

JUVENAL, SATIRE AND THE PERSONA THEORY:
SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

JON W. IDDENG

This article briefly outlines the origin of the persona theory as applied to Roman verse satire, particularly Juvenal. Scholars adapting this theory regard the speaker in the satires as a fictitious literary character, a dramatic mask (*persona*). The central arguments in favour of this concept put forward by W.S. Anderson and some of his followers are examined and discussed, and the validity of the whole persona doctrine in its more exceeding form is challenged.

*Semper ego auditor tantum? Numquamne reponam ...?*¹

In recent decades many scholars on Roman verse satire have been preoccupied with the study of the first-person voice. Most of these scholars regard the author of the Roman satire as separate from, and in opposition to, the speaker he creates. This 'I' person is called a mask, the Latin *persona*, or 'the satirist'.² In this paper I will try to give a brief sketch of this theory and look into the argumentation put forward by some of its most conspicuous contributors, first and foremost William S. Anderson. Apparently, Maynard Mack and Alvin B. Kernan were the first to introduce the idea of *persona* or 'the satirist' as the speaker, different from the author of the satire.³ Anderson picked up the thread, convinced he could unravel old patchwork on the Roman satire and stitch it together in a better way using this new concept,

¹ I am grateful for the comments and remarks offered by Professor Johan H. Schreiner, several research fellows and the anonymous referees of the publisher. They have helped improve this article, making me no longer *auditor tantum*. Above all, however, my gratitude is directed to Professor Nils Berg, and in honour of his 70th birthday this year I dedicate the article to him.

² I use 'satirist' here and in the rest of the paper as a synonym for *persona* or the narrator/speaker, distinguished from the satirist as author of satire. When speaking of satire I generally mean Roman verse satire, unless other is implicated.

³ See Winkler (1983, *iff.*) for a survey (though not a critical analysis) of the development of the persona theory. Maynard Mack "The Muse of Satire", *The Yale Review* 1951, and A.B. Kernan, *The Cankered Muse* (New Haven, 1959).

generally referred to as the persona theory.⁴ This he described himself as “we are possibly, therefore, at the beginning of a new era in studies of Roman satire” (1982, 10). The era was new in two senses. It was breaching with the biographical reading of Roman satire and it was broaching the speaker as the focal point of analysis. Anderson pointed out that the speaker in the satires should not be treated as identical to the author. Satires are fiction, where contradiction, exaggeration and inconsistency flourish and certain matters are pushed to extremes. Anything the speaker said, any verse the satirists wrote cannot be seen as the author’s own opinions, genuine feelings or a true description of the Roman society of his day. This distinction, obvious as it seems today, has been valuable and useful. It would be unwise to take Juvenal’s description of Greeks in Rome, of Subura or Egypt at face value, and it is of little interest whether or not Horace actually had a conversation with the bore. Anderson was in his right to call for a more scientific and thorough reading of the satires—certainly the only way to be better able to grasp their relations to contemporary people and events. Nevertheless, as a cultural historian I find Anderson’s persona reading, especially of Juvenal, unsatisfactory. In the following I put forward some critical remarks of this reading, and try to argue where and why I believe it fails. A considerable number of scholars have embraced Anderson’s view,⁵ but apart from quoting and referring to Anderson, few, if any, of them have made their own theoretical ground or argued their methodical approach to the persona. A discussion on the persona theory is therefore necessarily a discussion of Anderson’s views (mainly outlined in the 1960s). There is no reason to expect *ira et lacrimae*, but hopefully this can provoke debate on the issue.

The persona and the modern ‘ideal critic’

In the satires of Horace, Anderson (1982, 72) acknowledges a “complex and changing interrelation of autobiography and art in the works of the most subjective of all Roman poets”. In Persius he found a poet that “saw the situation different from his predecessors. Instead of personality with a full existence of amusing successes and failures, virtues and faults, his satirist is

⁴ Anderson’s substantial contribution to the study of Roman satire is collected in *Essays on Roman Satire* (Princeton, 1982). This includes several articles concerning this very topic, above all the famous “Anger in Juvenal and Seneca” (orig. in *California Publications in Classical Philology* 51, 1964). My references are to the Essay collection.

⁵ Of his followers, many could be mentioned; here are but a few significant names to be found in the reference list at the end: S.M. Braund, K. Freudenburg, J.R.C. Martyn and M.M. Winkler. Regarding when the persona phenomenon began in Roman satire, they seem to disagree, however.

monochromatic, even monotonous (if you will). He is the steady incarnation of *sapientia*" (Anderson 1982, 179). Reading the first two books of Juvenal, however, Anderson found a speaker who was irrational and inconsistent, in opposition to the Stoic ideal of tranquillity outlined by Seneca. He concluded that this 'satirist' should be seen as a fictitious dramatic character, a caricature whose viewpoints should not be taken seriously and "by no means identical with Juvenal's ideals and equally alien to the reader's preconceptions" (Anderson 1982, 313). Anderson apparently thus distinguishes between the personae created by Horace, Persius and Juvenal, in that the first is a character based on the author's autobiography, the second a clearly-drawn moralist figure and the latter an untrustworthy self-parody. This differentiation has affected satire reading and the understanding of the persona ever since. As few have challenged Anderson, the persona theory keeps appearing—more reluctantly on the other satirists, but, on Juvenal, scholars have revelled.⁶ Anderson was in his right to point out that the way Gilbert Highet and others were seeking autobiography in every line of Juvenal's *Satires* was an erroneous and fruitless quest.⁷ To separate the speaker in ancient literature from the author completely, and let him live his own isolated literary life, however, seems to be pushing it too far into barren land. A lesson from twentieth-century literary critics and linguists has been to read the text thoroughly and pay attention to its structures. This has more or less always been common sense in classical philology, but we cannot be reminded too often. It seems nonetheless that many tools taken from modern literary theory do not fit all that well for the analysis of ancient literature like the satires of Juvenal (cf. McCabe 1986). Anderson and his followers claim that the satires have been misunderstood and misinterpreted almost since they were written, but stand a chance of being more correctly understood and interpreted through their use of the persona theory.⁸ There are of course many fields

⁶ A typical example of this is the latest edition of *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, where Juvenal is accounted for in this way by S.M. Braund under 'Juvenal', but none of the other satirists under name or at the list word 'Satire', by other contributors. Three attempts to challenge Anderson are G. Highet 1983, 268–86 ("Masks and Faces in Satire" orig. *Hermes* 102, 1974, 321–37), K. McCabe 1986 and P. Green 1989.

