



---

Reactions toward the New Minorities of Western Europe

Author(s): Thomas F. Pettigrew

Source: *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24 (1998), pp. 77-103

Published by: Annual Reviews

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/223475>

Accessed: 13-02-2020 03:49 UTC

---

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

*Annual Reviews* is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Annual Review of Sociology*

# REACTIONS TOWARD THE NEW MINORITIES OF WESTERN EUROPE

*Thomas F. Pettigrew*

University of California, Santa Cruz, California 95064;  
e-mail: PETTIGR@CATS.UCSC.EDU

KEY WORDS: new minorities, blatant prejudice, subtle prejudice

---

## ABSTRACT

Millions of ex-colonials, “guest workers,” refugees, and other immigrants have settled in western Europe during recent decades. Extensive research on this phenomenon broadens sociology’s understanding of intergroup relations in industrial societies. Unlike African Americans, these new Europeans are often viewed as not “belonging,” and gaining citizenship can be difficult. The chapter discusses four major reactions to the new minorities: prejudice, discrimination, political opposition, and violence. Both blatant and subtle forms of prejudice predict anti-immigrant attitudes. And between 1988 and 1991, a hardening took place in these attitudes. Similarly, direct and indirect discrimination against the new minorities is pervasive. Moreover, anti-discrimination efforts have been largely ineffective. Far-right, anti-immigration political parties have formed to exploit this situation. These openly racist parties have succeeded in shifting the political spectrum on the issue to the right. In addition, violence against third-world immigrants has increased in recent years, especially in nations such as Britain and Germany where far-right parties are weakest. The chapter concludes that these phenomena are remarkably consistent across western Europe. Furthermore, the European research on these topics supports and extends North American research in intergroup relations.

---

## INTRODUCTION

The world is experiencing two major intergroup trends—massive migration and increased group conflict. An estimated 80 million migrants, almost 2% of

the world's population, live permanently or for long periods of time outside their countries of origin (Castles 1993, p. 18). And headlines of intergroup strife fill our newspapers.

These trends are especially evident in western Europe (Solomos & Wrench 1993, Thraenhardt 1992a). Somalis in London's East End (Griffiths 1997) and Cypriot entrepreneurs in the city's garment industry (Panayiotopoulos 1996), Russian Jews in Berlin (Doomernik 1997), Peruvian house servants in Barcelona (Escriva 1997), Senegalese street vendors in Italian cities (Campani 1993)—every western European city reveals the arrival of immigrants over recent decades. And every western European nation has seen harsh, often violent, reactions to these new minorities.

An extensive research literature has developed on these groups. This chapter outlines this work with an eye toward enlarging the sociological understanding of intergroup processes. Such a comparison is important for American sociology. The discipline has focused on black-white relations in the United States. This situation is atypical of the world's intergroup situations on many dimensions. African Americans endured two centuries of slavery and another of legal segregation. They still face intense racial barriers. They remain the most residentially segregated and have the lowest intermarriage rates with whites of any American minority (Pettigrew 1988). Nonetheless, African Americans "belong" in the United States (Landes 1955). Not even racists question their citizenship. Moreover, they share a language, religion, and a national culture with other Americans. Indeed, they are major contributors to the most distinctive elements of American culture.

In short, the position of African Americans is vastly different from that of Europe's new minorities. Yet it is the American black-white situation upon which much of sociology's study of intergroup dynamics rests. Hence, current scholarship on the unfolding scene of majority-minority relations in western Europe offers a welcome opportunity to broaden our perspective. Though only a ninth of the chapter's citations are from non-English literatures, works in English by leading European scholars help to compensate.

## THE NEW MINORITIES

### *A Rich Variety of Groups and Contexts*

The variety of new minorities within contrasting national contexts enhances the comparative value of intergroup phenomena in western Europe. The new Europeans come from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and South America. And they typically have cultural backgrounds sharply different from those of their host nations. Seven million, for instance, are Muslims (Peach & Glebe 1995).

This is not an entirely novel experience for the continent. There were mass movements of people after World War I and following the Russian Revolution (Kulischer 1948). And western Europe has long had indigenous minorities—such as the Frisians of the Netherlands and Germany, the Bretons and Corsicans of France, the Scots and Welsh of Great Britain, and the Basques and Catalans of Spain (Foster 1980). But the new minorities offer a more culturally diverse intergroup situation than the traditionally emigrating continent has experienced.

**FOUR DECADES OF IMMIGRATION** Driven by both economic opportunities and the decline of European empires, colonial minorities began arriving during the 1950s. Before independence of their native lands, French colonials were French citizens and began coming in growing numbers to France for greater opportunities. In Great Britain, London transport and other employers recruited West Indians for low-wage jobs. While only 2,000 immigrated from the islands in 1952, 26,441 came in 1956. By late 1959, Britain's West Indian population numbered 126,000 (Rich 1990, pp. 181, 188).

An especially troubled group were the South Moluccans. Prized soldiers of the Dutch East Indian Army, they had fought to maintain Dutch colonization. When Indonesia won independence in 1948, many of these soldiers and their families migrated to the Netherlands. But, upon arrival, the Dutch decommissioned them. Stripped of their specialty, many Moluccans became unemployed and remain today dependent on welfare. Their dream of returning to a sovereign South Molucca heightens their plight. Their island is now firmly in Indonesia's grip, and their dream has retarded their adjustment to Dutch society.

The 1960s saw the arrival of contract workers who were not colonials. Many of these misnamed "guest workers" were Europeans. Spanish and Portuguese came to France; Italians to France, Germany, and Belgium; Yugoslavs and Greeks to Germany; and Turks to the Netherlands and Germany. North Africans came soon after to France and the low countries. There were economic and other push factors as well as economic pull factors. Portuguese men, for example, avoided induction into their nation's colonial armies fighting to maintain African colonies.

Rapid industrial expansion in western Europe in the 1960s fueled the worker recruitment. West Germany, undergoing its "economic miracle," desperately needed more workers. It made recruitment treaties with Italy (1955), Spain (1960), Turkey (1961–1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Greece (1965), Tunisia (1965), Yugoslavia (1968), and even South Korea (1968) (Thraenhardt 1992b, p. 25). Almost 35,000 North Africans entered France each year during this decade (Creamean 1996, p. 51). Indeed, most western European countries took part in such recruitment efforts in this period.

The boom years ended with rising oil prices in the 1970s and consequent unemployment. Labor recruitment abruptly stopped, and governments developed schemes to encourage the “guest workers” to leave. Yet their numbers fell only slightly. By the 1980s, the new minorities were again growing in size from three sources: family reunion, the high birth and low death rates of their young populations, and increasing numbers of refugees. By 1995, resident foreign populations ranged from 3.6% in the United Kingdom to 18.9% in Switzerland. More than half of these foreigners are from non-European Union countries (Waldrauch & Hofinger 1997, p. 274).

**DIFFERENT STATUSES** Today the new minorities hold an array of statuses. We distinguish seven types. (For a detailed scheme, see Husbands 1991a.)

1. The most favored are the national migrants—those considered citizens who are seen as returning “home.” The special case of the “Saxons” from Romania illustrates the extremes this social construction can assume. Though separated by eight centuries from Germany, these Aussiedler “return” with full citizenship automatically granted them (McArthur 1976, Verdery 1985, Wilpert 1993).
2. Citizens of European Union (EU) countries living in other EU countries also are a favored class. Though “foreigners,” they have full rights under EU agreements. Of 13 million foreign residents in western Europe in 1993, six million were western Europeans (Muenz 1996, p. 211). Hence, they often constitute a large segment of a nation’s foreign residents—such as the Portuguese in France and Italians in Belgium (Martiniello 1992a, 1993; Franken & Martiniello 1992). Today, however, only rural Portuguese are still migrating in large numbers. Many EU migrants return to their native lands. Among those who remain, many are second- and third-generation residents.
3. Ex-colonial peoples form a large contingent. These groups usually arrived familiar with the host country’s culture and language. They include Indians, Pakistanis, and West Indians in the United Kingdom, North Africans and Southeast Asians in France, Eritreans and Somalis in Italy, and Surinamers in the Netherlands. Distinctions are often made among these groups. In Britain, “new commonwealth peoples” is the euphemism for ex-colonials of color (Miles & Phizacklea 1984, Miles & Cleary 1992, p. 131).
4. Recruited workers from such noncolonial countries as Turkey form a fourth group. Germany patterned the “guest worker” (*Gastarbeiter*) system after the Swiss treatment of Italian workers. The intention was for the recruits to rotate before planting family roots. But the Swiss plan involved mostly service workers. Skilled work required training, and companies were unwilling to rotate their “guests” and lose their human capital investment.

