like international migration affect local democratic practices in dynamic and unintended ways.

This research identifies a paradox at the heart of exercising “voice” and “exit” simultaneously (Fox and Bada 2008; Hirschman 1978). This paradox should temper expectations about the frequency and longevity of achieving empowered participatory governance or participatory development via migrant remittance-led development. Because migrants participate in hometown public life largely in absentia, lack of social and spatial proximity constrict their ability to effectively negotiate preexisting political structures and systems of social relations. Additionally, local state institutions often lack the capacity, and local government the incentives, to engage in coproduction in ways that support embeddedness between state, migrant, and local actors. Exit, and the remittance resources that endow migrants’ access to local authorities and bargaining leverage beyond borders, differentially amplify the voices of organized migrant groups and members of their social network, sometimes crowding out local citizens’ voice. Findings show how different organizational forms of coproduction are politically consequential for democratic governance, revealing important implications for local democratic quality in countries like Mexico, where asymmetrical democratization and decentralization often go hand-in-glove.
EXTANT LITERATURE

The large and growing migrant transnational-ism literature has pushed researchers to grapple with the effects of migrants’ dual connections and loyalties spanning origin and destination (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999). These studies bring to light manifold economic, social, cultural, and political consequences of migrant cross-border engagement linking home and host state (Durand, Massey, and Parrado 1996; Levitt 2001; Smith 2006; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Ongoing research studies how and why HTAs form, their organizational structures, their locations (across the globe), their partnerships with governments, and the social and development effects of remittances (Duquette-Rury 2014; Fitzgerald 2008; Goldberg 2002; Iskander 2010; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Moya 2005).

However, the impact of development projects funded in part or full by collective remittances on democratic governance in origin countries receives much less attention. What we know suggests that migrant engagement in community development has democratizing effects when migrant groups demand higher political standards from authorities (Fox and Bada 2008; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Portes 1999). Ethnographic research shows that HTA development projects make communities better at solving problems and introduce fiercer political competition (Levitt 2001; Smith 2006); other case-based research contends that HTAs can induce government accountability (Bada 2014; Burgess 2005). Some research, however, arrives at more pessimistic conclusions. Studies find HTAs often work at cross-purposes with the state and local citizens (Mazzucato and Kabki 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Waldinger, Popkin, and Magana 2008) and engage in coproduction to maximize electoral payoff (Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Meseguer and Aparicio 2012; Simpser et al. 2016).

The inability of this literature to adequately account for the conditions under which migrant transnational engagement produces more positive (or negative) political effects is perhaps due to two issues. First, the focus on single cases for exploratory theory and confirmatory analysis cannot observe or test how myriad factors affect public–private partnerships differentially. This work has advanced our collective understanding of migrant–state development efforts, but comparative analysis is often better suited to isolate and contrast factors that influence the nature of public–private partnerships and catalyze political dynamics in diverse hometown settings.

Second, when research does capture variation posited to affect coproduction outcomes, the focus has been on either the political institutional contexts or social factors, without consideration of how political and social contexts work in tandem to organize coproduction. Because development projects are public goods designed to improve the social welfare of local residents, they require at least some government involvement, most often subnational levels of government in decentralized systems like Mexico. Substantial local state capacity may suffice for the successful implementation of coproduction projects with migrant groups, but democratic development through coproduction depends not only on the actions of local officials, but also on migrants’ social bases. Migrants participate largely outside the territorial polity, so recruitment of local citizens and civil society groups into coproduction activities is based either on migrants’ existing social ties or social ties are constructed through a process of social learning.

Yet governments’ capacity and willingness to interact with migrant groups, who are no longer subject to sending-state control, receives scant theoretical attention (for exceptions, see Fitzgerald 2006; Lacroix 2014). Additionally, public goods decisions made between state and migrant actors may not be compatible with the preferences of local citizens, who are not passive recipients of public projects, but agents with a stake in both the democratic process (their voices being heard) and development outcomes (policies directly affect their quality of life). Research must also analyze local residents’ agency in the coproduction process, in conjunction with the political institutional factors shaping local...
state officials engagement in collaborative service provision. This article does just that.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Building on previous research, I offer a comparative framework for understanding pathways through which coproduction varies organizationally. In the spirit of Dahl (1971) and Koopmans and colleagues (2005), I conceive of transnational coproduction as a conceptual space in which to situate different actors and social and political institutions and trace processes over time. Figure 1 represents a conceptual space in which community inclusion (horizontal axis) and government engagement (vertical axis) intersect at different, and temporally variable, levels along the two dimensions. The two conceptual dimensions of coproduction are dynamic, as are the interactions between different sets of agents (migrant groups, political officials, local citizens, and citizen groups). It is this dynamism—this variation—within the conceptual dimensions that we must empirically investigate.

Different combinations of community inclusion and government engagement yield coproduction “types” identified in the four quadrants of Figure 1. When inclusion and engagement are high (quadrant I), I call this synergetic coproduction. Synergetic coproduction is characterized by cooperative engagement between migrant HTAs, local government, and local citizens. All groups collaborate to coordinate projects, including deliberation over project selection, implementation, and oversight. This organizational form is associated with more civic and political engagement of the citizenry, plural interest representation, and government responsiveness as citizens, migrants, and political officials become embedded in a network of project participation.

By contrast, when both indicators are low (quadrant III), fragmented coproduction emerges. This form is inherently vulnerable to co-optation by the state, and in some instances the HTA. The exclusion (intentional or unintentional) of local residents and low government engagement, coupled with migrants’ interrupted presence or physical absence from the hometown during project activities, often leads to project mismanagement, appropriation of funds, and ultimate failure. Fragmented coproduction is often associated with a worsening of state–society relations and a decline in citizen trust and engagement in local political life.5
I present two additional intermediary cases in which either inclusion or engagement is low (or high) along the continuum of the conceptual axes: corporatist coproduction (quadrant II) and substitutive coproduction (quadrant IV). In corporatist coproduction, high government engagement but low citizen inclusion links migrants’ organized interests directly with local government’s interests. Cooperative relations between HTAs and local governments grant HTAs privileged access to political officials to set the local public agenda. When migrants’ preferences for public goods predominate, the unequal distribution of resources toward migrant- and state-preferred public projects crowd out the voices of residents with a stake in development decisions. Corporatist coproduction is associated with two pathways to affect local democracy—political disengagement or short-run political activism.

Finally, substitutive coproduction refers to low government engagement and high community inclusion. In substitutive coproduction, local government provides some, albeit minimal, complementary inputs to public projects. Because co-financing from other levels of government (state and federal) accompanies 3x1 Program participation, higher tiers of government and migrant HTAs subsidize local government provision. HTAs in coordination with local citizens and citizen groups complete the lion’s share of project selection, planning, and implementation, leaving local government largely off the hook for service provision. In substitutive coproduction, government responsiveness will likely wane as HTAs, citizens, and state and federal co-financing partners subsidize local public works. It is important to stress that coproduction cases are often situated at other points along the conceptual continuum; these hybrid cases are likely more common than the stark characterizations presented here. The four cases I analyze reflect extreme combinations of inclusion and engagement in theoretically relevant, exemplary cases.

Local Democratic Governance
Not all forms of political participation are equally effective in conveying information or exacting pressure on government (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). By political participation, I mean activities that have the intent or effect of influencing government action, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies (Verba et al. 1995). Different kinds of voice differentially affect government responsiveness, so it matters not only how citizens take part, but also which citizens’ voices are being heard and which are being muted. Collective remittances, enabled by exit from the place of origin, endow migrant citizens with the motivation and capacity to be politically active. But migrants also possess access to social recruitment networks that can forge links between citizens and local government.

Coproduction creates new dynamic spaces for negotiations over project selection, budgeting, distribution, and implementation (Evans 1996). This dynamic space for information and resource exchange transforms not only migrant–state relations, but also local citizens’ interactions with migrants and the state via project collaborations. These iterative interactions shape citizens’ political interests and engagement in the local democratic system, as well as government responsiveness to the needs and preferences of the citizenry. Migrant–state coproduction processes are not the only interactions between state and society that matter for political engagement. Rather, I argue that coproduction is an additional mechanism that deserves systematic attention. As research shows in the Mexican case, institutional context can create (dis)incentives for citizens to become involved in politics. Specifically, this affects collaborative decision-making between local government and constituent groups, including indigenous forms of direct participatory governance called usos y costumbres (traditions and customs) and demand-based poverty alleviation through the National Solidarity Program (Pronasol) (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2014; Fox and Aranda 1996; Hiskey 2003; Holzner 2010).