⁷ *Juvenal the Satirist* (Oxford 1954) (the biographical attempt constitutes only a part of this book and the rest of Highet's production, however, and it is not fair that he has been so totally scolded and dismissed because of it). The same is the problem with Peter Green's chapter (1972) on "Juvenal and his Age".

⁸ Anderson (1982, 7–8): "Therefore, the task of the critic—that ideal critic who has not appeared for Persius in 1900 years—remains to interpret those poetic methods first, knowing quite well that the disclaiming of talent forms a conventional and always ambiguous aspect of the persona, that the producer of poetic satire would not have essayed the genre without

of research where new methods and approaches lead to new erudition and insights. We cannot rule out that history has misread and misunderstood a satirist like Juvenal until recently, but we should be aware of the problem of disclaiming nearly two thousand years of satire reading when considering the doctrine of persona. Regarding the speaker as an untrustworthy dramatic caricature, in opposition to the views and values of the author, raises two problems. It takes for granted that ancient authors conceived the conception of such speakers, although the sources do not support this. And it conditions an alternative access to ancient authors' minds to be able to learn something about their *real* views and values, although such access usually is denied. Let us then start with the speaker's moral conduct.

Rationality and fiction

Anderson focuses on indignation and rationality, and finds the contempt and criticism voiced by the speaker in Juvenal's early satires unreasonable in the era of the 'good emperors'. To him this is therefore evidence of the speaker's unreliability, and he joins those who comment on "the irrationality of Juvenal's analysis of Roman decline, especially as applied to the happy eras of Trajan and Hadrian when many a Roman like Pliny lived contentedly, and when the whole Roman world enjoyed marked prosperity".⁹ Edward Gibbon's more than two hundred years old idea of the good emperors and "the fairest part of the world and most civilized portion of mankind" has proven to be hard to kill, but modern studies on the period have helped develop a less glorious picture.¹⁰ To accept Pliny's words at face value, as omniscient on his contemporary society, and reject Juvenal as a social and political critic on lack of motive is unreasonable and illogical—there was then, as there will always be, plenty of meat for a satirist to get his teeth into.

Nevertheless, Anderson and his followers use the concept of the persona to explain actions and outbursts from the speaker that they find illogical or

fundamentally poetic purposes;" J.R.C. Martyn (1979, 219): "Juvenal has been regularly misunderstood by the scribes and Pharisees of both late-Roman and modern times;" S.M. Braund (1996a, 17): "From antiquity to the present day the satirist has been regarded as an angry champion of morality, as 'the scourge of villainies'. But only recently has the nature of Juvenal's *indignity* been analysed more closely".

⁹ Anderson 1982, 294. He also states (1982, 392): "citizens of Rome in the relatively comfortable, uncontroversial reign of Trajan, how could they muster much sympathy or credulity for the extremist conclusions of Umbricius?"

¹⁰ Quotation from the very beginning of Gibbon's *The Decline and the Fall of the Roman Empire*. Waters (1970, 77), to mention but one scholar, rigorously claims that "the reign of Trajan represented yet a further step in the development of despotism in Rome".

improper, something that a noble man like Juvenal never sincerely could have meant.¹¹ Thus, Anderson, discussing satire and persona, states (1982, 9): “sometimes the persona created by the satiric poet is so distinct from the poet’s biography that the two are opposites”. This is the case with Juvenal, he maintains. The satires are, however, the only sources to Juvenal’s mentality and points of view, and from them all we may claim to know is that he was a well-educated man. No matter what we think or believe about him and his state of mind, besides his texts we have no knowledge and no biography, and thus no evidence that the views of the speaker should be far from those of Juvenal, the author. People hold strange views and do strange things, even things that seem irrational or improper in their own time. We do, the Romans did. We must also remind ourselves that logic and morality are not universally understood constants. We do not need a persona theory to deal with things we find irrational or improper.

Anderson bases his persona theory on the speaker’s irrational tension, and puts forward a five-point programme taken from Kernan (see note 3) to show this (1982, 293):

“The typical satirist experiences or exhibits internal conflicts on at least five levels: 1) he is a plain, blunt, simple artless speaker who yet makes the most skillful use of rhetoric; 2) he proclaims the truth of what he says, while he wilfully distorts facts for emphasis; 3) although he loathes vice, he displays a marked love of sensationalism; 4) despite his moral concerns, the satirist can take sadistic delight in attacking his victims; 5) sober and rational as he may claim to be, he frequently adopts the most shockingly irrational attitudes”.

He goes on to point out that “the logical extension of the satirist’s inconsistencies is the presentation of the satirist as a villain, a perverse wretch who plots to create a diseased social order in conformity with his vile conception of life” (1982, 294). There is a problem with this description of the ‘satirist’, and the method behind Anderson’s “logical extension”. As Hightet pointed

¹¹ Anderson finds for instance Juvenal’s outburst on the female sex “utter fantasy, divorced from reality and distorted beyond measure ... few men would utterly spurn the fair sex, for few men can achieve a satisfactory existence without women” (1982, 310). Hightet (1983, 278f.) comments on this in his reply to Anderson’s criticism, and goes on to point out the world’s long history of misogyny. Winkler finds Juvenal’s use of rude words like *cinaedus*, *pathicus*, *mollis*, *clunis* and such bouncing back at the satirist, who thus “loses his credibility with the reader” (Winkler 1983, 219). This seems to be a bit too Victorian. Descriptions of sexuality, even obscenities, were not uncommon in the ancient world. We find plenty of such descriptions in Roman authors like Catullus, Horace (in the *Epodes*), Martial and Suetonius.