Soon families joined the workers, and migratory chains formed. The guests had come to stay (Thraenhardt 1992b).

5. Refugees and asylum seekers are an increasingly large cluster among the new minorities. About 15 million people throughout the world claim this status, though most go from one third-world country to another. While only 5% are in western Europe (Santel 1992, p. 107), their arrivals in EU countries rose rapidly during the 1980s—from 65,000 in 1983 to 289,000 in 1989 (Castles 1993, p. 18). It reached a peak in 1992 with 700,000 applications but, with tightened regulations, declined to 300,000 in 1994 (Koser 1996, p. 153).
6. Accepted illegal immigrants are those who, while not legal, are known to authorities and tolerated as long as they are economically useful. Polish construction workers in Germany and African harvest workers in Italy are two examples. These groups are vulnerable to the whims of officials and the economy, and they receive no social welfare benefits. In contrast, such prosperous illegals as the English in Portugal do not register so as to avoid taxes (Miles 1993).
7. Rejected illegal immigrants are the true illegals. Since there is no perceived economic need for them, authorities often deport them. Organized criminal groups from eastern Europe and Russia are often in this group. Many generalize justifiable opposition to such groups into opposition to all immigrants.

The fuzzy boundaries of these types overlap. Asylum seekers are a highly diverse group and constitute an especially slippery social construction (Castles 1993, p. 19, July 1996, Koser 1996, Santel 1992). The 1951 Geneva Convention of the United Nations defined a “political refugee” narrowly: persons with a “well-founded fear” of persecution in their native lands because of their race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. This definition excludes victims of generalized oppression, civil wars, or natural disasters as well as economic refugees. With rapid population and slow economic growth in much of the world, more asylum seekers try to escape poverty—not persecution as the United Nations defines it.

In the 1990s, the European Parliament enunciated its “safe country of origin principle.” Designed to harmonize EU policies toward asylum seekers, the Parliament returned to the narrow UN definition to exclude many “unfounded applications” (European Parliament 1997). The policy has had a chilling effect. In the Netherlands, for instance, the number of asylum seekers declined from 53,000 in 1994 to about 21,000 in 1996 (Muus 1996/7).

### *Belongingness and Citizenship*

The new minorities often find citizenship to be a major barrier. Without the New World’s immigration traditions, Europeans lack a “melting pot” meta-

phor and a sense that immigration is “normal.” Nationality often carries biological connotations—“British stock,” as Margaret Thatcher phrased it (Thraenhardt 1992b, p. 16). Thus, many view the new minorities as not belonging—even the growing numbers of the second- and third-generation who have lived only in the host nation.

This sense of not belonging interacts with citizenship. Here the nations vary widely (Thraenhardt 1992b). Sweden and the Netherlands are “the most welcoming for immigrants” (Waldrauch & Hofinger 1997, p. 278). They boast the highest rates of naturalization relative to their populations, and they allow voting in local elections for immigrants before citizenship (Hammar 1993). Although becoming more selective (Alund & Schierup 1993), Sweden provides courses in its language and culture, and naturalization for immigrants after five years.

Britain and France, though increasingly restrictive, have allowed extensive naturalization for ex-colonial peoples. And most of the second generation born in the United Kingdom or France receive citizenship. Three nations without former colonial subjects—Germany, Austria, and Switzerland—are by far the most restrictive (Waldrauch & Hofinger 1997). Turks provide a revealing example. By the mid-1990s, less than 5% of resident Turks had gained citizenship in Germany compared to more than a fifth in the Netherlands. In 1995, the Netherlands granted the largest number of naturalizations in its history—71,000, twice that of 1992 (Muus 1996/7).

### *A Time of Threat and Change*

Western Europe has experienced dramatic economic changes during the final decades of this century. The oil shocks of the 1970s reminded Europeans of the vulnerability of their economies. As in the United States, European governments began to give deficit reduction and global competitiveness priority over social and distributive justice (Stasiulis 1997). “Downsizing” the work force took hold, and unemployment mounted. Guest-worker programs ended, but the foreigners did not leave. Indeed, more immigrants arrived as families reunited, and the entry of refugees increased. Thus, the urban concentrations of the new minorities expanded. As unemployment intensified from the economic restructuring in the 1980s, it became easy to blame the foreigners.

These economic phenomena took place in a context of equally sweeping political alterations. The power of nation-states began to erode as European unity advanced, while regional claims for autonomy grew. The Communist regimes in the East imploded, the Berlin Wall fell, Yugoslavia broke up into contending ethnic enclaves, and German unification came suddenly. Societal disequilibria swept central and eastern Europe.

Many worried that a “flood” of eastern Europeans would “pour” in. Germany introduced a new Gastarbeiter policy in 1990 involving eastern Euro-

pean governments (Rudolph 1996). Germany now has about a million East European nationals within its borders, most of whom are Polish or from the former Yugoslavia (Carter et al 1993, p. 492). Overlooked in the public debate is that every western European nation's natural increase (births over deaths) has declined since 1960 while its economy has expanded—making immigration essential for continued prosperity (Munz 1996, Thraenhardt 1996).

Nevertheless, such events create threat. They set the scene for scapegoating the culturally different “others” in their midst. Quillian (1995) shows that group threat is important. Defined as the interaction of high non-EU minority percentage and low gross national product, it accounts for 70% of the variance in anti-immigrant attitude means across the 12 EU nations (also see Fuchs et al 1993).


## MAJORITY PREJUDICE AGAINST THE NEW MINORITIES

We can assess attitudes toward the new minorities with a rich data source. In 1988, the Eurobarometer Survey 30 asked seven probability samples a range of prejudice measures about a variety of minorities (Reif & Melich 1991). In West Germany, the survey asked 985 majority respondents about Turks. In France, it asked 455 about North Africans and 475 about southeastern Asians. In the Netherlands, it asked 462 about Surinamers and 476 about Turks. And in Great Britain, it asked 471 about West Indians and 482 about Pakistanis and Indians (Pettigrew et al 1998, Zick 1997).

### *Blatant and Subtle Prejudice*

Two key measures distinguish between blatant and subtle types of prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens 1995). Blatant prejudice is the traditional form; it is hot, close, and direct. The ten items that tap it involve open rejection of minorities based on presumed biological differences. Subtle prejudice is the modern form; it is cool, distant, and indirect. The ten items that measure it are not readily recognized as indicators of prejudice. They tap the perceived threat of the minority to traditional values, the exaggeration of cultural differences with the minority, and the absence of positive feelings toward them. American researchers have studied similar distinctions (Pettigrew 1989, Sears 1988). And, as various writers had proposed (Barker 1982, Bergmann & Erb 1986, Essed 1990), it proved equally useful in Europe.

Figure 1 shows the *blatant* and *subtle* scale means for the seven samples. Four major findings emerge. 1. The *subtle* means are consistently higher than those of the *blatant* scale, because the *subtle* items are covert and more socially acceptable (Pettigrew & Meertens 1995, 1996). 2. The means for *blatant*




Source: Pettigrew et al. 1997.