Community Inclusion
Migrants’ social connections and attachments to their hometowns do not automatically confer membership in the social collective, even
as they use resources, time, and energy to support the improvement of a place where they no longer physically reside (Waldinger 2015). Residents, however, live in a spatially bound geography, which ascribes and recognizes their status as members regardless of their political participation. Migrants’ participation after exit has a complicated legitimacy: their preferences are sometimes put forward without recognized equal membership in their hometown. Migrants’ social connections motivate remittance sending, which in turn does important “relational work” by conveying strong and meaningful indicators of attachment to people and place (Zelizer and Tilly 2006). Collective remittances then alter the organization of power and wealth (Goldring 1998), making audible and amplifying certain voices in decision-making over public goods and services.

Migrants’ social bases inform the degree of community inclusion in transnational coproduction and reflect which citizens’ voices are articulated to the local government. By community, I am referring to local, non-migrant citizens living in locales benefitting from coproduction projects. Inclusion, in this context, denotes the extent to which non-migrant residents are integrated into the coproduction process with migrant and government agents. Public goods decisions are not binding on migrants; if local citizens, who must abide by coproduction decisions, are not included in the coproduction process in meaningful ways, they may not perceive the outcomes as legitimate (Young 2000). Exit provides the opportunity for migrants to organize collectively and amass remittances for use in hometown development, but it also creates contestation with local residents over public goods priorities and resources.

Community participation in coproduction activities—selecting, volunteering, monitoring, and donating labor and resources to projects—most often draws from migrants’ close circle of familiars (family and close friends), as these social ties create trust and reciprocity between migrants and non-migrants at home. Migrants’ physical distance from their hometown exacerbates social distance to the community writ large. Social ties to friends, family, neighbors, acquaintances, and community leaders attenuate the longer one is away, as does information about town affairs. Transnational coproduction occurs in this system of social relations, despite being organized from outside the polity. As such, it is more likely to be effective, especially in poorer communities, when it draws on local assets, including social institutions, elites, and infrastructures (Cohen 2002). Migrants must often go beyond their immediate social circles to recruit residents to participate in coproduction decisions that affect the entire community’s quality of life.

**Government Engagement**

The degree to which local government engages in coproduction through project selection, planning, technical support, labor, and quality control varies. Three distinct but related factors affect local government engagement. First, local state capacity (resources, expertise, and professionalism) determines political officials’ ability to provide complementary inputs to coproduction. Local state capacity thus captures the organizational competence of local officials. Second, the distribution of societal interests and the articulation of those interests into public policy preferences help determine the degree to which local political officials will be interested in engaging coproduction projects. In democratic systems with multiparty elections, government officials’ incentives to cooperate with HTAs are shaped by local electoral incentives. Finally, because local elections occur every three years in Mexico, regular political party turnover will likely make coproduction arrangements established in prior periods transitory.

Both demand- and supply-side factors help explain the degree to which local government engages in transnational coproduction projects. On the supply side, government contributions to coproduction are shaped by local budget constraints as well as the training and professionalism of local government officials and staff (Ziblatt 2008). Government engagement suffers if local officials do not have the training and skills to provide technical plans and organize project budgets, or the ability to
maintain authority and provide security in their political territory. In short, government engagement in coproduction is more likely in political contexts where local government has *infrastructural power* (Mann 1984). When analyzing sending states’ experiences with mass migration, explaining variation in local government engagement in coproduction necessitates a description of the “real and effective authority” of the government and treating local state capacity as a “variable to be evaluated, rather than a property to be assumed” (Pearlman 2014:41).

On the demand side, societal preferences for public goods aggregate through elections in representative democracies. As recent research shows, the relationship between electoral competition and public service provision is quite mixed (Cleary 2010; Hiskey 2003; Moreno-Jaimes 2007). Electoral competition has become fiercer with subnational democratization, but local incumbents and political parties interested in electoral victory choose different strategies: programmatic spending on public goods to win over swing voters, or targeted spending through patron–client ties to reward core supporters (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni 2016). Research suggests a political bias in coproduction partnerships: regardless of a locality’s objective social welfare needs, local officials are more likely to participate in the 3x1 Program in partisan strongholds than in places with more contested elections. Officials are also more likely to time their disbursements with the election cycle (Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Meseguer and Aparicio 2012; Simpser et al. 2016). According to this logic, we should expect more government engagement in less competitive municipalities, because incumbents use coproduction as a strategy to exchange public infrastructure for political support from their loyal base, provided they have the local state capacity to fulfill their obligations to public–private partnerships. Moreover, government engagement in coproduction should wax and wane across election cycles.

The framework I present allows me to link recurrent causal mechanisms whose combinations produce distinct organizational forms of coproduction (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). The typological theorizing traces the pathways through which transnational coproduction produces consequences for local governance and describes when distinct pathways yield similar outcomes.9 Certainly, other factors are important to coproduction processes, including migrants’ length of stay in the United States, ecological features of the destination locale (e.g., membership size), network dynamics, proximity of HTAs to other clubs and the Mexican Consulate, membership in state-level federations, and the internal structure of club decision-making. All of these vary across coproduction cases. The point is not that other factors are irrelevant, but rather that they do not straightforwardly affect configurations of coproduction and are likely contingent on how HTAs are situated in the hometown community and the nature of the local state apparatus (Staniland 2014).10 Migrant HTAs’ ability to overcome the challenges inherent to collective action from abroad hinges on community inclusion and government engagement.

However, the level of HTA involvement may have consequential effects that deserve special attention, especially if changes in HTA involvement have ramifications for the degree of citizen inclusion and government engagement. One could imagine that the degree of HTA involvement is conditioned, in part, by the size of the U.S. destination membership base, which has corollary effects on fundraising ability and a club’s internal organizational structure. HTAs with more extensive membership bases may be more involved, because they can draw on a greater number of heterogeneous social ties at origin. Additionally, HTAs with more resources to invest in public works or that are part of club–state federations with links directly to state-level political officials may encourage more government engagement by leveraging bargaining power over municipal authorities.11 The level of HTA involvement is relatively constant across the four cases presented, but this factor likely varies across and within coproduction cases over time and warrants more consideration in future research.
EMPIRICAL METHODS, DATA SOURCES, AND CASE SELECTION

Mexico provides a rich terrain to observe the effects of transnational coproduction on local governance for several reasons. First, as discussed earlier, democratization occurred unevenly across Mexico, ushering in competitive elections in some places and leaving authoritarian enclaves in others. Local electoral context provides varying incentives for government engagement, so it is important to explore how variation in electoral context influences outcomes.

Second, decentralization reforms devolved administrative and political responsibility for public goods provision to municipal government, but without the fiscal autonomy that would allow mayors to collect income taxes to finance public goods. Local authorities must often search for novel ways to fund public works, making collective remittances more attractive in some places than others. For many municipalities, collective remittances and the 3x1 Program have become an important funding source to amplify public works budgets.12

Third, the 3x1 Program institutionalized coproduction that was previously either informal and spontaneous or administered in a state-level 2x1 program.13 In addition to magnifying migrants’ collective remittance funds by three (local, state, and federal), the 3x1 Program provides some oversight over project proposals. First, HTAs propose projects to municipal officials who agree to support the project.14 Next, project proposals are approved in validation committees (Comité de Validación y Atención a Migrantes, COVAM). Each COVAM is composed of two representative members of each coproduction contributor—local, state, federal, and migrant agents.15 Finally, once projects are approved in the COVAM, local government and migrant HTAs must work together to coordinate, design, plan, source materials, find labor, and see to all other project needs. Although the state and federal government provide co-financing, the locus of project coordination and implementation occurs at the municipal level.

Since its federal unveiling, the 3x1 Program has inspired other countries to experiment with and adopt remittance co-financing policies, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Morocco, France, the Netherlands, Spain, El Salvador, and the Philippines (Beauchemin and Schoumaker 2009; Galatowitsch 2009; Nijenhuis and Broekhuis 2010; Panizzon 2011). Estimates suggest that over 21 percent of Latin American migrants alone send collective remittances to support development, so it is important to evaluate how this form of transnational collective action is shaping and transforming governance (Multilateral Investment Fund 2001). Understanding how coproduction partnerships are organized and how this affects local democracy in Mexico provides an important first step to understanding the kinds of conditions that are essential for remittance-mobilized democratic development elsewhere.