out, “All human beings are inconsistent with themselves”.¹² Tension, inconsistency, irrationality—it is all part of the human nature. Anderson had faith in Pliny’s sincerity and saw him as a representative of the educated Romans, contentedly living in the reign of Trajan and Hadrian. Given that this five-point programme can reveal (and confirm the existence of) a wretched literary character, distinct from a reliable speaker in satire, it must be assumed that by using the same programme on an author whose voice clearly never was meant to be a fictitious villain, such would not be revealed (and assumptions of this would be invalidated). Let us then consider using this scheme on two of Juvenal’s contemporary prose writers, Pliny the Younger and Tacitus. Pliny was never modest enough to claim to be a “plain, blunt, simple artless speaker”, but few readers of the *Panegyricus* would have problems finding all the other characteristics of Anderson’s scheme. When Pliny held that speech (or an earlier version of it), did the audience regard it as stand-up comedy, smiling at Pliny’s inconsistent and exaggerating persona? Did they at least acknowledge the insincerity of the lick-spittle of a ‘panegyrist’? I believe there is a general consensus that the answer should be *no* to both questions. Pliny’s tension and inconsistencies have never led anyone to suggest he is creating a persona who is a villain and a perverse wretch. But then, we know more of the context of *Panegyricus*. What happens if we run the five-point programme on Tacitus?

1) Tacitus claims to be “a plain, blunt and artless speaker”—*vel condita ac rudi voce* (“however unartistic and unskilled my language”, *Agric.* 3) and *nobis in arto et inglorius labor* (“my labours are circumscribed and inglorious”, *Ann.* 4.32)—yet nobody would deny he “makes the most skillful use of rhetoric”.¹³

2) Tacitus “proclaims the truth of what he says”—*tradere...sine ira et studio, quorum causas procul habeo* (“to relate...without either bitterness or partiality, from any motives to which I am far removed”, *Ann.* 1.1), and *incorruptam fidem professis neque amore quisquam et sine odio dicendus est* (“those who profess inviolable truthfulness must speak of all without partiality and without hatred”, *Hist.* 1.1). But even Tacitus knows the art of distorting facts and leading his reader through emphasis and anonymous comments.¹⁴

¹² Hightet (1983, 277). He quotes Walt Withman (*The Song of Myself*): *Do I contradict myself? / Very well then I contradict myself*, and goes on to ask (p. 280): “Would it not be a waste of effort for such an author to create fictitious entities full of incongruities, designed to voice ideas not his own, and therefore two degrees removed from truth and reality?”

¹³ Mellor (1993, 114): “Every page of Tacitus shows the effects of this rhetorical training”.

¹⁴ Mellor (1993, 116): “The rhetorical innuendo of the politician and the advocate proved congenial to the imperial historian. Tacitus uses rumors and hearsay to attribute motives and

3–4) Tacitus “loathes vice” and is a man of “moral concerns”, examples should be unnecessary. But even he enjoys telling about it, using whatever rumours he feels fit, and passing harsh judgements on reprobates. Tacitus’s description of certain episodes in the life of Nero in the *Annales* underlines this: Nero on stage during the fire in 64 (15.38–9), the palace intrigues with Agrippina, especially the murder of Britannicus (13.12–17), and the description of Otho’s wife Poppaea Sabina (13.45–46). Surely, one can say that even Tacitus has a “marked love for sensationalism” and takes “delight in attacking his victims”. After all he feels obligated (*praecipuum munus annalium reor*) to reveal proposals in the senate that were remarkably scandalous (*notabili dedecore—Ann. 3.65*).¹⁵

5) It is quite obvious that Tacitus presents himself as “sober and rational”—*sine ira et studio*. Then we are left with “shockingly irrational”. Aspects of Tacitus’s work may be seen as irrational. When Tacitus describes the fall of the republic and the political and social climate during the early principate it is with the Roman nobility in mind. The common people of the empire he describes more with contempt than concern. With one sentence he summarises the way the provinces were happy with Augustan rule (*neque provinciae illum rerum statum abnuebant—Ann. 1.2*). To me it seems irrational to condemn a development that allegedly benefited such a large proportion of the population of the empire, but I have a feeling that my view would be equally alien to a Roman noble. Tacitus was preoccupied by evil forces and the punishment of the gods in the Roman society. Not uncommon, but hardly rational by our standards. The way he condemns others who silently made careers under tyrants, but tries to explain away the fact that he had done so himself (along with Agricola and Trajan) is not always convincing. Still I find it hard to label Tacitus “shockingly irrational”. But “shockingly irrational” is such a strong phrase that I am not sure it is suitable even for Roman satirists, definitely not Horace or Persius.

If these quick surveys can be given any weight, Anderson’s five-point programme did confirm the existence of a speaker who is “a villain, a perverse wretch” even in the works of Tacitus. If such a confirmation results in Juvenal’s narrator being an unreliable dramatic persona “by no means identical with Juvenal’s ideals”, does not Pliny’s and Tacitus’s as well? Perhaps one could argue the existence of some sort of inconsistency scale, but then one

secret feelings to his characters, and anonymous comments function as an important dramatic device ... Again and again Tacitus uses anonymous comments to paint a prejudicial picture while he maintains a pose of neutrality and detachment”.

¹⁵ See Sinclair (1991) for an analysis of Tacitus’s use of innuendo and rumours.

would need to fix a certain maximum level of tension or inner contradiction to pass as sincere. A Sisyphean task, I would argue.