Figure 1 Blatant and subtle prejudice across seven samples

prejudice are conspicuously higher for German attitudes toward Turks and French attitudes toward North Africans. This result suggests that norms against the open expression of prejudice are weakest in these two instances. The means for *subtle* prejudice, however, reveal less variability. 3. Target differences exist in two nations—less French prejudice against Asians than North Africans, and less Dutch prejudice against Surinamers than Turks. Note these preferences place greater weight on cultural than racial similarities. 4. Observe, too, the distinctive data of the Dutch. They are significantly lower on *blatant* prejudice, but not on *subtle* prejudice. The contrast is striking when we compare similar target groups. The Dutch *blatant* mean for Turks is significantly lower than that of the Germans for Turks. And the Dutch *blatant* mean for Surinamers is significantly lower than that of the British for West Indians. Yet the Dutch *subtle* means are higher than these comparisons. In normative terms, this unique pattern outlines the famed “tolerance” of the Netherlands. There exists a stern Dutch norm against *blatant* prejudice. But *subtle* prejudice slips in under the norm, unrecognized as prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens 1996).

Across the seven samples, the *blatant* and *subtle* prejudice scales correlate between +.48 and +.70. The two measures share the same correlates in all samples (Meertens & Pettigrew 1997). Both the blatantly and subtly prejudiced are less educated and older. They report less interest in politics but more pride in their nationality. They less often think of themselves as “Europeans” (Petti-



Source: Meertens & Pettigrew 1997.

Figure 2 Three prejudice types and attitudes on immigrant rights

grew 1998). They are more politically conservative; but subtle prejudice is not, as some claim, simply a reflection of conservatism (Meertens & Pettigrew 1997). The prejudiced also are more likely to have only ingroup friends (Pettigrew 1997). Finally, they reveal a strong sense of group, but not individual, relative deprivation. Thus, the prejudiced sense a group threat to “people like themselves” from minorities, but not a sense of personal threat. These correlates replicate findings of American research. Since these extensive data involve seven independent samples, four nations, and six target minorities, this replication is of theoretical significance.


### *Attitudes Toward Immigration*

Do the blatant and subtle prejudice measures predict attitudes toward the salient issue of immigration? Consider the differences among three types of respondents. Equalitarians are those who score below the central point (not the mean) of both the blatant and subtle scales. Bigots score above the central points of both scales. The subtles are the most interesting; they score low on blatant but high on subtle prejudice. They reject crude expressions of prejudice. Still, they view the new minorities as “a people apart” who violate traditional values and for whom they feel little sympathy or admiration. (A fourth logical type, those high on blatant but low on subtle prejudice, occurs in less than 3% of the sample.)

Figures 2 and 3 show the results for all 3800 majority respondents, and these results replicate in all seven samples. In Figure 2, most Bigots wish to restrict immigrants' rights further. Most Equalitarians favor extending immigrants' rights. By contrast, many Subtles simply wish to leave the issue as it is. When asked if government should make citizenship easier for immigrants, the three types line up as expected. While most Equalitarians think naturalization procedures should be easier, most Subtles and Bigots disagree.

The surveys also included a scale of immigration positions that allowed multiple responses. "... The government should... (1) send all Asians, even those born in France, back to their own country. (2) Send only those Asians who were not born in France back.... (3) Send only those Asians back who are not contributing to the economic livelihood of France. (4) Send only those Asians who have committed severe criminal offenses back... (5) Send only those Asians who have no immigration documents back... (6) The government should not send back to their own country any of the Asians now living in France."

In Figure 3, differences between the types also appear on this measure. Many Bigots want to send all immigrants home. Equalitarians often favor not sending back any immigrants. Subtles typically support sending immigrants home only when there is an ostensibly nonprejudicial reason for doing so—if they have committed crimes or do not have their documents. These differences among the types are statistically significant in all samples.




Source: Meertens & Pettigrew 1997.

Figure 3 Three prejudice types and preferred immigration policies. Total sample: N = 3783

*Are Attitudes Toward Foreigners Becoming More Negative?*


Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer surveys have not repeated the extensive 1988 measures of prejudice. They have, however, repeatedly asked several relevant questions (Melich 1995). Figure 4 shows the rising percentage of Europeans who believe there are “too many” non-EU foreigners in their country. For each national sample shown and the 12 EU nations (EU12) combined, the sharpest increase occurs between 1988 and 1991. (Preunification 1988 data for East Germany were not attainable.) Clear majorities in Belgium, West Germany, France, and Italy agreed during the early 1990s that the number of foreigners is excessive. There was, however, less of this feeling by 1994, especially in Germany and Italy. The decline in Germany may well reflect changes in the constitution that made it difficult for asylum seekers to gain entry.

Figure 5 tells a similar story. Abrupt increases in the numbers of those who wish to restrict the rights of non-EU nationals again occur between 1988 and 1991. Yet not all indicators show this effect. The percentage of respondents who find the presence of non-EU nationals “disturbing” does not rise much over these years. Hence, western European opinion toward foreigners did harden during the years when the issue took center stage and political leaders defined immigration as a serious problem. Yet the increases in negative attitudes are not so large as to explain the rise in political and violent actions against immigrants.



Source: Melich 1995.

Figure 4 Too many non-European Union nationals in the country, 1988–1994



Source: Melich 1995.

Figure 5 The rights of non-EU nationals should be restricted, 1988–1992

## DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE NEW MINORITIES

### *Direct and Indirect Discrimination*

Discrimination against the new minorities is pervasive throughout western Europe (Castles 1984, MacEwen 1995, World Council of Churches Migration Secretariat 1980). But, save for the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the problem has received far less attention than that of violence.

Both direct and indirect discrimination are involved (Pettigrew & Taylor 1991). Direct discrimination, like blatant prejudice, is straightforward. It occurs at points where inequality is generated, often intentionally. Indirect discrimination, like subtle prejudice, is less obvious. It involves the perpetuation or magnification of the original injury. It occurs when the inequitable results of direct discrimination are used as a basis for later decisions (“past-in-present discrimination”) or decisions in related institutions (“side-effect discrimination”; Feagin & Feagin 1986). Indirect discrimination, a result of systemic patterns, is largely unrecognized in Europe.

Investigators have repeatedly uncovered direct discrimination in England (Amin et al 1988, Daniel 1968, Gordon & Klug 1984, Smith 1976). Controlled tests reveal the full litany of discriminatory forms involving employment, public accommodations, housing, the courts, insurance, banks, even car rentals.

One study sent identical letters for 103 advertised, nonmanual jobs from native white, West Indian, and Asian applicants. The letters contained multiple cues of ethnicity. Firms refused the white an interview only six times when they granted one to a minority candidate. But on 49 occasions, they called the white for an interview and refused to interview the minority candidates (Hubbuck & Carter 1980).

In Germany, a reporter dyed his moustache black, dressed in guest-worker style, and tried to get a drink in bars and cafes throughout Frankfurt. Repeatedly, he was refused service and thrown out (Castles 1984, p. 191). Better-controlled field studies by social scientists reveal differential, face-to-face treatment of the new minorities in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands (Den Uyl et al 1986, Klink & Wagner 1998, Sissons 1981). Their results closely resemble those of similar field studies of discriminatory acts in the United States (Crosby et al 1980).

Employment discrimination poses the most serious problem. In every western European nation, foreigners have far higher unemployment rates than do natives. In 1990 in the Netherlands, Moroccans and Turks had unemployment rates above 40%, and the Surinamese 27% compared with the native Dutch rate of 13% (Pettigrew & Meertens 1996). During the 1974–1977 recession, West German manufacturing reduced its labor force by 765,000—42% of whom were foreign workers (Castles 1984, p. 148).

There are many reasons in addition to discrimination for this situation. The “last-in, first-out” principle selectively affects the younger foreign workers. Being typically less skilled, they are more affected by job upgrading. Foreigners also are more likely to be in older, declining industries in such areas as the Ruhr Valley. Indeed, planners put Gastarbeiter into these industries for cheaper labor precisely because of their decline. Some emphasize these factors to deny any role for discrimination. Yet these factors offer insufficient explanations for the greater unemployment of foreigners. Veenman & Roelandt (1990) tested how much education, age, sex, region, and employment level account for the large group discrepancies in Dutch unemployment rates. They found that these factors explained only a small portion of the differential rates.