In other research, I developed a nationally representative survey instrument and disseminated it to all Mexican HTAs registered in the database of immigrant organizations housed at the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME). Of the 550 organizations listed with accurate contact information that self-identified as clubes de oriundo (hometown associations), half of the organizations contacted completed the survey.16 I used the survey findings to select cases capturing variation on community inclusiveness and government engagement for in-depth comparative analysis. This approach allows me to test alternative factors purported to affect coproduction, including municipal size, levels of poverty and migration intensity, political party affiliation, organizational characteristics of migrant clubs, and total years club leadership has resided in the United States (see Table 1).

In total, I conducted fieldwork in six municipalities in Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Zacatecas (four cases presented here) between 2009 and 2011. I stayed in each municipality (often in the homes of migrant and non-migrant families) and accompanied community and HTA leaders to project meetings.
### Table 1. Characteristics and Distribution of Comparative Cases by Coproduction Organizational Form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sociodemographic Characteristics</th>
<th>Santa Catarina</th>
<th>Tlatelolco</th>
<th>Telepi</th>
<th>El Serrito</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population in County Seat</td>
<td>10,745</td>
<td>18,091</td>
<td>8,954</td>
<td>94,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Outlying Communities</td>
<td>253a</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority of Coproduction in County Seatb</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population of Project Beneficiaries</td>
<td>4,951</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>8,954</td>
<td>3,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Index in Beneficiary Community</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Intensity Index</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Local Political Context**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party in Power</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PAN</th>
<th>PRI</th>
<th>PAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Competition</td>
<td>Recently Competitive</td>
<td>PAN Stronghold</td>
<td>PRI Stronghold</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Migrant Hometown Association**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Formed</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>Came together at request of locals and church</td>
<td>Mayor asked paisanos to form club</td>
<td>Club came together on their own</td>
<td>Club came together on their own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Time in the United States (leadership)</td>
<td>18 years</td>
<td>45 years</td>
<td>30 years</td>
<td>15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club Membership Size</td>
<td>Five core decision-makers; 200 to 500 members in Chicago metro</td>
<td>One leader; loose coalition of about 50 members in TX and CA</td>
<td>Five core families; +1,000 supporters in S. CA and C. Valley</td>
<td>Three leaders; 15 core members; +1,000 supporters (four cities)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Data compiled from fieldwork, in-person and telephone interviews, survey instrument, Sedesol, and Institute of Federal Elections.

a Half of the total municipal population lives in five main localities, including the cabecera municipal.

b “No” indicates all or most of coproduction activities occurred in a single outlying community.
Because I was staying in each municipality for an extended period, I got to know many of the locals and met with migrant and non-migrant residents for meals and after weekly mass at the Catholic church to chat informally about town affairs and coproduction projects. Additionally, in each locality I interviewed approximately 20 key informants (the mayor and his administration, directors of the offices of migrant affairs in the county seat, local priests, business owners, principals and teachers of local schools, political party operatives, village delegates, leaders of community and recreational associations, and leaders of other HTAs active in the town). I conducted follow-up telephone interviews with individuals I was unable to meet with during fieldwork. I also interviewed state-level political officials in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas; the director of the 3x1 Program in Mexico City; program officials at the Mexican Consulate in Chicago, Illinois; migrant HTA leaders; club members; and HTA federation leadership in Chicago and Los Angeles.17

These three Mexican states have a common storied history of migration to the United States, active HTAs, and participation in the 3x1 Program. The 3x1 Program is administered by the Mexican Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) and seeks to improve social development in poor migrant communities while promoting transnational ties with the organized migrant population in the United States.18 Only 20 Mexican states and 200 municipalities participated in the program’s inaugural year, 2002, but by 2014, every state had participated and half of all municipalities had coproduced at least one project through the program. The 3x1 Program has expanded the breadth and scope of coproduction partnerships between organized migrants and the three levels of the Mexican government.19 By 2013, 20,869 coproduction projects, ranging from schools and health clinics to roads, highways, and sidewalks, sanitation, drainage, potable water, electricity, bridges, nursing homes, and recreational infrastructure, were successfully completed. In 2013, the total budget for the 3x1 Program, including all contributors, was about $1.5 billion pesos (MXN) (about $124 million USD). When compared to family remittances, which were $22 billion in 2013, collective remittances are a small share of money sent home. Although small in absolute terms, migrants’ collective resources, amplified by three levels of the Mexican government, go a long way to providing additional public works in municipalities and distributing public monies to outlying communities, which are historically poorer than the county seat and receive fewer public works projects (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social [Sedesol] 2013).20

Sedesol maintains annual data on all coproduction projects, including project types and budgets. Using Sedesol’s annual 3x1 Program data, I compiled additional data on participating municipalities to clarify the sociodemographic and political characteristics of places with coproduction. I used the 3x1 Program data and my original survey findings to guide case selection for comparative analysis, maximizing important variation on key variables. Where appropriate, I provide descriptive statistics in the cases to complement the description of political outcomes resulting from each organizational form.

The first empirical case of Santa Catarina,21 a municipality in Jalisco, approximates fragmented coproduction and shows what happens when government engagement and community inclusion remain low. The second case of Tlatelolco, an outlying community in the municipality of Comarga, Jalisco, demonstrates what happens when community inclusion remains low, but government engagement increases over time, approximating corporatist coproduction. The municipal case of Telépi, Zacatecas, shows how high community inclusion but low government engagement in the wake of political party turnover can upset synergetic partnerships and lead to more substitutive coproduction. Finally, El Serrito, an outlying community in Selvillo, Guanajuato, shows how expansion in migrants’ social base increases community inclusion, and, in turn, government engagement, producing synergy. Table 1 describes key sociodemographic, political, and organizational characteristics
across HTAs and municipalities and provides additional background of the cases.

**FINDINGS FROM COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES**

**Case One: Fragmented Coproduction in Santa Catarina, Jalisco**

In 2005, five men living in Chicago (Aurora and Bolingbrook, Illinois) came together to form Club Santa Catarina. During a trip home to visit, the priest of the local church approached the migrants and asked them if they would help finance a new church roof. The migrants, keen on supporting their beloved hometown after departure, collected funds for the project from more than 200 families in Chicago and surrounding suburbs. The roof project organized by the church and the new migrant club went off without a hitch, and Club Santa Catarina was excited to do more projects. In the following year, the club raised funds for new uniforms for the baseball team and the *fiesta patronal* (annual patron saint festival). Local residents were also involved. The church had an active group of members who would raise funds from locals by hosting potluck dinners and dances.

When the club heard about the 3x1 Program from the priest at a nearby church, they applied for funds and approached the local PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) mayor for support. Santa Catarina is a PRI stronghold. In municipal history, no opposition party had ever effectively challenged the party for power. Miguel, one of the leaders of the group, recalled how he was anxious to approach the local government to engage 3x1 projects:

> I really didn’t want to interact with any kind of government official. You have to understand that they have treated paisanos badly in the past and we often get harassed at the border. But we can’t raise the kind of money that would have a bigger impact in the town by knocking on doors in Illinois. We needed the help of the government to do more ambitious projects.22

The mayor agreed to support the proposed 3x1 project: paving four main streets in the county seat. After the mayor’s administration completed the budget estimates, the club’s contribution amounted to $3,000 (USD). Raul, one of the other migrant leaders explained:

> We had a lot of momentum going into the pavement project. Local citizens weren’t interested in being involved, but they seemed in support of the street pavement idea. Officials put together the budget proposal and the state and federal government contributed their share to the municipal treasury so we thought everything was going good, but we were in Chicago, we really didn’t know what was happening. And then we waited and waited. Nothing happened. We called the mayor’s office and they never returned our calls. We asked residents to check on progress on the project, but no one wanted to go... ask what was going on. We called the state 3x1 official, but they didn’t have any answers for us and told us to call a bunch of other people.23

After months of waiting and attempts to contact local officials, a new municipal administration took office and the club’s $3,000 contribution to the proposed pavement project vanished. “No one would tell us anything,” Miguel said. “We lost all the money and had to tell our paisanos that we lost the money. Any hope we had to do more projects with our paisanos or earn the confidence of the locals vanished with the money.” Club Santa Catarina disbanded after their failed attempt to coproduce a pavement project with the local government through the 3x1 Program. Local residents reported they had little trust in elected officials before the failed pavement project, and their suspicions were confirmed. Interviews, both informal and formal, with church members, business owners, family members of migrants, and schoolteachers suggest coproduction efforts exacerbated distrust in the local democratic process, by exposing government wrongdoing, and led to some trepidation in exercising political rights.