This problem may be connected to genre. Anderson seems to take for granted that the Roman reader distinguished sharply between literary fiction (including poetry) and non-fiction (mainly factual prose). Verse satire then must fall into the first category, whereas history and (epideictic) oratory fall into the second. This is hardly a **perspicacious** distinction for literature in general, for ancient literature perhaps all wrong. Some distinctions were obviously made. Poetry, more or less meaning verse in a grand style, was a particular category with distinct labels on those practising (*poeta, vates*). **Certain distinctions of genre (epigramma, satura, elegia, epos, historia, annales) or topoi (consolatio, apologia, propemptikon, paraklausithyron) were used. However, a line between fiction and factual prose was never drawn.** We have no record of a substantially different approach by the readers or the audience to different types of writing. All types of literature (even usually drama) were subjected to the same procedures in the literary institution—read to and circulated among friends, recited at a more public gathering and finally published and read (hopefully) by the many. **Poets refer to or cite annalists, historians and biographers, and vice versa. To cut it short, I do not think a Roman reader would reflect much on the distinction fiction/non-fiction.**¹⁶

This is not to say that he or she would treat any epic on Jason or Orestes in the same manner as political biography. Juvenal, for one, starts his first book of satires by rejecting making verse on mythological nonsense, and he explicitly states his wish to treat **contemporary real life.** **The point is that all writing in antiquity had a literary aspect, and all literary genres could comment on or reveal something about current affairs.** Cicero's *Orationes* were not just political documents to a Roman, they were literary and rhetorical masterpieces—and that is why they were widely read, studied and preserved. Pliny polished and published his letters, not primarily for future historians or biographers, but to gain a reputation for eloquence and style. Lucan's *Pharsalia* was not just an epic tale, but a striking political statement; it was forbidden and Lucan forced to commit suicide. An educated Roman would appreciate eloquence and rhetorical mastery and be familiar with innuendo and double speech. He would not expect the author to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, although he would expect him to claim so. He would expect to get the author's version on an issue or event (either straight out, or hidden), and then himself examine the author's inten-

¹⁶ Woodman (1988, 100): "Though we today see poetry, oratory and historiography as three separate genres, the ancients saw them as three species of the same genus—rhetoric".

tions, his viewpoints as argued, and finally the verisimilitude of the whole presentation. If convincingly brought forward he might find it *verisimile*, and/or in accordance with his own perceptions on the issue. Historians, biographers and so alike would try to make their narrative as verisimilar as possible (but not necessarily unbiased), poets would not worry about the credibility of the narrative as such, but more of the ideas or sentiments behind. To be able to succeed, they would use whatever rhetorical device they found fit. For a satirist this included hyperbole, irony, periphrasis, paradoxes, anti-theoretical outbursts and so on. Since satirists do not produce forensic oratory they may utilise rhetorical tools differently according to their *lex operis*, and still create a picture that is not contradictory to their own view.

Seneca, Juvenal and Ira

In his renowned article “Anger in Juvenal and Seneca” Anderson analyses Seneca’s *De ira*, where Seneca dissociates himself from anger as irrational. Seneca insists, according to Anderson, that “rage against personal injuries fails to achieve its end; and outrage against the corruption of Rome is impractical and insane” (1982, 338). Anderson maintains that this is relevant for Juvenal and his speaker, and ends up with the following chain of thought: a) Juvenal’s speaker claims to be indignant and shows signs of anger. b) The educated reader was skilled in rhetoric and shared Seneca’s conception on *ira*.¹⁷ c) Juvenal, a great poet, would not seriously contradict it either. d) Hence the speaker in Juvenal’s earlier satires must be an unreliable figure, the main object of ridicule: “no sane man should seek the insanity of indignation” (1982, 339). e) “Juvenal himself recognised this and in his later Satires created a new satirist in close conformity with the Senecan ideal” (*ibid.*). Since this study has been cited and brought forward as proof of the persona theory by many scholars, it is worthy of a closer look. In my opinion it has five weak points.

Firstly, Anderson takes for granted, but does not prove, that Seneca’s view on *ira* (as outlined above) was well known, accepted and normative in the Roman literary institution in the days of Juvenal. By inducing something on a society or a social group from one of its individuals, the outcome is always in danger of being incorrect. When the issue is values and morality and the

¹⁷ Anderson (1982, 324): “Seventy years later Juvenal’s audience, undoubtedly familiar with Seneca’s treatise or similar ideas, would have been bound to question the ethical propriety of *indignatio* and hence of the satirist’s angry picture of the Roman world”.

individual is a philosopher and master of ethics living two generations before the social group in question, the danger is overwhelming.¹⁸

Second, Anderson does little to place the mentioned work (or others of Seneca for that matter) in its historical context. Much has been written on Seneca and his position at court (or out of it). Perhaps Seneca was motivated no less by an urge to influence the current emperor than later literati when writing these works.

Third, Anderson does not discuss Lucilius, the genre inventor, as role model for Juvenal on *indignatio*—undoubtedly he wrote fierce and indignant verses.¹⁹ Lucilius wrote them long before Seneca, but Juvenal would be more than familiar with his work. It seems sensible to analyse to what extent Lucilius's use of indignation is reflected in Juvenal as well. After all, Juvenal (or his speaker if you like) explicitly states he is going to follow in his wheel rut.

Fourth, Anderson points to a possible connection of thoughts between Seneca and Juvenal, but does little to show that this is implicit in the narrative of the *Satires*. Anderson sets out to establish that although *ira* (Seneca's main term) and *indignatio* (Juvenal's term) are not strictly the same emotion, "the Roman rhetoricians and moralists used them synonymously" (1982, 315–16). Yet, when listing the other words Seneca uses to describe inappropriate anger, Anderson admits (1982, 325): "None of these synonyms occur in Juvenal's early *Satires*; the satirist is not so foolish as to cut off from himself all possibility of sympathy". The problem with this is not foremost that the 'satirist' himself suddenly makes the decisions, but the lack of logic behind this consideration. These words cannot be used synonymously if the 'satirist' at the same time can gain sympathy when *indignatio* is used that he would not have got if *ira* was used. Furthermore, Anderson would have to hold that all ancient readers (or listeners, if we are to understand the satires as drama to be performed) knew *De ira* by heart or had a copy to run over before deciding to sympathise or not with a narrator. Could there not be a possibility that since Seneca never describes *ira* and *indignatio* as close synonyms, they were in fact not as close as Anderson wants them to be? Such a notion can be sup-

¹⁸ McCabe (1986, 81): "Would Anderson maintain that a treatise written seventy years ago—say by Bertrand Russell—would preclude a present day author from writing in a manner scorned by that philosopher?"