Indirect discrimination operates when the inability to obtain citizenship restricts the opportunities of non-EU minorities in most institutions. It restricts their ability to get suitable housing, employment, and schooling for children. A visa is required for travel to other EU countries. In short, the lives of noncitizens are severely circumscribed (Wilpert 1993).

Castles (1984) contends that the guest-worker system was itself a state-controlled system of institutional discrimination. It established the newcomers as a problematic and stigmatized outgroup, suitable for low-status jobs but not for citizenship. For initial victims of such direct discrimination, indirect discrimination in all areas of life was inevitable.

Wilpert goes further. She asserts that Germany's institutions are based on "a dominant ideology which distributes rights according to ethnic origins..." (Wilpert 1993, p. 70). The revealing comparison is between the almost two million *Aussiedler* and the *Gastarbeiter*. Officials regard the former as kin often on the thinnest of evidence, though since 1996 a language test must be taken. *Aussiedler* readily become citizens and receive favorable government treatment. Yet even third-generation Turks, who are at least as culturally "German" as the *Aussiedler*, are largely denied citizenship and given unfavorable treatment.

### *Anti-Discrimination Remediation*

Basic rights in Germany are guaranteed only to citizens. So, the disadvantages of noncitizenship include limited means to combat discrimination (Layton-Henry & Wilpert 1994). Extensive German legislation combats anti-Semitism and Nazi ideology, but these laws have proved difficult to apply to noncitizens.

The German constitution explicitly forbids discrimination on the basis of origin, race, language, beliefs, or religion—but not citizenship. Indeed, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has ruled that differential treatment based on citizenship is constitutional if there is a reasonable basis for it, and if it is not wholly arbitrary. In practice, this has meant a court has upheld charging foreign bar owners higher taxes than German bar owners. And restaurants can refuse service to Turks and others on the grounds that their entry might lead to intergroup disturbances. According to the German legal specialist Dan Leskien, Germany needs anti-discrimination legislation with broad enforcement powers and an effective monitoring system (Layton-Henry & Wilpert 1994, pp. 19–22).

Few means of combating discrimination are available in France either. Commentators often view discrimination as "natural," as something universally triggered when a "threshold of tolerance" (*seuil de tolerance*) is surpassed (MacMaster 1991). Without supporting evidence, this rationalization supports quotas and dispersal policies that limit minority access to suitable housing.

The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Sweden have enacted anti-discrimination legislature that specifically applies to the new minorities. Not coincidentally, these countries make citizenship much easier to obtain than Germany. Yet this legislation has been largely ineffective for two interrelated reasons. First, European legal systems do not allow class action suits—a forceful North American weapon to combat discrimination. Second, European efforts rely heavily on individual complaints rather than systemic remediation. Britain's 1976 Act gave the Commission for Racial Equality power to cast a

broad net, but individual complaints remain the chief tool (MacEwen 1993, 1995).

It is a sociological truism that individual efforts are unlikely to alter such systemic phenomena as discrimination. Mayhew (1968) showed how individual suits and complaints are largely nonstrategic. Minorities bring few charges against the worst discriminators, because they avoid applying to them. Complaints about job promotion are common, but they are made against employers who hire minorities. Thus, effective anti-discrimination laws must provide broad powers to an enforcement agency to initiate strategic, institutionwide actions that uproot the structural foundations of discrimination.

## POLITICAL RESPONSES

### *The Rise of Far-Right Anti-Immigration Parties*

By the 1980s, the new Europeans elicited an increasingly hostile reaction from sectors of the native populations that felt especially threatened. Throughout western Europe, extreme right-wing groups seized on the threat as their central issue. In each election for the European Parliament, the average vote for these anti-immigration parties has risen—3.4% in 1979, 4.9% in 1984 to 5.1% in 1989. By 1994, with an average of 11.1% unemployment in the European Union, the far-right parties garnered 6.9% of the vote and 25 seats (3 from Belgium, 11 each from France and Italy). Indeed, a close relationship is found across countries between the extreme right's share of the European Parliament votes and unemployment (Baimbridge et al 1994, 1995).

It is a mistake to view the new European right as simply Nazi revivals. To be sure, they share the classic authoritarian personality orientation—calls for a strong leader and law and order, beliefs in conspiracy theories, and an exclusionary view of citizenship. But, as Kitschelt (1995) makes clear, times have changed and so has the radical right. He distinguishes four types of far right. Two have only tiny constituencies—traditional fascists and “welfare chauvinists.” Two other types, however, have attracted strong followings—the new radical right and “populist anti-statists.” Unlike the first two varieties, these right-wing movements heartily endorse free market capitalism. They are political, not economic, populists. And the anti-statists gain ground in Italy and Austria, where patronage is based on the traditional party system. Yet one central theme runs through all four types—nativism and stern opposition to immigration.

**AUSTRIA** Begun after World War II under a former member of the Nazi SS, Austria's Freedom Party (FPÖ) met with only modest success until Joerg Haider became its leader in 1986. A multimillionaire with a populist flair,

Haider fashioned the FPO into the strongest far-right party in western Europe and a major party of Austria. He gained international notoriety when, as governor of Carinthia province, he praised Nazi labor practices as a good way to reduce the welfare rolls (Feen 1996, Wise 1995). Not surprisingly, Haider and his party vigorously oppose immigration, bilingual education, and immigrants' rights.

In 1994, Haider's Freedom Party won 42 of 183 parliamentary seats with more than 22% of the vote. In 1996, the party won 29 seats in Vienna's city council with the anti-immigration slogan, "Vienna must not become like Chicago" (Shanker 1996). Despite Haider's ambiguous remarks about Nazis, he claims the party is leaving its Nazi roots. Indeed, the FPO has strong free market and anti-statist positions (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Parkinson 1989). It offers a classic case of Kitschelt's (1995) anti-statist type. Nonetheless, violent groups in Austria, such as the one that desecrated a new Jewish cemetery in November 1992, use Nazi symbols and proclaim support for Haider and his party (Husbands 1993, p. 113).

**BELGIUM** Until 1979, the Volksunie was the only nationalist party of Flanders. Then dissidents formed the Vlaams Blok (VB)—a prime example of Kitschelt's "new radical right" type. This party stands for a separate Flanders that would someday join the Netherlands, and it opposes non-European residents. It would set up a fund for their repatriation, expel them after three months of unemployment, prohibit family reunion, and levy a tax on their employers. With this program, the VB has increased its vote in every general election since 1981. Centered in Antwerp, it now attracts about one eighth of Belgium's Flemish voters (Govaert 1995).

**FRANCE** The best known of Europe's far-right parties is Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National (FN)—another example of "the new radical right." Formed in 1972, the FN suffered repeated electoral reverses until the 1980s. It gained respectability in 1983 when conservatives joined them in a second ballot in the small city of Dreux. From 1984 to the present, the party has consistently attracted between 9% and 16% of the vote in a variety of national elections (Singer 1991; Husbands 1991b, Table 3). In 1995, for example, Le Pen received more than four million votes for president—more than 15% of the total.

The FN is a nationalist and populist party that has carved out a stable slot in French politics (Birenbaum 1992, Fysh & Wolfreys 1992, Husbands 1991a, Marcus 1995, Mayer & Perrineau 1992, Shields 1989, Tezenas du Montcel 1995). It is especially strong in cities of the Southeast and Northeast—areas hit hardest by industrial decline and "the exhaustion of the working-class movement" (Wieviorka 1993, p. 64). Yet it also has secured a modest hold throughout the country.

It has a broad policy program, but its key position is anti-immigration. Its leader, Le Pen, expresses blatant bigotry against a range of immigrants and minorities—from Jews to the Harkis who fought with the French against Algerian independence. “Two million unemployed” he asserts, “that’s two million immigrants too many” (Gunn 1989, p. 23). Increasingly, the French understand Le Pen’s position. National surveys show 53% in 1996, compared with 43% in 1990, “understand the Le Pen vote” considering “the behavior of certain immigrants” (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme 1997, p. 371).