Miguel and Raul expressed interest in doing future projects, but they did not believe they could raise money from the paisanos...
after the original contributions disappeared in the municipal treasury. I asked the priest about the likelihood local residents would be involved in future projects, and he expressed reluctance:

Paisanos work really hard in the U.S. It’s a sacrifice for them and for their families. And our residents here work hard too. I don’t blame our residents for not wanting to get involved in projects when officials are supposed to be involved. We are a poor community. We have to do a lot for ourselves without help from anyone . . . and since the situation has worsened (referring to the drug trade), no one wants to bring any attention. Everyone tries to keep a low profile these days.24

As news spread of the missing migrant contribution, and with increasing violence from the drug trade in and around the municipality, Club Santa Catarina decided to remain inactive. The PRI remained in office until the election of 2010, when a candidate representing an alliance between the PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) and PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) upset the PRI incumbency. With the ousting of the PRI, paisanos in Chicago formed a new club in 2011, Club Unido en Chicago, which has successfully coproduced public lighting for a local bridge, purchased electrocardiogram technology for the clinic, and is currently coordinating plans for a new classroom for a preschool, all through the 3x1 Program. Martin and Alejandra, club leaders of the new HTA, believe the new administration is different from the previous ones, but they are still very careful and said they have learned from the experiences of Club Santa Catarina:

We don’t put any money in the treasury. We do everything in a separate bank account. The new mayor is much better. He’s an engineer and has good ideas for the town, but he has a lot of work to do trying to get security under control. It will take a long time for us to gain the trust of local residents who have seen a lot of things happen in this town. We ask them what kinds of projects they want and they tell us, but they won’t donate funds or help very much . . . . We have to work very hard to stay on good terms with the administration and communicate often through video chats and phone calls.25

Raul wished the new club the best of luck in their development projects with the new mayor, but Club Santa Catarina was skeptical of the 3x1 plans. In their experience, a corrupt municipal administration took advantage of migrants’ physical distance and pocketed the pavement project budget for personal gain. Without more participation from local residents, the migrant HTA in Chicago was unable to exert any pressure on officials to meet their obligations.26 3x1 officials were unable to explain what happened to the state and federal contributions for the pavement project and lamented that they had no recourse to hold local officials accountable in these situations. Jaime Almaraz, a 3x1 state-level official in Jalisco, explained that in situations when outright corruption occurs, Sedesol will often reimburse the club their contribution, but this has happened only a few times in his recollection.

Low community inclusion and government engagement produced a context ripe for organizational corruption in Santa Catarina, leading citizens to become even more disenchanted with municipal officials. Without support from residents in the coproduction process, Club Santa Catarina was vulnerable to co-optation by the local state. In the absence of citizen monitoring, local government officials are in a favorable position to take advantage of HTAs and their resources for their own benefit. Corrupt behavior takes many forms, including shirking monitoring responsibilities to ensure quality control; failure to match resources in part or in full; inflating projected budget totals to extract surplus resources from migrant, state, and federal partners; and outright appropriation from migrant groups. Because migrants live abroad, local government officials can capitalize on information asymmetries, which are exacerbated in the absence of local citizens and civil society groups to monitor project implementation and
upkeep. Officials also collude with preferred contractors and construction companies for kickbacks and change technical plans and costs during implementation for mutual gain.27 Citizens were already somewhat disillusioned with the local political process prior to coproduction; this experience compounded their disillusion. In the wake of failed coproduction, voter turnout dropped a percentage point in Santa Catarina, before increasing again to 77 percent in 2010 when the opposition party alliance mobilized voters. It is too soon to tell if coproduction between Club Unido and the new administration will improve sour citizen–state relations, political interest, or participation in local governance.

Case Two: Corporatist Coproduction in Tlatelolco, Comarga, Jalisco

In 2006, an enterprising Panista mayor in Jalisco, Pepe Coronado, visited several U.S. cities where the majority of his municipality’s paisanos lived. His goal was to persuade migrants to form HTAs and partner with his administration to supply public works throughout the municipality. Mayor Coronado heard about the 3x1 Program from a neighboring mayor in Zacatecas who had completed several 3x1 projects. Coronado’s U.S. trip was quite successful, and three migrant clubs agreed to organize and support projects in their respective outlying communities. One of the HTAs created was Club Tlatelolco, named for the locality where club members originated. This group initially formed to help build a vehicle bridge.

Before 2006, during the rainy season, half the residents of Tlatelolco lived in almost complete isolation along the river that bifurcates the community. The mayor, whose family was from the isolated part of Tlatelolco, promised residents that if they could raise funds to contribute to the project, he would petition the HTA to help fund it through the 3x1 Program. The completed vehicle bridge was financed through the 3x1 Program with additional financial support from the local Patronato.28 Club Tlatelolco is a loose-knit group of migrants located in San Antonio, Texas, and parts of California led by a migrant named Emilio, who has been in the United States for more than 20 years. The paisanos that make up the small club correspond to four migrant families in the community, but beyond their social network, neither Emilio nor other club members know many of the people in their hometown. More importantly, no one in the HTA was well acquainted with members of the Patronato, which was made up of active community members. The Patronato was involved in the bridge project from day one, although the HTA was unaware of the extent of their contributions to the project. The bridge project felt like a victory for the Patronato and their extensive social network of supporters, since they asked for and helped coordinate the project with the mayor. However, information asymmetries between the HTA, the mayor, and the Patronato led to conflict and contestation.

In 2006, during the ribbon cutting ceremony for the bridge, in front of the whole town, the mayor applauded the efforts of the paisanos for building the bridge, but said nothing about contributions from the Patronato. This initial misstep of crediting the HTA for the bridge confused and alienated local residents who had spent time, energy, and resources fundraising with the Patronato for the bridge. Long-time resident Don Nel explained:

I have personally asked each and every mayor for the bridge for 20 years. When I asked this mayor, he said he knew of a new program where we can get the money we need to build the bridge. We got together in the town and formed a bridge committee and raised money with the Patronato to help pay. Why the migrants are getting the credit for the bridge I do not understand. But this is typical. No one cares about us out here.29

When asked about the calculus for praising the HTA and omitting the town’s contributions, the mayor explained he wanted to implement many future projects for the town and saw the 3x1 Program as the way to make his budget go
further. Mayor Coronado believed public praise for the HTA would build on the bridge momentum and lead to several coproduction projects in Tlatelolco. What the mayor did not appreciate was that this HTA did not have extensive social ties in Tlatelolco, in contrast to other localities where he had helped form HTAs.

The lack of social ties and communication between the HTA and the Patronato spelled disaster for the coproduction partnership. The HTA and political officials decided unilaterally that residents should have to contribute financially to 3x1 projects, because migrants “visit only three or four days a year.” The residents’ contribution would decrease the total cost of the project, thereby decreasing the cost to each 3x1 contributor (federal, state, municipal, and HTA). The Patronato and other locals were upset that they were now expected to pay for a project they had no say in choosing—they did not perceive the HTA as being a legitimate voice of the townspeople.

The Patronato called a meeting between the local citizens, Emilio (HTA), and Chuy, the Director of Public Works. It was contentious. Residents in attendance were confused about what the 3x1 Program was, who the HTA was, and why they had been told to contribute funds. The parties were unable to reach a compromise after rounds of intense exchange. The Patronato was resolute—they did not want “outsiders” deciding how community money would be used and which projects would be completed. The HTA did not want locals or the Patronato to “dictate” how paisano contributions or 3x1 funds were spent. Municipal officials who needed the HTA’s support to receive 3x1 amplifying funds were in the middle of a heated debate between the HTA and project beneficiaries, whom they did not anticipate would be vocal dissenters of the 3x1 collaboration.

The conflict continued for several months over e-mail after Emilio returned to Texas. Emilio instructed Daniel, the president of the Patronato, to “release the funds for the good of the town”; HTA members remained confused and insisted they had a legitimate voice in making town decisions. Emilio asked: “Is the function of the Patronato to punish the paisanos, our donations, and our sacrifices? . . . What is the role of the Patronato at all?” The personal attacks against Daniel and questions about the importance of the Patronato were worrisome to residents who feared the municipal government and the HTA had formed an alliance and wanted to steal the Patronato’s money. Emilio’s claim that he was a resident were dismissed and locals became angry as news of the e-mails spread.

The Patronato held another meeting that most residents of the village attended, but no members of the HTA were present, as they were back in the United States. The treasurer, Angelica, began the meeting by expressing what many locals said in private:

> I don’t understand his motives [Emilio]. I see him at City Hall talking with the officials and with the mayor, why doesn’t he come and talk to us directly? I am completely against releasing any funds to these people. We have never even seen his face before. . . . I am worried—what if something bad happens? Will the neighbors still have faith in the Patronato if something happens to their money? . . . Who is he [Emilio]? Is he even Mexican anymore? He doesn’t live here and he wants to tell us what to do with the Patronato money?