¹⁹ Braund (1988, 8) labels Lucilius "a byword for aggression". Horace asserts that Lucilius defied the sensitivity of the nobility with twists, insults and offensive verse (*versus famosi*), and attacked (*arripuit*) them and the people tribe by tribe (*Sat.* 2.1.62–70). Persius claims Lucilius assailed the whole city and took a bite at many a noble (*secuit Lucilius urbem / ..et genuinum fregit in illis*—1.114–5.). Juvenal presents an inflamed Lucilius roaring as with a drawn sword (*ense velut stricto quotiens Lucilius ardens / infremuit*—1.165–6).

ported by Latin etymology. *Ira* and *irasci* are linked to uncontrolled wrath, clearly something a self-restrained Stoic would countermince. *Indignatio* stems from the verb *indignari* (to be offended, or find something unworthy/unjust), a more reasonable reaction for a morally sound man to something offensive or atrocious (partly as argued by Seneca's *adversarius* in *De ira*).²⁰ Nevertheless, let us suppose that Anderson is correct in maintaining that *indignatio* was used more or less synonymously with *ira* and the other words he mentions: *furor*, *rabies*, *feritas*, *infirmetas*, *dolor*. If other influential Roman writers approach anger in a different manner, we must assume that part of the Roman audience did so as well. I shall give three examples, although I am convinced that with a little research many others could be produced. Juvenal's contemporary Pliny praises Novius Maximus for his ability to unite great poetry with anger/indignation (*in quo tu ingenii simul dolorisque velis latissime vectus es—Ep.* 4.20). A mixture of poetry and indignation was appreciated, not condemned, by one of the day's most influential rhetoricians and literary critics. Moreover, when speaking in *Panegyricus* 53 of the duty (*officium*) he felt it was for all subjects to praise the new emperor Trajan by attacking former bad ones, Pliny explicitly says nobody can properly appreciate a good princeps who does not sufficiently hate a bad one (*qui malos satis non oderit*). He goes on to praise Trajan for letting everybody (with their recently felt *dolor*) avenge themselves on evil emperors of the past. Cicero claims in his famous first speech against Catilina that he has always held hatred (*invidia*)²¹ brought forward by *virtus* as honourable (*tamen hoc animo fui semper ut invidiam virtute partam gloriam, non invidiam putarem—Cat.* 1.12). These three examples clearly contradict Seneca's ideal. In other words, distinguished Roman authors and rhetoricians disagreed with Seneca regarding anger (at least as outlined by Anderson). Other Roman authors and poets (and their audience) could thus choose between different authorities on the issue, based on moral philosophy or rhetoric.

That brings us over to the final point, the use of rhetorical devices. Seemingly Anderson ends up being brought down by his own logic when discussing Juvenal, rhetoric and the problem of *orator iratus*. As shown, Anderson claims that Seneca's condemnation of anger leads to a general condemnation in the Roman audience. Appearance of anger will therefore seem

²⁰ As stated by Anderson (1982, 426—in his essay “Quintilian and Juvenal”): “An honest man would be affronted by injustice; therefore, the advocate as *vir bonus* should convey the appropriate effect of *indignatio* when the occasion demands”.

²¹ *Invidia* is not mentioned by Anderson, but in this context it conveys the same meaning as the listed synonyms—anger or indignation towards somebody.

ridiculous and unsympathetic. This does not go for the *orator iratus* as even Seneca and thus Anderson (1982, 327) admits:

“True, the ‘angry orator’ achieves greater success than his calm confrere; but the key to his success lies not in being angry, but in skillfully imitating wrath. ... the orator ... must be prepared to simulate convincingly many emotions, among them anger. By so doing, he can provoke sympathetic anger while himself retaining all his faculties, ready to resort to a different emotion at need”.

Can Anderson’s chain of thought then carry any weight when facing Juvenal and his speaker? Anderson has pointed out that orators with their rhetorical set of tools readily adapt emotions and arguments to fit the purpose there and then. The emotions they display are simulated or imitated, not real or true. The more skillful at this, the more successful—according to Quintilian (*Inst. Or.* 6.2.26–36) the ability to act these emotions wholeheartedly was not just a way to success, but also a duty. Anderson points to Juvenal’s extended use of rhetoric, his speaker’s swiftly change in tone and sentiments and claims he was successful in provoking indignation,²² but not consistent and trustworthy. The logical and obvious conclusion to this must be that Juvenal is using the same rhetorical equipment as the *orator iratus* and is “skillfully imitating wrath”. What is a successful play on *pathos* if undertaken by an orator cannot at the same time be proof of the creation of a ridiculous speaker not to be taken seriously when it comes to a satirist. The main purpose of rhetoric is after all to persuade people that one is right.

Cicero speaks several times of the use of *indignatio* as a just rhetorical technique, especially in *De inventione* (1.100–9). Here he points out that *indignatio* is something that a speaker can arouse in his audience through different *loci*. As Susanna M. Braund has shown, almost all of Cicero’s *loci* can be applied to Juvenal’s speaker.²³ But the point Cicero is making is not that the speaker should arouse inappropriate and uncontrolled wrath, but a rightful discontent or indignation over an outrageous situation. Stirring up indignation is a rhetorical technique; Cicero outlined this technique in detail for future speakers to use when appropriate. Even if we follow Anderson, assuming that Seneca did not appreciate a speaker playing on anger or indignation, what would we expect a satirist to do who wants to make his case; to follow prudent advice from a temperate philosopher or a vigorous pointer from an experienced rhetor?

²² Anderson (1982, 327): “Most readers would agree that the satirist of Juvenal’s Books I and II achieves greater success, makes a better case, than the satirist of the later books; and indeed I believe that the source of this success is *indignatio*”.

²³ Braund (1988, 3–6) (same in 1996b, 5–8). See also Rudd (1986, 108), and Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* 4.55 for more information on his use of *indignatio*.