Given its broad base, the FN’s voters do not differ from the general French electorate as much as some writers suggest (Husbands 1991b). There are, however, consistent findings in the many studies of the phenomenon. Like supporters of other radical right parties, FN voters are typically males (women are more attracted to European Green parties; Betz 1994, p. 143). And they are particularly numerous among small businessmen and craftsmen as well as white ex-colonials. Since 1984, the FN has attracted an increasing percentage of manual workers. Yet most of their gains are at the expense of other right-wing parties, not the declining French Communists, as some claim. And those French who live in communities with more than 10% foreign populations are less prejudiced and more accepting of immigrants than are other French (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme 1997, p. 388). There also is a vigorous anti-FN countermovement (Mayer 1995), fueled by students (Husbands 1991b).

GERMANY Le Pen’s success inspired the German right. In the 1986 Bavarian state elections, the Christian Social Union (CSU) began a furious campaign against third-world refugees. Their electoral success put the issue on center stage.

This event also saw a new far-right party split from the CSU. With anti-immigration its chief issue, the Republikaners under their leader, Franz Schoenhuber—a former SS member—offered a populist-nationalist alternative similar to that of the Front National. While centered in Bavaria, the Republikaners enjoyed success in elections elsewhere from 1989 to 1993. In 1989, they won 90,000 votes and 11 parliament seats in West Berlin. And they garnered more than two million votes and six seats in a European Parliament election. They also did well in state elections in Baden Wuerttemberg in 1992 and Hessen in 1993. However, the Kohl government’s partial adoption of their program blunted their appeal (Atkinson 1993, Thraenhardt 1992b, Wilpert 1993). By the 1994 European Parliament election, their strength had dissipated.

GREAT BRITAIN From the 1950s till the late 1960s, a policy consensus on immigration existed between the Labor and Conservative parties. It depoliticized

race, allowed limited nonwhite immigration, but did little to improve the status of immigrants (Messina 1989, Rich 1990). The crowning achievement of this era—the 1968 Race Relations Act—lacked the necessary enforcement powers to be effective. North American specialists (including the writer) had warned the act's drafters of the need for structural teeth, but their advice was ignored.

Ending this cozy arrangement, Enoch Powell began an anti-minority campaign in 1968 (Schoen 1977). A maverick Conservative member of Parliament, Powell predicted “rivers of blood” if nonwhites continued to come to Britain. He opposed anti-discrimination legislation and called for immigration restrictions and nonwhite repatriation. His message struck a popular chord in British opinion. So popular, in fact, it broke the consensus and molded the Conservatives into an anti-immigration party. “Almost single-handedly,” writes Messina (1989, p. 105), “Powell prepared the intellectual groundwork for the emergence of Margaret Thatcher as Conservative party leader in 1975.”

In 1967, England’s National Front mobilized far-right opposition to the new minorities. It had minor success, especially in the 1977 elections of the Greater London Council. Yet, as in Germany, the government assumed much of the Front’s position. Thatcher won election in 1979, aided by her anti-immigration stand. She slashed the budget of the Commission for Racial Equality and pushed through revisions of the immigration rules designed to end primary nonwhite entry.

**THE NETHERLANDS** Unlike Britain, the major Dutch parties have maintained an enlightened consensus throughout this period. The focus of this consensus, however, has shifted. In the 1980s, it emphasized the collective integration of minorities. Now it stresses the integration of minority individuals into the labor market (Fermin 1997). Still, a misnamed Centrum Party formed in 1980 to exploit the immigration issue. Two years later, it secured one seat in the lower house of parliament (Tweede Kamer). In 1986, the party split into two—the Centrum Party 86 and the Centrum Democrats. Only the latter has secured seats in the Tweede Kamer—one in 1989, three in 1994. Some members sit on municipal councils (van Donselaar 1993). Yet, with only modest strength in a few urban pockets, the Dutch far-right has failed to crack the dominant consensus on the new minorities.

**SWITZERLAND** Economic insecurity is a facilitating factor in far-right opposition to immigration. Yet prosperous Switzerland shows that it is not a necessary factor. An extremist alliance, National Action Against the Swamping of the People and Homeland, came forward with a radical initiative in 1970. It proposed to cut the foreign population almost in half, and the initiative won the support of 46% of Swiss voters. The alliance later split into two small parties, both with parliamentary representation. They have kept immigration contro-

versial, and gained power in Geneva as vigilants (Thraenhardt 1992b, pp. 42–44).

**SOUTHERN EUROPE** For Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, large-scale immigration is a new phenomenon. Long accustomed to emigration, these nations have been slow to adjust to their new situation. Italy has attracted the most immigrants, many of them illegals. Under EU pressure, Italy belatedly began to formulate immigration policies in 1986 (Campani 1993, Martiniello 1992b). Its mishandling of Albanian refugees in 1991, however, revealed how Italy remains unprepared to be an immigrant receiving country (Vasta 1993).

Figures 4 and 5 record the pointed rise in Italian concern over immigration after 1988. This suggests that a sudden increase in foreigners, rather than the actual proportion of foreigners, is key to predicting change in European attitudes toward immigration. In Italy, both national and regional political parties have exploited the public's changing attitudes. At the national level, a neo-fascist party (Movimento Sociale Italiano) and the Partito Repubblicano Italiano have taken anti-immigration positions. And so have regional secessionist parties, especially the Leagues of Tuscany and Lombardy (Martiniello 1992b, Vasta 1993). Indeed, a blatantly racist platform helped the Lega Lombarda gain success in the local elections of May 1990. More recently, the Lega Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale have added to anti-immigration agitation.

### *The Thraenhardt Thesis*

Thraenhardt (1995) contends that these political phenomena are similar across France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. While far-right efforts have gained only minimal power directly, they have shifted the entire political spectrum to the right on immigration. Left-wing and center politicians have equivocated, sometimes even collaborated. Conservative politicians have exploited the situation for two reasons. First and foremost, they see an opportunity to obscure economic issues and seize a share of the left's labor vote. And, second, they fear the loss of supporters to the far right. Thraenhardt (1992b, p. 49) credits racist appeals as vital to conservative victories in all three nations.

Conservative governments have made repeated concessions to anti-minority sentiments. They have "played an important role in promoting xenophobia and putting it on the public agenda" (Thraenhardt 1995, p. 337). Former Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major in the United Kingdom, Chancellor Kohl in Germany, and President Chirac in France have all espoused restrictions on immigration and citizenship that partly meet the far right's demands. Note these similarities across the three nations emerged despite sharp differences in their immigrant populations. Note also the policy inconsistency: Conservative parties actively pursued immigration to provide cheap labor for industry; now they stigmatize and scapegoat the foreigners who they earlier had invited.

The Thraenhardt thesis applies beyond Europe. Recall 1968 in the United States when Alabama Governor George Wallace helped to create a climate that moved President Nixon to the right on civil rights. The Republican Party has played “the race card” ever since, and converted the white South into its major base of support (Carmines & Stimson 1989, Kinder & Sanders 1996). Similarly in Australia, the rise of a far-right, populist politician, Pauline Hanson, has pushed Prime Minister John Howard’s Liberal Government further to the right on racial and immigration issues.

## VIOLENCE AGAINST THE NEW MINORITIES

### *Increasing Anti-Immigrant Violence*

Playing “the race card” heightens intergroup tensions and risks violence. Indeed, Europe’s political shift to the right accompanied a rise in anti-minority violence (Bjorgo & Witte 1993, Koopmans 1995, Witte 1995). In 1990, violent attacks against African street vendors in Florence, Italy, and the desecration of Jewish graves in Carpentras, France, made headlines.

The most publicized attacks occurred in Germany (Atkinson 1993, Heitmeyer 1993). In September 1991, a mob attacked and besieged a residence of asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda. Soon imitative acts of brutality erupted, the worst being riots and murders in Rostock, Moelln, Solingen, and Magdeburg. Passive onlookers and ineffective police characterized these horrendous events. Initially, Asian and African refugees were the primary targets. Later, Turks also became victims (Wagner & Zick 1997). Moreover, the intensity of the political debates on the constitutional rights of asylum seekers closely paralleled these acts of extreme-right violence (Gerhard 1992, Koopmans 1995, p. 27, Zick & Wagner 1993).