Lydia, a local resident, said:

> How much money does this club actually have? How do we know they . . . are not holding out and making us pay? I saw those e-mails that Emilio sends Daniel and he says this is how much the citizens and the Patronato have to pay. Who does he think he is? . . . We are living in this town. We know everyone and everyone knows us. Why don’t we just go to all the neighbors and see what kinds of projects they would be interested in the Patronato supporting . . . we don’t need 3x1 or the paisanos . . . we are from here.

The Patronato decided to release half the funds stipulated by the HTA and local government to preserve local–paisano relations; this
was half the funds in the Patronato’s till. Patronato leadership decided this was a one-time contribution made in solidarity with the migrants, but moving forward, the proposal of public works would not be defined by the migrants, or Emilio, but by the people of Tlatelolco who are represented by the Patronato and care for the town funds. Members of the HTA were confused why the locals “attacked” their club president, because they only heard Emilio’s perspective on the events that transpired during the visit. Some members of the HTA suggested they “withhold” funds for future projects until the town “paid their fair share.”

The events that unfolded between December 2008 and August 2011 exacerbated social divisions in the town between migrant and non-migrant households, and between the HTA and the Patronato. The HTA failed to solicit the input of the Patronato, a trusted association in the Tlatelolco community. Emilio also enjoyed the exclusive attention of local politicians, which valorized his social status and interest in achieving social mobility; in turn, the local administration pursued its preferred public projects in coordination with the HTA through the 3x1 Program. The local government privileged the support of the HTA over local residents, with the intention of maintaining their participation in the 3x1 Program for long-term electoral support. This strategy backfired and may have cost the PAN at the next election. Citizens in Tlatelolco banded together to back the opposition PRI candidate, a move designed to punish the PAN incumbent. It is difficult to know how much Tlatelolco’s political mobilization contributed to the PAN’s loss (PRI vote share increased 12 percent from the 2010 to 2013 elections), but this was the goal of Tlatelolco voters—to punish the PAN party for privileging the HTA over local demands for voice. The PAN’s vote share declined 19 percent and the PRI won handily in 2013; the margin of victory was 31 percent.

The HTA’s inability to construct effective social ties with the Patronato, as well as its privileged access to and alliance with the local government, eventually led to the collapse of coproduction and worsened relations between local citizens and the municipal government in Tlatelolco. After the election, many local residents said they were “done dealing with politicians” and “none of them can be trusted.” The HTA felt connected to their hometown and wanted to express that attachment by supporting improvements; they did not expect physical exit to complicate their ability to use voice as if they had never left. Migrant membership status in a social collective is complex, and without building meaningful bridges to social elites and residents, making claims in the name of the community reinforces political inequalities between migrants and non-migrants and magnifies distrust in the political process. As a result, the corporatist partnership between the HTA and the local government was short-lived. The club is currently inactive. Citizens of Tlatelolco told me they are more disenchanted with municipal representatives and participating in politics than before, even if their exclusion led to short-term political mobilization against the PAN party incumbent.

In more corporatist forms of coproduction, migrants’ organized interests and links to a cooperative local government take precedence over competing societal interest articulations. This arrangement produces two kinds of political effects. First, citizen exclusion compromises plural interest representation. In this context, citizens may feel slighted and react by challenging coproduction decisions publicly, sanctioning the HTA, or making independent political demands on the state to be heard. Migrant–state corporatism in places with an active civil society may increase locals’ political participation due to their exclusion in the coproduction process, as evidenced in the Tlatelolco case. Although these data cannot speak authoritatively on conditions producing political participation from exclusion, one possibility is that places with latent or active social capital (e.g., a Patronato or other community groups) likely have the resources and networks to mobilize “voice” more readily than places without. Second, corporatist coproduction may
prompt citizens to retreat from public life, depressing political interest and engagement. As Piven and Cloward (1997) argue, patterns of motivated inaction are often impelled by objective circumstances—people who know they cannot win often do not try. Corporatist coproduction, in which citizens perceive an alliance between an HTA and an engaged local government, may crowd out citizens’ interest in and ability to use democratic channels to voice preferences for public goods and gain access to officials.

**Case Three: Synergetic Coproduction, Interrupted, in Telepi, Zacatecas**

Since 1990, Familias de Telepi, an HTA located near Los Angeles, California, has supplied public goods in Telepi with both extensive and minimal local government support, leading to different political consequences. Familias is one of the oldest HTAs in the state; club leadership was involved in negotiating the state 3x1 Program with political officials and helped create the Federation of Zacatecan hometown clubs in Southern California.

Nacho, an entrepreneurial engineer serving as the Director of Social Development for the PRI administration, saw the potential of the 3x1 Program to overcome budget constraints and expand public goods provision after the PRI lost the governorship to the PRD in 2004. A former migrant with social ties to HTA members, Nacho regularly met with the HTA. He traveled to Los Angeles several times to coordinate coproduction projects for Telepi. Nacho recalled, “The government did not have much trouble getting funds back then to do a couple projects, but things changed when the PRD took the state from the PRI. It got a lot harder to get money at the local level after that. I saw the migrants as a way to get more money for projects than relying on Ramo 20 [revenue-sharing funds].” When the PRD took the governorship and the distribution of transfers became more precarious, Nacho, as director of social development and later as mayor, used coproduction and the 3x1 Program to secure additional resources for municipal development.

Nacho’s relationship with the migrant leadership of the HTA was an important component of coproduction success. He sought to prioritize water and electricity projects and job creation in accordance with his Development Plan, but the HTA and local citizens had their own preferred projects. The migrant club, local citizen committees, and local government negotiated the selection of projects and worked in tandem at every stage, from project design to hiring contractors to monitoring quality standards during implementation. Having extensive experience working with the HTA, Nacho ran in the 2004 election as the PRI candidate and won in a competitive race (by a 10 percent margin). Prior to coproduction, only four public works projects were implemented in the previous administration. Nacho designed his entire budget around the 3x1 Program, leading to 30 projects over the course of the two administrations he served. Public works expenditures (per capita) between 1999 and 2001 averaged $416 pesos, compared to $1,082 over the 2001 to 2004 electoral cycle. By the end of Nacho’s term in 2007, total public works expenditures (per capita) increased to $1,500. Coproduction in Telepi increased public expenditures for public goods and services for local residents, improving government responsiveness in public social spending.

Between 2001 and 2007, the Telepi government invested time, energy, and resources coproducing projects with the HTA and residents. Coproduction partners regularly held meetings to deliberate and negotiate project selection and discuss completion timelines. Local government engagement in this period was high. Moreover, Sarita and Leo, leaders of the HTA, maintained an extensive social base throughout the town, even though they left Telepi in the early 1980s. They maintained and enlarged their social network by keeping a home in Telepi and spending summers there with their children. Sarita regularly participated in church activities, hosted local dinners, and visited poor residents of the outlying communities. Despite living in the United States for 30 years, Sarita and Leo still...
consider Telepi as much their home as Los Angeles. Because of their regular participation and presence in Telepi, they are recognized as members of the community, capable of practicing voice and exit simultaneously.

The club had projects they were interested in supporting, but they learned at church events that citizens had their own project ideas. Sarita, other club members, and Nacho thus invited citizens—friends, family, and strangers alike—to initiate project proposals and form coordinating “citizen committees” that would oversee project implementation in concert with municipal staff and officials. Over Nacho’s three-year term as mayor, about 10 citizen committees proposed, fundraised, and assisted projects, while ensuring timely completion and quality standards. The creation of civil society groups happened in response to the inclusion of the local citizenry and activated new forms of social capital not previously present.

Local residents appreciated the increase in civic engagement resulting from community inclusiveness in the coproduction process. Eduardo, the director of the technical high school told me:

The paisano club is kind of like an institution here. . . . We had some of this kind of infrastructure before, but it didn’t reach all of the communities and it was very old and needed to be redone . . . the club helps makes things happen here. We make a list of priorities and meet with the club and the mayor and we focus together on the most important ones. That is how we got the two new buses for the school children . . . we all donate some money and the parents help to collect donations from their neighbors too.35

Citizen committees inspired residents to form neighborhood sports clubs and a lion’s club. Local government engagement based on shared decision-making authority and community inclusiveness that integrates local residents into the coproduction process had important state–society effects. Locals who participated in citizen committees met regularly with officials in the local government; they reported feeling more comfortable interacting with local officials than they had before, even when they disagreed. These citizen committees would have additional importance in the community when the new PRD administration took office in 2007.