The satirist's apologia and the genre

Horace, Persius and Juvenal, all writing satire during the autocracy known to us as the principate, let their respective interlocutors warn about outspokenness and criticising of powerful individuals. This, we are informed, could lead to exclusion from the finer circles or, even worse, to severe punishment. The satirists then claim the freedom of speech Lucilius could benefit from, but acknowledging this is impossible in contemporary society they end up seeking other solutions.²⁴ They would hardly be so preoccupied with the freedom of speech and the danger of offending powerful men, and tune down invective and attack on contemporaries if the speaker himself was the object of ridicule. Criticism or invective should not offend anyone if it is clearly not seriously meant; on the contrary, coming from a ridiculous outcast such would be a mark of honour. The apology for writing satire would probably then reflect this in one way or another. Besides, all satirists claim Lucilius, the genre inventor, as a model. After all he entrusted everything to his books, according to Horace, and exposed his *own life* (not that of a fictive 'satirist') to view as if on a *votive tablet* (not on a theatre mask).²⁵

The satire genre was, I believe, quite 'republican', clearly the one to contain most invective and political criticism. In the time of Lucilius the freedom of speech was greater and the law of libel confined to the Twelve Tables.²⁶ But even he, apparently, tuned down his sharp criticism after his patrons Scipio and Laelius died. Sulla the dictator introduced laws which probably limited the freedom of expression further (*de iniuriis* and *de maiestate*).²⁷ But still Catullus and Calvus attacked *nobiles* without being prosecuted, Varro wrote satire against the first triumvirs, yet he was 'pardoned' by Julius Caesar and assigned to organise a public library in Rome. During and after the Civil War, however, the public security and freedom of expression decreased substantially. We do not know much about satire writing in this period; Trebonius tells Cicero in a letter that he had written verses against a major political opponent in Lucilian manner.²⁸ Clearly these verses did not improve his relationship with the faction of Marcus Antonius, and not long after,

²⁴ See Kenney (1962) for more on the satirists' apologetic satires.

²⁵ *Quo fit ut omnis / votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella / vita senis*—Horace, *Sat.* 2.1.32–4.

²⁶ Rudd (1986, 40ff.). Augustine quoting Cicero (*De Republica*) claims the capital punishment could be sentenced *si quis occentavisset sive carmen condidisset quod infamiam faceret flagitiumve alteri* (*Civ. Dei* 2.9).

²⁷ Ulpian *Digest* 47.10.5.8ff.

²⁸ *Ad Fam.* 12.6.3. The opponent is normally taken to be Marcus Antonius, but K. Heldman (1988) argues that his *amicus* Dolabella is the real target.

when proconsul in Asia, he was captured and killed by Dolabella. We know about satire writing from republican groups in opposition to Octavian, especially the Stoic circle around Sextus Pompeius. Caesar's heir did not approve invective, and was by no means interested in loud criticism. Still we may assume that Lucilius's *libertas* was close to holy, something untouchable for Octavian and his party. If he had moved against this symbol of *libertas*, he would have proved to be a tyrant. Perhaps then, Horace defeated the enemy by singing his song (cf. DuQuesnay 1984). At least we know he made the satire apolitical, and wit and elegance its most important features. Horace let the invective and insults go, claiming that humour and sharp wit are more sufficient to make a point. Lucilian satire was impossible during the principate, even Horace's version, closer to moral diatribe, lacked an inheritor until Persius. The fact that the satire then again was brought forward by a Stoic in connection with what can be said to be the last real republican faction in Rome should not be ignored. Satire was probably the most outspoken and critical genre in Rome, which everybody knew. Therefore we must assume that the expectations were high at a recital, whoever the audience was, or when a new book was released. The emperor and his men would probably be on the alert as well. One could only be as free as the power and influence of one's patron allowed. Horace shows this at the end of his apologetic satire, when he asserts that he could criticise anybody because (Octavian) *Caesar himself was his protector*. Nothing in the genre thus indicates an insincere persona, or a comic show for its own sake.

Satire as drama

Yet the persona theory followers hold that satire should be best seen as drama, where the speaker, like his interlocutors, is a character in a performance. This is especially evident in the works of Susanna M. Braund, one of the most diligent contributors on Roman satire and Juvenal today. She asserts that "we should regard Juvenal's poems as a series of dramatic monologues delivered in the first person".²⁹ As much as I admire her productivity and enthusiasm I do not agree with this approach to the speaker. As far as I am able to see, works on poetics in Roman imperial times do not show any sign of a close connection between dramatic characters and the first person voice of poetry and satire.³⁰ The fact that this is not mentioned in these sources is of course not

²⁹ Braund (1988, 1). This idea is the pillar of one of her more popular publications *The Roman Satirists and their Masks* (1996b), where she starts by saying (p. 1) "To view satire as a kind of drama is perhaps the most illuminating approach available".

³⁰ There is nothing in 'Longinus' to support the persona theory. In his letter to the Pisos (*Ars Poetica*), Horace uses the term *persona* several times, but always linked to drama, never

evidence, but an indication. What about the Roman contemporary scene? Unfortunately the Romans have left us with scarce evidence of how the satires were received by contemporary society, but the few references we have are exclusively to writing and reading, never performing.³¹ What is even more striking is the fact that the satirists consistently comment on their *writing*, the *literary genre* and its ‘laws’, their *books* and their *readers*. Often they insist on a few worthy readers in contrast to other poets and their big recitations (although there is reason to doubt their sincerity on this). If these writers wrote with performance in mind, if they saw their work as drama, they would hardly have emphasised that the product was a written book to be read.