Germany was not alone. Britain (Gordon 1993), France (Lloyd 1993), the Netherlands (van Donselaar 1993), Scandinavia (Bjorgo 1993, Loow 1993), and the rest of Europe have all experienced patterned, anti-minority violence. Differences in record keeping and definitions of violence preclude precise cross-national comparisons (Koopmans 1995, Witte 1995). Nonetheless, sharp differences in racist violence exist. Per million inhabitants over the 1988–1993 period, England and Wales have had as many or even more racist acts as Germany. France, Norway, and Denmark have far lower rates. Switzerland has a high rate of deaths due to racist and extreme-right violence (Koopmans 1995, pp. 9–14). Save for Switzerland, however, the lethality of this European violence has not rivaled that of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland or of the Ku Klux Klan in the late nineteenth century in the southern United States.

The far-right does not commit all the racist violence. Some youthful perpetrators evince little or no right-wing ideology (Willems 1995). Their violence

often involves the affect-arousing context of sports (Holland 1995). And not all right-wing targets are minorities. Still, in Germany and the Netherlands in the early 1990s, low-status minorities were the targets of roughly three fourths of far-right violence (Buijs & van Donselaar 1994, pp. 69–70). Significantly, other immigrants—from the EU, Japan, or North America—were rarely victims (Witte 1995, p. 494).

### *The Koopmans Thesis*

Using social movement theory, Koopmans (1995) offers a two-part explanation for the sharp differences in racist violence among European nations. Following from Thraenhardt's thesis, he first emphasizes the significance of political elites who legitimize the far-right's view of foreigners as unbearable burdens. Thus, respected leaders convert the new minorities into problems. Such legitimization, Koopmans (1995, p. 34) argues, furthers far-right mobilization "...with high mass media resonance and favorable chances of substantive success."

This mobilization, however, need not invoke violence. It also can activate far-right political parties, as shown by the Vlaams Blok and Front National. Hence, Koopmans' second point highlights the importance of such parties. He shows that countries with influential racist parties, such as France, Denmark, and Norway, have experienced relatively low levels of racist violence. By contrast, countries with weak racist parties, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have had high levels. Even the Netherlands and Sweden, with low levels of general violence and without strong racist parties, have endured mid-levels of such racist attacks.

This second part of Koopmans' thesis is problematic. Aggregate data from only a few nations provide the quantitative support. And Europe's experience between the world wars contradicts the argument. Fascist parties and political violence developed together during those turbulent years. Two divergent theories of human aggression are at issue. Koopmans is following Freud's (1930) steam-boiler model of a finite amount of aggression. If it can be channeled into political action, then right-wing aggression against minorities should decline. Allport's (1954) feedback model of aggression predicts precisely the opposite. Have the far-right mobilize anti-immigrant feelings, and aggression will increase and spill over into more violence against the new minorities.

Americans can readily apply the first part of Koopmans' thesis. The regressive 1980s and 1990s have seen the erosion in the United States of the sense of inevitability of continued racial progress. Repeated attacks by leading public officials on civil rights, affirmative action, and immigration have produced an intergroup climate comparable to that shaped by Thatcher, Kohl, and Chirac in Europe (Kinder & Sanders 1996). And violence against minorities, especially

on college campuses, appears to have risen over these years (US Commission on Civil Rights 1990). Koopman's emphasis on the role of political leaders in violence is also consistent with recent time-series analyses by Green and his colleagues (Green et al 1997) of ethnic hate crimes in New York City. They find little relationship between these crimes and such macroeconomic conditions as unemployment rates.

## CONCLUSIONS

This chapter emphasizes the negative reactions to western Europe's new minorities. There also is a positive side to the picture. Native populations are slowly adjusting to the new cultures. Parisians have developed a taste for hummus, Berliners for kabab; the Indonesian rijsttafel is a basic of Dutch cuisine.

More importantly, western Europe now boasts anti-racist movements. When the wave of atrocities against foreigners swept Germany in 1992, hundreds of thousands of Germans protested. With torchlight vigils and candlelight demonstrations, they countered "hatred and violence" in Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, and other cities and towns. When the French government tried to discontinue the naturalization of French-born children of foreign parents, students protested with the slogan, "Don't touch my buddy."

Still, increased prejudice, direct and indirect discrimination, political opposition, and extensive violence are major European reactions to the new minorities. These responses represent serious social problems worthy of study for practical, policy reasons. In addition, attention to these problems broadens our understanding of intergroup conflict in industrial societies.

The research to date reveals remarkable agreement across societies. Despite sharp differences in national histories, political systems, and minorities, this new work reveals considerable consistency across the nations of western Europe. It also largely replicates and extends, rather than rebuts, the North American literature.

This chapter has noted many such convergencies. Blatant and subtle prejudice measures scale in nearly identical ways across four nations and diverse minority targets. The scales also share the same correlates across the seven samples, and these correlates replicate North American research. Both types of prejudice also predict attitudes toward immigration in all samples. And throughout the EU, attitudes toward immigrants hardened during the tense 1989–1992 period.

Moreover, a host of established social psychological processes, such as intergroup contact and group relative deprivation, operate in comparable ways in Europe. They typically act as proximal causes of prejudice, serving as mediators for the distal effects of cultural and structural factors (Pettigrew et al 1998).

The comparabilities extend to discrimination. Examples of both direct and indirect forms abound throughout western Europe. And efforts to combat discrimination have been weak across the continent. In those countries that resist granting citizenship to their new minorities, efficacious remediation of discrimination is extremely difficult. In those countries that have legislated against discrimination, the reliance upon individual complaints limits their effectiveness—again comparable to the North American experience.

Western European nations have seen the rise of far-right political opposition to immigration and the new minorities. While none of these parties has risen to power, this right-wing surge has succeeded in moving the entire political spectrum to the right on the issue. The process closely resembles that of the Wallace movement in the United States and the current Hanson movement in Australia.

Finally, similar patterns of racist violence have swept western Europe. While there is variability across nations in the number of reported incidents, the timing of this violence is similar. In particular, the elite framing of the immigration discourse, especially defining the new minorities as unbearable burdens, relates closely to the violence patterns.

The new European research supports and broadens earlier North American research in intergroup relations. It also extends our understanding in important ways. The chapter has described two of these extensions: the Thraenhardt thesis on the political exploitation of xenophobia and the Koopmans thesis on the mobilization of racist violence.

#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank James Jackson and Myriam Torres of the University of Michigan, Roel W. Meertens of the University of Amsterdam, Ulrich Wagner of the Philipps University of Marburg, and Andreas Zick of the University of Wuppertal for their invaluable help with data and bibliography. I also greatly appreciate the helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter by William Domhoff, Roel Meertens, Amelie Mummendey, Ann Pettigrew, Bernd Simon, Dietrich Thraenhardt, and Ulrich Wagner.

Visit the *Annual Reviews* home page at  
<http://www.AnnualReviews.org>.