The PRD won the election in a close race. Very early in the new mayor’s term, Sarita and other paisanos attended a breakfast meeting they organized to begin discussions on future coproduction collaborations. Sarita recalled that the new mayor was dismissive of their ideas. She was also skeptical that his administration had the requisite professionalization to be an effective leader and coproduction partner. She explained, “He just wanted us to pay for the projects that he wanted. I don’t even think he graduated high school.” Familias was not interested in funding state-preferred projects and felt slighted at the lack of consultation between the club, its local affiliates, and the administration, especially after their synergetic partnership with the previous administrations. The local government’s dismissal of their ideas and previous work was not received well by the paisanos and residents, who said they “did not believe this mayor.” When the mayor began to pave over the cobblestone streets in the main part of town, residents used the social capital created during the synergetic period to mobilize and make political demands. The museum director explained:

All the projects the mayor wanted to do were pavement projects because they get concrete for free from the state and all they have to do is pay for some labor and additional supplies. We thought the pavement projects were ruining the provincial feel of our town, so we made him stop.36

Local residents circulated a petition in their citizen committees and took it door-to-door throughout their neighborhoods; a member of a citizen committee also wrote an open letter in the local paper demanding the mayor stop the pavement projects. The citizen committees’ swift mobilization of local residents in opposition to the mayor’s policy was effective, and the municipality suspended the concrete
pavement projects in response. Social capital created through coproduction forced municipal government to change policy course.

The transition to a new mayor and party in power (PRD) upset synergetic coproduction. Because the PRD mayor declined to participate in the 3x1 Program, the HTA worked with citizen groups to fundraise, select, and implement two public goods projects without 3x1 co-financing: drainage pipes that connected a locality to the public system and improvement to a dam. The only complementary input the municipality provided was the right-of-way access to public land to complete the infrastructure projects. This period of low government engagement brought about by the municipal electoral transition halted participatory engagement between citizens and the state.

The case of Telepi demonstrates how synergetic coproduction characterized by strong government and local citizen engagement creates new opportunities for state and non-state actors to solve local problems through embedded, participatory action. Because Sarita had maintained membership in the social life of Telepi, she could draw on the resources of her social network to recruit community residents as cooperative partners. Community participation permitted the exchange of ideas and preferences directly between citizens and local government officials, and citizens gained ownership over the coproduction process. The contributions of the migrant club and citizen committees, and the healthy engagement of local representatives, led to the completion of 30 projects in six years—a marked increase in municipal public works expenditures—and the creation of new sources of social capital with politically efficacious spillover effects.

With the ousting of the PRD administration in 2010, synergetic coproduction resumed. Voters cast their ballots in record numbers in 2010, with over 98 percent of the voting-age population turning out to the polls and bringing the PRI back to power. From the 2007 to 2010 elections, the PRD’s vote share dropped 18 percent, some of which can be attributed to the unpopularity of the mayor and active, informed, mobilized citizen groups demanding change.

Case Four: Substitutive and Synergetic Coproduction in El Serrito, Selvillo, Guanajuato

In 2005, Reymundo and Francisco, paisanos from the locality of El Serrito, banded together to form Club El Serrito after hearing about the 3x1 Program at the Mexican Consulate and conducting some informal Internet research. With family still in El Serrito, Reymundo visited regularly; for the past 10 years, he lived a life between “here” and “there” as many paisanos do. Their club had a difficult start organizing, fundraising, and getting other paisanos and local residents to take interest and believe in what they were trying to do, but the club has since flourished. Since 2005, Club El Serrito has grown to about 1,000 members spread across four main U.S. cities. Through the 3x1 Program, they have coproduced more than 30 community projects with the local government, amounting to more than $2 million (USD) in collective remittances. Migrant and non-migrant residents alike have not only benefitted from co-financed projects, but residents have also created new community associations to solve local problems in conjunction with the local government.

The positive spillovers from the club’s coproduction efforts were not immediate. El Serrito’s long history of distrust in the local government, coupled with a community fractured by political scandals, pockets of intense poverty, and perpetual migratory flows in and out, presented club leaders with many challenges to successfully complete projects. When Club Serrito first began its hometown development efforts, community inclusion and government engagement were low. Migrant club members recalled how difficult it was to get early projects off the ground, as residents were suspicious of paisanos’ motives and the local government was not initially supportive:
People are so used to the government not delivering that we knew we had to do a quick and easy project. We extended the electrical grid to a street that had never had electricity. We did the whole project in 20 days. And still people didn’t trust us. They were so suspicious they would say, “How come it happened so fast? They must be corrupt.” . . . I had to show Jesus [a popular local resident at the time] the receipts and the check we wrote for 3x1 just to get them to believe that we weren’t trying to steal the money.40

Local residents were wary of the HTA. Although migrant leaders had maintained strong ties to their close family and friends, neighbors who did not recognize them or know their families were suspicious of their motives and cooperation with the local government.

The 3x1 Program is designed to have all contributors match collective remittances one-to-one, but Club El Serrito members said that the first municipal government they worked with (PAN) shirked its financial and planning responsibilities. Migrant leaders reported that the mayor and his administration stalled technical plans, materials, and matching funds required for project implementation and frequently inflated the total cost of the proposed projects. Reymundo recalled how frustrating it was working with this administration: “They had a mañana mentalidad, everything was we’ll get it to you soon, but nothing ever came.” With skepticism growing from prominent townspeople and a reticent local government “partner,” Club El Serrito decided to work without a municipal partner, thus substituting for the local government in the provision of public goods.

With complementary funding from the state and federal government through the 3x1 Program, the club selected projects, hired their own local architect, and completed a few small-scale projects. Beyond agreeing to participate in the 3x1 Program and permitting Club El Serrito’s project proposals to go to the COVAM for administrative approval, the Selvillo municipal government was minimally involved in the early years of the Club’s activities.

The 3x1 matching funds provided financial support to the club, but Reymundo and Francisco feared they would not be able to complete many future projects without local support, as it takes considerable time, energy, and resources to coordinate public goods projects from San Diego, California. Members of Club El Serrito speculated that if the local town was more involved, it might translate into more support from the local government, which seemed interested in claiming credit for projects without doing much of the hard work to execute them. The year 2009 marked a significant shift in the way coproduction projects were organized. These organizational changes in the manner of project selection, coordination, and implementation generated synergy between Serritenses and the local government.

Reymundo and club leadership decided to meet with Jesus, a well-connected local resident, to discuss his issues with the club and figure out how to solicit more support. They hosted a town hall meeting and recruited volunteers to participate in the selection and implementation of public works. This effort built the club’s credibility and expanded the density and heterogeneity of social ties throughout the town. More than 70 citizens attended the meeting, and 20 of those in attendance decided to form a mirror association they called the Public Works Committee (PWC). Jesus and two close friends, including Miguel, a popular veteran schoolteacher, also organized a separate committee to work alongside the HTA. They were informally called the “Hawks”—the self-appointed watchdogs of both the migrant club and the politicians. The construction of new social ties to Jesus and Miguel facilitated a number of additional ties to the principal of the elementary school, teachers, and members of the church group. Other active community members knew and trusted the Hawks because they were popular local residents. The branching out of the migrants’ social base to citizens active in schools and the church improved the HTA’s visibility and credibility in El Serrito.

Once the Hawks and the PWC began working on a series of coproduction projects
with the HTA, community inclusion escalated. The Hawks, Club El Serrito, and the PWC threw a party for the town to fundraise and try and bring the community together once again. Reymundo described the change:

We realized we had to make it more interactive and give people a piece of the project that actually means something to them. We threw a huge jaripeo where we got the most popular banda in all of Guanajuato to perform. I got a very expensive truck on credit and we raffled it off. We sold tickets in the U.S. and Mexico for $10 each [USD] and after we covered the costs of everything we made enough money to finance a recreation area for the schoolchildren. The whole town came, like 3,000 people! It really showed people that we could do things together. Things really changed after that.

One important change was the local government’s degree of engagement. Prior to more extensive citizen inclusion, the government was absent from the coproduction process. Witnessing how effective the club was in working with the town to produce projects, the local government became more proactive. In 2010, the Panista mayor told me, “We aren’t a rich municipio, but we aren’t a poor one either. We have a public works budget that allows us to do maybe one project in each outlying town, but most of the projects are completed in the county seat because that’s where most of the people live. But when you have a really active HTA like Reymundo’s, it looks bad if the municipio is not involved. The 3x1 Program gives us the extra funds we need to do projects in towns like El Serrito.”