Notwithstanding, the Romans were well aware of the concept of persona, especially through the schooling in declamation. Persona theorists thus point to the Roman education system and the use of role plays, in which the cultural elite was trained in performing different parts and arguing different cases, which made them experts on creating literary characters of any kind. But creating literary characters was by no means the central idea behind this type of education, creating *virī Romani* was—men with capacity to argue, obey rules and orders, take command, make decisions and pass judgements. In the words of W. Martin Bloomer: “Prosopopoiæ in ancient literature have charmed modern readers into treating each instance as a sort of literary character. However, the whole process of learning to enact characters served as a technique for managing hegemonic identity for a class of speakers”.³² We can conclude that the Romans were familiar with *dramatis personae* from

to other poems. Besides, when speaking of creating a new persona for the theatre stage, he maintains that the character should be consistent and true to himself—quite the opposite of how the persona theorists view ‘the satirists’. Neither of his two other epistles on poetics (the second book of epistles) shows any sign of or comments on a fictive dramatic ‘I’ in poetry.

³¹ Braund (1996b, 52ff.) argues that the satirist’s own label *sermo* (chat, dialogue) indicates a present audience. But dialogue in one form or another was used in many different genres from antiquity, and does not prove that satire in particular should be regarded as drama. She also maintains that satire uses monologue and dialogue and thus “combines the forms of drama with the metre of epic. It is a hybrid form” (1996b, 1). So does Lucretius, yet nobody has claimed he created a dramatic mask, definitely not one making Epicureans look ridiculous.

³² Bloomer (1997, 59). He is discussing *fictio personae* (the presentation of a character), and makes the connection clear in his note 3: “*Fictio personae* translates the Greek *προσωποποιία*”. He continues: “Training in this particular rhetorical figure is important then on several levels: it involved the adolescent in the assumption of roles of social subordinates, it offered imaginative play in the attitudes and words of adults, it mirrored and no doubt affected the changing roles of the adolescent”.

drama and the role-plays of the schools, but there is no ancient external evidence supporting that Roman poets and satirists consciously used this to create dramatic first person voices.

If Juvenal's speaker is meant to be a character in a dramatic piece, we would perhaps expect to find other dramatic characters in the satires to sharpen and contrast him, to give him depth. It is hardly so. Naevolus of *Sat.* 9 is clearly a character quite different from the speaker, bringing real dialogue into Juvenalian satire for the first time, but the only one. Laronia (*Sat.* 2) and Umbricius (*Sat.* 3) use pretty much the same words as the narrator and pretty much share his points of view. Anderson concludes that Umbricius and 'Juvenal' are to be treated as two pines of the same cactus: "we treat Umbricius and the satirist who rage in the early Satires as dramatic characters whose indignation is part of the drama".³³ This raises some questions. Was there a Greek or Roman dramatic/comic tradition to introduce two main characters playing pretty much the same role? What would the purpose be? Why did Juvenal introduce other similar characters if his true aim was to make a parody of his speaker? Why make him 'I' in the first place, and why connect him with the *writer* of the satire?³⁴ It would make more sense to introduce other characters sharing his own view if Juvenal was sincere in his social and political criticism of contemporary Rome. To add indignant voices from other angles and social strata would strengthen the satires artistically and help sharpen the criticism.

The speaker in Juvenal's later Satires

The indignant and fierce voice of the first two books is tuned down in Juvenal's later satires. Anderson draws "a sharp distinction" between the ear-

³³ Anderson (1982, 394). Others (B. Fruelund Jensen 1986 and J. Sarkissian 1991) have discussed the narrator's relationship with Umbricius, finding differences. But these are differences in degree, not on substantial points of view or feelings towards contemporary Rome.

³⁴ There are clear references by the speaker on the process of writing satire, especially in satire 1: *difficile est saturam non scribere* (1.30); *nostris farrago libelli* (1.86); *si natura negat, facit indignatio versum / qualemcumque potest, quales ego vel Cluuienus* (1.79–80). Cluuienus in this last line is not just a scribbler or "an amateur poet ... unknown to us", as Braund labels him in her recent commentary on Juvenal Book I (1996a, 94). **As MacKay (1958) pointed out, this is certainly a reference to the Helvidian family from Cluviae.** Helvidius Priscus the elder, a diehard republican in constant verbal opposition to the emperor, was executed by Vespasian, and his son the Younger reached the same destiny because Domitian recognised himself in his *Paris and Oenoe*, we are told by Suetonius. The reference is not to mediocre poetry; "Juvenal's ground for association is quite explicitly stated: *facit indignatio versum*" (MacKay 1958, 237). He associates himself with outspoken and fierce regime critics. I read this as a serious political statement, the topic was definitely nothing to joke about in Rome at the time.

lier (1–6) and the later (10–16) satires, with the third book (sat. 7–9) as a pass-over—“its transitional features include a transitional satirist” (1982, 295). While Anderson ignored the third book, Braund goes “Beyond Anger” to find irony to be the “new satiric mode” of this book (1988, 22). She holds that in the first six satires the speaker’s discrepancies easily give him away—“he is pompous, narrow-minded, untruthful and ridiculous” (ibid.), but in these next three he “becomes a much more complicated figure, whose sincerity is always in doubt because of his ambivalence towards the subjects under discussion”. He is now in fact “an ironical man who is detached enough to be able to see two aspects of any affair”. (1988, 23). Braund goes on to point out (1988, 183) that “Irony does not alienate us with extremes but beguiles us with reasonableness”. When outlining the late ‘satirist’ of satire 10–16, Anderson maintains that Juvenal used Seneca’s Democritean figure from *De tranquillitate animi* as a model. He is a self-content world citizen with “a tenable attitude, morally sound and consistent with the best ideas of antiquity” (Anderson 1982, 360). Martin M. Winkler claims that we can hear the voice of the author, not the persona “wherever in satire we encounter a point of view consistent in itself, uncontradictory and coherent” (1983, 16). It must be fair to conclude from this that the speaker in Juvenal’s satires 7–16 is not to be understood as unreliable, insincere and ridiculous. I take it that both Anderson and Braund would agree that the persona therefore must be much closer to Juvenal’s ideals, perhaps even as Winkler suggests, the voice of the author. What the difference between the ideas of the speaker and those of Juvenal then consists of, and what applications this makes for the relationship between the author and his persona, I have problems finding an answer to in their studies.