*Literature Cited*

- Allport GW. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 537 pp.
- Alund A, Schierup CU. 1993. The thorny road to Europe: Swedish immigrant policy in transition. See Solomos & Wrench 1993, pp. 99–114
- Amin K, Fernandes M, Gordon P. 1988. *Racism and Discrimination in Britain: A Select Bibliography, 1984–87*. London: Runnymede Trust. 98 pp.
- Atkinson G. 1993. Germany: nationalism, Nazism and violence. See Bjorgo & Witte 1993, pp. 154–66
- Baimbridge M, Burkitt B, Macey M. 1994. The Maastricht Treaty: exacerbating racism in Europe? *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 17: 420–41
- Baimbridge M, Burkitt B, Macey M. 1995. The European Parliamentary election of 1994 and racism in Europe. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 18:128–30
- Barker M. 1982. *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe*. Frederick, MD: Aletheia. 183 pp.
- Bergmann W, Erb R. 1986. Kommunikationslatenz, moral und öffentliche meinung. *Köln. Zeitschr. Soziol. Sozialpsychol.* 38:223–46
- Betz HG. 1994. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 226 pp.
- Birenbaum G. 1992. *Le Front National en Politique*. Paris: Balland. 358 pp.
- Bjorgo T. 1993. Terrorist violence against immigrants and refugees in Scandinavia: patterns and motives. See Bjorgo & Witte 1993, pp. 29–45
- Bjorgo T, Witte R, eds. 1993. *Racist Violence in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 261 pp.
- Buijs FJ, van Donselaar J. 1994. *Extreem-Rechts: Aanhang, Gewald en Onderzoek*. Leiden: LISWO. 67 pp.
- Campani G. 1993. Immigration and racism in southern Europe: the Italian case. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 16:507–35
- Carmines EG, Stimson JA. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 217 pp.
- Carter FW, French RA, Salt J. 1993. International migration between East and West Europe. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 16:467–91
- Castles S. 1984. *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities*. London: Pluto. 259 pp.
- Castles S. 1993. Migrations and minorities in Europe. Perspectives for the 1990s: eleven hypotheses. See Solomos & Wrench 1993, pp. 17–34
- Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme. 1997. *Rapport de la Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme*. Paris: La Documentation française. 442 pp.
- Creamean L. 1996. Membership of foreigners: Algerians in France. *Arab Stud. Q.* 18: 49–67
- Crosby F, Bromley S, Saxe L. 1980. Recent unobtrusive studies of black and white discrimination and prejudice: a literature review. *Psychol. Bull.* 87:546–63
- Daniel WW. 1968. *Racial Discrimination in England*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. 272 pp.
- Den Uyl R, Choenni CE, Bovenkerk F. 1986. *Mag het ook een Buitenlander Wezen? Discriminatie bij Uitzendburo's*. Utrecht, The Netherlands: Natl. Bur. Against Racism. 45 pp.
- Doomernik J. 1997. Adaptation strategies among Soviet Jewish immigrants in Berlin. *New Community* 23:59–73
- Escriva A. 1997. Control, composition and character of new migration to south-west Europe: the case of Peruvian women in Barcelona. *New Community* 23:43–57
- Essed P. 1990. *Everyday Racism: Reports from Women of Two Cultures*. Claremont, CA: Hunter House. 288 pp.
- European Parliament. 1997. *Asylum in the European Union: The "Safe Country of Origin Principle"*. Strasbourg, France: Eur. Parliament. 41 pp.
- Feagin JR, Feagin CB. 1986. *Discrimination American Style: Institutional Racism and Sexism*. Malabar, FL: Krieger. 246 pp. 2nd ed.
- Feen RH. 1996. Thunder on the right: Austria's Jorg Haider and Freedom Party. *Migration World Mag.* 24(1–2):49–50
- Fermin A. 1997. Dutch political parties on minority policy, 1977–1995. *Merger* 4(2):14–15
- Foster CR, ed. 1980. *Nations Without a State: Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe*. New York: Praeger. 215 pp.
- Freud S. 1930. *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Transl. J Riviere. New York: Cape & Smith. 144 pp.
- Fuchs D, Gerhards J, Roller E. 1993. Wir und die Anderen. Ethnozentrismus in der zwölf Lander der europaischen Gemeinschaft. *Köln. Zeitschr. Soziol. Sozialpsychol.* 45:238–53
- Fysh P, Wolfreys J. 1992. Le Pen, the National

- Front and the extreme-right in France. *Parliam. Aff.* 45:309–26
- Gerhard U. 1992. Wenn Flüchtlinge und Einwanderer zu 'Asylantenfluten' werden—zum Anteil des Mediendiskurses an rassistischen Pogromen. *Osnabrucker Beitr. Sprachtheor.* 46:163–78
- Gordon P. 1993. The police and racist violence in Britain. See Bjorgo & Witte 1993, pp. 167–78
- Gordon P, Klug F. 1984. *Racism and Discrimination in Britain: A Select Bibliography, 1970–83*. London: Runnymede Trust. 143 pp.
- Govaert S. 1995. Flander's radical nationalism: how and why the Vlaams Blok ascended. *New Community* 4:537–49
- Green DP, Strolovitch DZ, Wong JS. 1997. Defended neighborhoods, integration, and hate crime. Unpublished ms. Yale Univ. Inst. for Social and Policy Stud., New Haven, CT
- Griffiths D. 1997. Somali refugees in Tower Hamlets: clanship and new identities. *New Community* 23:5–24
- Gunn S. 1989. *Revolution of the Right: Europe's New Conservatives*. London: Pluto. 135 pp.
- Hammer T. 1993. Political participation and civil rights in Scandinavia. See Solomos & Wrench 1993, pp. 115–28
- Heitmeyer W. 1993. Hostility and violence towards foreigners in Germany. See Bjorgo & Witte 1993, pp. 17–28
- Holland B. 1995. Kicking racism out of football: an assessment of racial harassment in and around football grounds. *New Community* 21:567–86
- Hubbuck J, Carter S. 1980. *Half a Chance? A Report on Job Discrimination Against Young Blacks in Nottingham*. London: Comm. Racial Equal. 63 pp.
- Husbands CT. 1991a. The mainstream right and the politics of immigration in France: developments in the 1980s. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 14:170–98
- Husbands CT. 1991b. The support for the Front National: analyses and findings. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 14:382–416
- Husbands CT. 1993. Racism and racist violence: some theories and policy perspectives. See Bjorgo & Witte 1993, pp. 113–27
- Joly D. 1996. *Haven or Hell? Asylum Policies and Refugees in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 215 pp.
- Kinder DR, Sanders LM. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press. 391 pp.
- Kitschelt H. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. Mich. Press. 332 pp.
- Klink A, Wagner U. 1998. Discrimination against ethnic minorities in Germany: going back to the field. *J. Appl. Soc. Psychol.* In press
- Koopmans R. 1995. *A Burning Question: Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe*. Berlin: Wiss.zent. Berlin Soz.forsch. 38 pp.
- Koser K. 1996. European migration report: recent asylum migration in Europe. *New Community* 22:151–58
- Kulischer E. 1948. *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917–47*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 377 pp.
- Landes R. 1955. Biralcialism in American society: a comparative view. *Am. Anthropol.* 57:1253–63
- Layton-Henry Z, Wilpert C. 1994. *Discrimination, Racism and Citizenship: Inclusion and Exclusion in Britain and Germany*. London: Anglo-German Found. Study Indust. Soc. 30 pp.
- Lloyd C. 1993. Racist violence and anti-racist reactions: a view of France. See Bjorgo & Witte 1993, pp. 207–20
- Loow H. 1993. The cult of violence: the Swedish racist counterculture. See Bjorgo & Witte 1993, pp. 62–79
- MacEwen M. 1993. *Enforcing anti-discrimination law in Britain: Here they be monsters*. Presented at Discrim., Racism and Citizenship Conf., Anglo-German Found. Study Indust. Soc., Berlin, Ger.
- MacEwen M. 1995. *Tackling Racism in Europe: An Examination of Anti-Discrimination Law in Practice*. Washington, DC: Berg. 223 pp.
- MacMaster N. 1991. The "seuil de tolerance": the uses of a "scientific" racist concept. In *Race, Discourse and Power in France*, ed. M Silverman, pp. 14–28. Aldershot, UK: Avebury. 129 pp.
- Marcus J. 1995. *The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen*. London: Macmillan. 212 pp.
- Martiniello M. 1992a. *Leadership et Pouvoir dans les Communautés d'Origine Immigree*. Paris: CIEMI/L'Harmattan. 317 pp.
- Martiniello M. 1992b. Italy—the late discovery of immigration. See Thraenhardt 1992a, pp. 195–218
- Martiniello M. 1993. Ethnic leadership, ethnic communities' political powerlessness and the state in Belgium. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 16:237–55
- Mayer N. 1995. The dynamics of Anti-Front National countermovement. *French Polit. Soc.* 13(4):12–32