As local residents realized they could make change through participation in the coproduction process, local government took renewed interest in societal preferences for public works. The mayor said, somewhat in jest, that the administration did not want to be “showed up” by the HTA’s projects.

Club Serrito’s active effort to construct social ties and recruit participation had substantial effects on not only the quality and quantity of coproduction projects, but also the extent of local government engagement. The local government became more involved as citizen participation increased. High inclusion and engagement produced synergy in Selvillo. Municipal government increased the average total share of expenditures on public works by 3 percent, and they increased public works spending by $466 pesos (per capita) from the previous administration. Most of the increase was distributed to the El Serrito locality. The integration of a broad swath of local citizens (voters) into the coproduction process altered the local government’s incentives to engage in the process as more citizens voiced their needs and preferences for public works, first indirectly (through the HTA) and later directly in regular meetings and negotiations over development projects with elected representatives.

When migrant club members were back in the United States, the PWC and the Hawks went to city hall more regularly to work on technical plans with municipal engineers, collecting local donations and fundraising across town for preferred projects and overseeing the project implementation process. When workers failed to report to work on time or materials did not arrive, citizens complained directly to their contacts in the government. The local committee provided much needed oversight to coproduction implementation.

Additionally, improved community inclusiveness led to more pronounced spillovers in local participation and better citizen relations with the local government. Coproduction drew attention from local residents who felt increasingly comfortable contacting the HTA and PWC leaders to report social problems in the town. To meet new citizen requests, the PWC and the HTA asked residents to form “citizen block committees,” which organized groups of neighbors to fundraise for preferred projects. The PWC worked directly with political officials and block committees to fund road pavements projects through the 3x1 Program. The popularity of the 3x1 Program led to another political development: the Serrito mayor created a new municipal 3x1 Program position and hired Jesus to his staff.
Jesus brought his strong connections within the local government and built effective working relationships with the director of public works, the mayor, the director of the office for migrant affairs (OFAM), and the state and federal officials that approved 3x1 Project proposals. Since the creation of the 3x1 municipal liaison position, Jesus has become embedded in the local municipal government, charged solely with working with citizens to coordinate coproduction projects—a kind of organizational entwining par excellence.

The initial expansion of community inclusion and government engagement produced positive democratic spillovers empowering Serritenses, migrants, and the local government to coordinate decision-making and resources in more representative participatory governance. Scaling up of citizen inclusion energized new community groups, including the public works committee, citizen block committees, and a public security committee. Even though El Serrito was a poor locality in a middle-income municipality, with scarce social capital endowments and citizens distrustful of the migrant club and government officials, the coproduction process improved state–society relations and citizen political participation as a result of increased citizen inclusion. And, as more local residents became integrated into the coproduction process, sharing preferences for public works with elected representatives, officials became more engaged. The migrant HTA’s links to local government and town residents created a way for citizens to build working relationships with elected officials and participate in everyday democratic decision-making for public goods provision. Voter turnout increased by 11 percent after the synergetic period, which can be partially credited to Serritense citizens engaging in the formal political process, after being disengaged from politics in the past.

Attaining the best match of citizen inclusion and government engagement is often difficult, as local state capacity, electoral incentives and transitions, and migrants’ limited hometown social ties leave coproduction inherently vulnerable. However, when migrant social bases reflect the maintenance or construction of social ties in a community, citizen inclusion is higher and ordinary citizens are included in the process.

Migrant HTAs’ complementary remittances link them directly to local government officials responsible for supplying public goods. When migrants’ social bases provide an HTA heterogeneous links in local society, residents and local government become embedded in a cooperative decision-making apparatus for public goods provision, capturing more of a plurality of societal interests. This non-electoral mode of political participation expands the institutional terrain in which citizens, migrants, and public officials communicate, negotiate, plan, budget, and implement public works projects that solve local problems through deliberative democratic mechanisms. Social ties that bind the state and society provide institutionalized channels for the negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies (Evans 1996).

CONCLUSIONS

By analyzing the dynamics and organizational variation of transnational coproduction partnerships, this study illuminates how migrant HTAs’ mobilization of collective remittances for hometown development has important spillover effects for democratic governance. My chief purpose here was to draw attention to how coproduction is configured, and how different organizational forms of coproduction correspond to political outcomes in places with emigration; two important insights emerged from this research and provide a window into how local democracies actually work in the wake of decentralization and democratization.

First, the strength of civil society is often weak in newly transitioned democracies, where pockets of authoritarianism and entrenched clientelistic networks create citizen antipathy toward local politics, dampening associational life. In Mexico, democratization rejuvenated civic life to some extent, but recent estimates suggest the surge may have stalled: only 16 percent of all
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municipalities report the presence of a citizen assembly, 27 percent have a citizen council or board, 12 percent report representation of municipal delegations in outlying communities, 20 percent have a comptroller for social welfare and public works projects, and just over a third have at least one citizen committee of any kind (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía [Inegi] 2013). Findings from this study suggest that migrant clubs’ nonpolitical associational activity in public goods provision can have positive unintended effects on individuals’ political socialization and aid in the creation of new civic associations (Putnam 2000; Walker 2009).

Because voice is often materially conditioned, migrant associations’ collective resources help forge links to local authorities keen on using external financing to amplify local social spending. When coproduction is synergetic, citizen recruitment and government engagement create participatory project networks. Project coordination allows for routinized interactions between public officials and citizens, citizens have a platform to voice preferences and help set the social welfare policy agenda, and deliberation makes for more informed citizens while showing them how democratic engagement helps solve local problems of direct consequence to their lives (Ackerman 2004; Avritzer 2010; Campbell 2003; Fung and Wright 2003; Holzner 2010; Verba et al. 1995). Citizen inclusion builds an occasion for political learning for migrants and local citizens alike. Recent research shows that Mexican HTA leaders are regularly engaged in U.S.-based civic associations—like PTAs, neighborhood and church organizations, and immigrant rights advocacy—using skills transferred or honed while engaging in transnational forms of collective action (Bada 2014; Duquette-Rury and Bada 2013). This study suggests that collaboration in development may build social assets like connections and trust that facilitate future collaboration between state and society in other related tasks (Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995).

Second, informal social institutions often play a complementary and substitutive role to formal institutions of accountability in exacting better government performance when electoral institutions are weak or absent (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2000; Tsai 2007). This article adds to this literature by describing the conditions under which the transnational coproduction of public goods can induce better government responsiveness with the right match of key structural components (Tsai 2011). In places where citizens become active and equal partners in core state functions—developing local budgets, making social investment expenditure decisions, and selecting and planning public works projects—social groups and their solidarity ties can induce more government responsiveness through participatory mechanisms, in both non-democracies and newly transitioned settings (Tsai 2007).

When coproduction fails to include representative voices of the hometown community in project decision-making, however, migrant grassroots actors may crowd out and mute local citizens’ preferences, privileging migrant groups’ interests, and introducing or reinforcing social and political inequalities and elite power relations. The vast majority of coproduction projects administered through the 3x1 Program occur in rural, outlying communities, so the degree to which migrant clubs represent the community to the municipality or the municipality to the community is contested terrain and brings to the fore important questions about who gets to speak for whom in local democracy (Fox 2007). Migrants are of their hometowns and maintain meaningful sentimental attachments that motivate their cross-border investments, but they are no longer residents, complicating the maintenance and construction of social ties that ensure migrant citizens’ private interests do not trump local voices (see Waldinger 2015).

Finally, local institutional capacity must be sufficiently coherent and capable to ensure state–society embeddedness does not deteriorate into clientelism (Evans 1996). It must also be strong enough to secure social and political order in the face of external threats intent on extracting rents and wrangling.
power from the state apparatus (Heller 2001). As in many countries still experiencing the growing pains of democratic transition and powerful organized interests competing with the state, weak institutions constrain the transformative potential of development aid and investment contributed by private and public philanthropic 501(c)3 organizations, domestic civil society associations, international development banks, and migrant hometown associations alike.

Migrant social groups face a high bar to achieving democratic development through the investment of collective remittances for hometown development in Mexico and beyond. Social and political learning through iterative interactions between state and society can organize public–private partnerships that help achieve more inclusive participatory governance. More research is needed to assess the systematic effects of transnational coproduction on dimensions of local democratic quality in and beyond Mexico, but this study provides insight into the social and political institutions that enhance, interrupt, and stymie democratic development mobilized by collective remittances.