- Mayer N, Perrineau P. 1992. Why do they vote for Le Pen? *Eur. J. Polit. Res.* 22:123–41
- Mayhew LH. 1968. *Law and Equal Opportunity: A Study of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 313 pp.
- McArthur M. 1976. The “Saxon” Germans: political fate of an ethnic identity. *Dialect. Anthropol.* 1:349–64
- Meertens RW, Pettigrew TF. 1997. Is subtle prejudice really prejudice? *Public Opin. Q.* 61:54–71
- Melich A. 1995. *Comparative European trend survey data on racism and xenophobia*. Presented at Workshop Racist Parties Eur., Inst. d’Etudes Polit. de Bordeaux, France
- Messina AM. 1989. *Race and Party Competition in Britain*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 200 pp.
- Miles R. 1993. Introduction—Europe 1993: the significance of changing patterns of migration. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 16:459–66
- Miles R, Cleary P. 1992. Britain: post-colonial migration in context. See Thraenhardt 1992a, pp. 121–44
- Miles R, Phizacklea A. 1984. *White Man’s Country: Racism in British Politics*. London: Pluto. 184 pp.
- Munz R. 1996. A continent of migration: European mass migration in the 20th century. *New Community* 22:201–26
- Muus P. 1996/1997. International migration to the Netherlands. *Merger* 4(1):4
- Panayiotopoulos PI. 1996. Challenging orthodoxies: Cypriot entrepreneurs in the London garment industry. *New Community* 22: 437–60
- Parkinson F, ed. 1989. *Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State Univ. Press. 345 pp.
- Peach C, Glebe G. 1995. Muslim minorities in western Europe. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 18: 26–45
- Pettigrew TF. 1988. Integration and pluralism. In *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, ed. PA Katz, D Taylor, pp. 19–30. New York: Plenum. 380 pp.
- Pettigrew TF. 1989. The nature of modern racism in the United States. *Rev. Int. Psychol. Soc.* 2:291–303
- Pettigrew TF. 1997. Generalized intergroup contact effects on prejudice. *Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull.* 23:173–85
- Pettigrew TF. 1998. *Systematizing the predictors of prejudice: an empirical approach*. Univ. Calif., Santa Cruz. Unpubl. ms
- Pettigrew TF, Jackson J, Ben Brika J, Lemain G, Meertens RW, et al. 1998. Outgroup prejudice in western Europe. *Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol.* In press
- Pettigrew TF, Meertens RW. 1995. Subtle and blatant prejudice in western Europe. *Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.* 25:57–75
- Pettigrew TF, Meertens RW. 1996. The verzuiling puzzle: understanding Dutch intergroup relations. *Curr. Psychol.* 15:3–13
- Pettigrew TF, Taylor MC. 1991. Discrimination. In *The Encyclopedia of Sociology*, ed. EF Borgatta, ML Borgatta, 1:498–503. New York: Macmillan. 519 pp.
- Quillian L. 1995. Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: population composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 60: 586–611
- Reif K, Melich A. 1991. *Euro-Barometer 30: Immigrants and Out-Groups in Western Europe, October–November 1988*. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-Univ. Consort. Polit. Soc. Res. 780 pp.
- Rich PB. 1990. *Race and Empire in British Politics*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 274 pp. 2nd ed.
- Rudolph H. 1996. The new gastarbeiter system in Germany. *New Community* 22: 287–300
- Santel B. 1992. European community and asylum seekers: the harmonization of asylum policies. See Thraenhardt 1992a, pp. 103–16
- Schoen DE. 1977. *Enoch Powell and the Powellites*. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 317 pp.
- Sears DD. 1988. Symbolic racism. In *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, ed. PA Katz, DA Taylor, pp. 53–84. New York: Plenum. 380 pp.
- Shanker T. 1996. City hell. *New Republic* 215(22):14–15
- Shields JG. 1989. Campaigning on the fringe: Jean-Marie Le Pen. In *The French Presidential Elections of 1988: Ideology and Leadership in Contemporary France*, ed. J Gaffney, pp. 140–57. Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth. 241 pp.
- Singer D. 1991. The resistible rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 14: 368–81
- Sissons M. 1981. Race, sex and helping behavior. *Br. J. Soc. Psychol.* 20:285–92
- Smith DJ. 1976. *The Facts of Racial Disadvantage: A National Survey*. London: PEP. 257 pp.
- Solomos J, Wrench J, eds. 1993. *Racism and Migration in Western Europe*. Oxford, UK: Berg. 293 pp.
- Stasiulis DK. 1997. International migration, rights, and the decline of “actually existing liberal democracy.” *New Community* 23: 197–214
- Tezenas du Montcel A. 1995. Le Pen: la strate-

- gie de la fourmi. *Le Nouvel Econ.* 24: 56–60
- Thraenhardt D, ed. 1992a. *Europe: A New Immigration Continent*. Muenster, Ger: Lit. 252 pp.
- Thraenhardt D. 1992b. Europe—a new immigration continent: policies and politics since 1945 in comparative perspective. See Thraenhardt 1992a, pp. 15–74
- Thraenhardt D. 1995. The political uses of xenophobia in England, France and Germany. *Party Polit.* 1:323–45
- Thraenhardt D. 1996. European migration from East to West: present patterns and future directions. *New Community* 22: 227–42
- US Commission on Civil Rights. 1990. *Bigotry and Violence on American College Campuses*. Washington, DC: US Comm. Civil Rights. 80 pp.
- van Donselaar J. 1993. The extreme right and racist violence in the Netherlands. See Bjorgo & Witte 1993, pp. 46–61
- Vasta E. 1993. Rights and racism in a new country of immigration: the Italian case. See Solomos & Wrench 1993, pp. 83–98
- Veenman J, Roelandt T. 1990. Allochtonen: achterstand en achterstelling. In *Arbeidsmarkt en Maatschappelijke Ongelijkheid*, ed. JJ Schippers, pp. 88–114. Groningen, The Netherlands: Wolters-Noordhoff. 281 pp.
- Verdery K. 1985. The unmaking of an ethnic collectivity: Transylvania's Germans. *Am. Ethnol.* 12:62–83
- Vranken J, Martiniello M. 1992. Migrants, guest workers and ethnic minorities. Historical patterns, recent trends and social implications of migration in Belgium. See Thraenhardt 1992a, pp. 219–51
- Wagner U, Zick A. 1997. Auslanderfeindlichkeit, Vorurteile und diskriminierendes Verhalten. In *Aggression und Gewalt*, ed. HW Bierhoff, U Wagner, pp. 145–64. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 268 pp.
- Waldrauch H, Hofinger C. 1997. An index to measure the legal obstacles to the integration of immigrants. *New Community* 23: 271–85
- Wieviorka M. 1993. Tendencies to racism in Europe: Does France represent a unique case, or is it representative of a trend? See Solomos & Wrench 1993, pp. 55–65
- Willems H. 1995. Right-wing extremism, racism or youth violence? Explaining violence against foreigners in Germany. *New Community* 21:501–23
- Wilpert C. 1993. Ideological and institutional foundations of racism in the Federal Republic of Germany. See Solomos & Wrench 1993, pp. 67–81
- Wise MZ. 1995. Spandau spandex: Meet Austria's latest fascist. *New Republic* 213(26): 16–17
- Witte R. 1995. Racist violence in western Europe. *New Community* 21:489–500
- World Council of Churches Migration Secretariat, ed. 1980. *Migrant Workers and Racism in Europe*. Geneva: World Council of Churches. 158 pp.
- Zick A. 1997. *Vorurteile und Rassismus: Eine Sozialpsychologische Analyse*. Muenster, Germ: Waxmann. 494 pp.
- Zick A, Wagner U. 1993. Den Turken geht es besser als uns. Wie Fremde zu Feinden werden. *Psychol. Heute* 20:48–53