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Notes
1. Different terms that refer to countrymen and women are used throughout the world, including, for example, paisano/a, paesano/a, and son/daughter of the soil.
2. For an important exception, see Abdih and colleagues (2012) for a discussion of how household remittances are associated with weak institutional quality in origin countries.
3. Municipalities are the lowest level of government, below state and federal, in Mexico’s three-tiered federal system. Each municipality is governed by a municipal president (presidente municipal), akin to a mayor, who heads a municipal council. Citizens elect the municipal mayor to a three-year term by plurality; incumbents cannot run for immediate reelection. Most municipalities designate one town as the cabecera municipal (similar to a county seat in a U.S. township) where the majority of the local population resides. The remainder of the municipal population not residing in the county seat is spread out across outlying communities referred to as localidades. About 25 million people live in 200,000 localities with fewer than 2,500 people (Fox 2007). For example, in the municipality of Tlatelongo in Zacatecas, 65 percent of the population resides in the county seat of the same name, and the remaining population is scattered across 75 outlying communities. In this article, I use “local” and “municipal” interchangeably to refer to the territorially based lowest tier of government, and I use “outlying community” to refer to hamlets outside but still a part of the municipality.
4. The transnational “matched” survey includes data on the organizational and destination characteristics of respondent HTAs as well as sociodemographic, political, and economic data on the Mexican municipality where coproduction projects were situated. Data on Mexican municipalities was taken from the National Institute for Geography and Statistics (Inegi) and the 3x1 Program database maintained by the Ministry of Social Development, the federal agency that administers the 3x1 Program. The survey will be made available for the public domain and additional information about survey methodology and results appear in Duquette-Rury and Bada (2013).
5. Fragmented coproduction need not result in co-optation, although I suggest it is a likely outcome. Low inclusion and engagement may produce coproduction partnerships that fizzle or fail after the completion of one project.
6. In many cases, HTAs privately supply public goods without any complementary involvement by origin-state agencies; however, treatment of this kind of remittance-led provision is beyond the scope of this article. In this vein, HTAs are akin to non-state providers (NSP) of social welfare. See Cammett and MacLean (2011) for more discussion of NSP social welfare provision in the global South.
7. In Mexico, HTAs support public goods in different geographic contexts. Some HTAs invest in projects in one or more outlying communities in their municipality of origin; others focus their efforts in the county seat (Duquette-Rury and Bada 2013). The geography of projects is determined, in part, by negotiations between HTAs and municipal government, as well as the HTA’s membership base, which reflects the concentration of paisanos in the destination.

8. See Tsai (2007) for important research on the role of informal institutions of accountability in non-democratic settings.

9. Equifinality results when similar outcomes on the dependent variable have different causes. In the case of corporatist coproduction with limited citizen inclusion, political participation may result from the exclusion of segments of society in the coproduction process (see George and Bennett [2005] on equifinality).

10. Duquette-Rury and Bada (2013) provides further descriptions of survey respondents, including how HTAs formed and when, the degree to which Mexican consulates were involved in club formation, the concentration of HTAs by U.S. destination city and Mexican municipality, club decision-making structures, and federation membership. Results from the quantitative analysis of the full survey sample are available by request.

11. I appreciate a reviewer’s suggestion on this point.

12. The 3x1 Program has a much smaller budget than Mexico’s other national-level social spending programs, including Oportunidades and Seguro Popular. However, 3x1 projects are of great consequence to local mayors, because they constitute a substantial portion of public works spending. On average, municipal contributions to 3x1 projects comprised over 20 percent of total public works spending in a quarter of participating municipalities; total 3x1 spending accounts for more than half of all public works spending in 30 percent of program participants (author’s calculations using Sedesol’s database of 3x1 projects from 2002 to 2013).

13. See Iskander (2010) and Goldring (2002) for a discussion of state-level matching grants programs and the rise of the federal 3x1 Program in Mexico.

14. Recent survey data suggest that local residents and municipal officials are also likely to approach migrants and ask them to form a club and coproduce projects through the 3x1 Program, but the majority of survey respondents reported that their clubs came together on their own (Duquette-Rury and Bada 2013).

15. As of 2015, total project costs cannot exceed one million pesos (MXN), and each agent agrees to financially contribute a quarter of the total project cost. For the most recent 2015 rules of operation, see http://www.normateca.sedesol.gob.mx/work/models/NORMATECA/Normateca/Reglas_Operacion/2015/rop_3x1_migrantes.pdf.

16. Additional analysis was conducted on characteristics listed along with the contact data of the clubs in the IME database. Statistical tests between survey respondents and non-respondents did not reveal systematic bias. However, it is important to note that the IME database includes only HTAs that elected to register the club with the Mexican state. This is a limitation of this data source and likely excludes clubs that are more informal or wary of state legibility. All clubs that participate in the 3x1 Program are registered with IME, either through their state-level federation or individually.

17. Several states in Mexico maintain state-level federations, which are composed of many HTAs from the same state of origin. The largest federations include migrants from Michoacán, Jalisco, and Zacatecas, and are located in Southern California and Chicago, Illinois.

18. Interview with Ms. Irma Hidalgo, director of the 3x1 Program, Mexico City, March 2011.

19. A growing literature examines the political economy of the 3x1 Program (see Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Duquette-Rury 2014; Meseguer and Aparicio 2012; Simpser et al. 2016).

20. Author’s calculations show coproduction projects occur in localities (about 85 percent in 2013) more often than the county seat alone. This confirms what Burgess (2005) found in early years of the 3x1 Program.

21. The names of all case study communities and municipalities are pseudonyms to protect the identity of informants. This is of special concern because mafia-related violence has escalated substantially in one of the field sites. Migrant club leaders and local citizens receiving remittances have been targets of extortion from local gangs.

22. Face-to-face interview with Miguel, Chicago, IL, September 2010.


24. Telephone interview with Pastor de la Torre, April 2009.

25. Face-to-face interview with club leaders in Chicago, IL, July 2010.

26. Even with more citizen engagement, corruption may not have been thwarted; citizen inclusion does not necessarily prevent corruption by rent-seeking politicians.

27. It is also plausible that in contexts of low inclusion and government engagement, migrants collude with governments, not simply to impose their view of what is good for the public, but to use public resources to further their own private ends. I did not witness this outcome in any of the case studies presented; however, anecdotal accounts from informants in the field characterize some HTAs as “mano negra.” In this context, “mano negra” means suspicious of wrongdoing.

28. The Patronato is the local association responsible for planning and executing the annual patron saint festival in Tlatelolco. Many outlying communities
across Mexico have patronatos to celebrate the town’s patron saint. These are often big and important celebrations that attract residents from other communities and municipalities as well as migrants returning home for the occasion.

29. Face-to-face interview in Tlaltetolco, March 2009. All interviews in the municipality were conducted during fieldwork between March and August 2009.

30. E-mail correspondence dated April 5th, 2009.

31. Emilio told me he had political aspirations of his own in Mexico. Many former migrants have successfully campaigned and won mayoral office in their hometowns.

32. HTAs created by the administration in the same period are still active and successfully coproducing in three other communities in Comarga. Local political participation and state–society relations have improved as a result of more synergetic coproduction in these places, where government engagement was consistent but community inclusion was higher.

33. Face-to-face interview in Telepi, March 2009. Face-to-face interviews with Sarita and Leo took place between March 2009 and December 2009 in Telepi and over the phone when they returned to Los Angeles in 2010 and 2011.

34. A few HTAs sporadically engage in coproduction in Telepi, and one additional HTA has had a long-term presence in the municipality.

35. Face-to-face interview, Telepi, Zacatecas, April 2009.


37. Club Serrito has a large membership, but a committee of 15 core members subject to branch approval makes most club decisions. Each branch regularly fundraises in their respective city to finance club projects. The board of directors is located in San Diego, California. The club recently became a 501(c)3 and maintains an annual budget of $100,000 (USD).

38. As of 2013, the Club had coproduced the 6th highest number of projects through the 3x1 Program.

39. Like many municipalities, El Serrito has a community delegado (delegate) who represents the town in municipal government. Serritenses have bad memories of the delegados stealing money and misrepresenting town interests. As a result, few residents support the delegado, and few residents want to fill the position because they fear the town residents will turn on them.

40. Face-to-face interview with Reymundo, club president, April 2008.

41. Many households used family remittances for their contribution.

42. The mayor requested permission from local council officials (regidores) to create a municipal 3x1 position. The 3x1 liaison receives a municipal salary for overseeing all 3x1 Program activities.

References


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