We do not know under what circumstances the *Satires* were written and not exactly when, but most people agree on the presumption that the books of satire were written one by one, with years between them. It is true that *Satire 13* in many ways contradicts the indignation in the earlier satires. We do not know why Juvenal changed his style, but it is not an uncommon thing to do for an author over a period of time. Juvenal moved from Lucilian invective satire towards Horatian moral diatribe (and, one can say, more than two steps back again in the last two satires), and thus explored the two extremes within the satire genre. So what? As I read him, he still aims at laying open and denouncing vice and wickedness in the Roman society of his day. He still got a pessimistic outlook, and he still shows ability to social and political criticism. I would like to quote Kenneth Weisinger (1972, 234), who comments on Juvenal’s attitude to his contemporary society in his later satires:

“it is not simply vice but a more pervasive corruption and moral blindness which afflict Rome. It is because Juvenal has seen more deeply into the nature of corruption of his time he can adopt a more tolerant and resigned attitude. Simple vice could be confronted with indignation; in the face of the overwhelming proportions of this deeper corruption, the best the poet can do is to contrast his own relative moderation to the excesses of the other Romans”.

I am not sure whether or not Weisinger has hit the nail on the head, but at least he offers an alternative explanation to Juvenal’s less indignant voice in the later satires.

Perception and audience

The proof of the pudding is in the eating. What do we know about the consumption of Roman verse satire? We have no record from the literary circles in Rome indicating that their contemporary readers found the satirists creating a speaker far from their own ideals and even making him the butt of his own jokes. Where satire is mentioned or commented on, it is never self-parody, unreliable speakers or insincerity that is brought to surface. The same goes for literary commentaries in late antiquity and the early Christian literature. Martial ranks ancient literary genres in 12.94, for all that it is worth. Satire is placed behind epic and tragedy on the scale, but before the more trivial elegy and epigram. The fact that no reader or commentator on satire from antiquity to post-war Europe apparently recognised any subtle persona or untrustworthy speaker is a rather strong indication that such a recognition is a modern creation. A satirist like Juvenal must have been somewhat faulty and obviously unsuccessful at his task if it took the world that long to understand his satires properly. I assume that he did better using parody, wit, irony, ridicule and extremes to launch sharp social and political criticism in a genre with a significant position and a reputation for such.

Anderson and his followers are convinced that Juvenal succeeded in creating a literary masterpiece using the unreliable persona.³⁵ Some questions

³⁵ Anderson (1982, 198): “In his Book I, Juvenal achieved his greatest success, employing his structural principles with such skill as to create a masterpiece like satire 3”. Winkler (1983, 229): “His greatness lies primarily in his awareness of the potential inherent in satire through the skillful use of a satiric speaker who is not to be believed. Undoubtedly this represents the highest achievement possible in the genre ... He ... stands as the most complex and accomplished among the writers of the most uniquely Roman kind of literature”. Martyn (1979, 219): “... a brilliant exponent of epic parody, a master of every form of rhetorical and ironical wit; in fact, Rome’s outstanding writer within the field of literature most congenial to the Italian spirit”.

could be asked in this connection. If so successful and excellent, why was not Juvenal apparently more popular in his day? If he launched no sincere social or political criticism, and no serious invective against anyone, why did his contemporaries not hail him as a brilliant poet? Anderson claims “there is no doubt whatsoever that the sophisticated Roman audience repeatedly smiled and applauded at this superb display of ‘honest indignation’” (1982, 390). I claim there is reasonable doubt, for in the material handed down to us, his audience is in fact completely tacit. Martial speaks of Juvenal (if it is correct to identify his *Iuvenalis* with the author),³⁶ though quite a while before the *Satires* were written. But none of his contemporary authors mentions him or his work. Pliny, one of the most distinguished literary name-droppers of the day, does not set his name down.³⁷ In fact no other writer does for the next two hundred years: “After his death, for a long time, his work was buried in absolute silence” (Highet 1954, 181). Some attempts have been made to identify traces of Juvenal in other later writers,³⁸ but to be on sure ground we need to go two centuries ahead to find Juvenal and his work mentioned (in Lactantius *Divinae Inst.* 3.29). Fronto refers several times to Horace and Lucilius as satirists, but never to Juvenal. Apuleius and Aulus Gellius are equally silent. No Juvenal is mentioned in the first Christian apologists or writers like Cyprianus, Arnobius and Minucius Felix either. And later literary critics and grammarians like Julius Romanus, Nonius Marcellus, Donatus, Festus and Charisius make no reference to Juvenal. But even more remarkable is his absence in Porphyrio, the Horace commentator, and Diomedes the grammarian. Porphyrio makes use of the terms *satura* and *satiricus*, and

³⁶ *Iuvenalis* was not a very unusual name in Rome. Among the most merited was C. Iulius Iuvenalis, consul in 81. This Iuvenalis or the author himself may of course also have had brothers and other male relatives with the same cognomen. Another Iuvenalis from another stemma (L. Cassius Iuvenalis) was consul during Antoninus Pius’ reign (*RE* X2.1356).

³⁷ Pliny: *Erant sane plerique amici; neque enim quisquam est fere, qui studia, ut non simul et nos amet* (“To say truth, the authors have generally been my friends; as indeed there are few friends of learning who are not”, *Ep.* 1.13). Kenney (1982, 10) argues that the literary circle in Rome was rather small at the time: “In spite of the huge and heterogeneous population of the capital, the literary public must have been relatively small: Martial’s epigrams give an impression of a closed society whose members were mostly well known to each other”. White (1975) discusses the literati and authors in Martial, Statius and Pliny and comes to the conclusion (p. 300) that the milieu was less homogeneous and united: “We have to do with three separate groups (or aggregates), not with a literary circle in the Augustan sense. This diversity carries several implications, but what it suggests first of all is that there did not exist a well-known group of patrons predisposed to encourage and subsidize writers. Else we would discover more homogeneity among the respective audiences”.

³⁸ See Knoche (1940, 36), Highet (1954, 182–3 and 296–7, n 1–5) and Baldwin (1982, 76–7).

commenting on Horace as satirist, he often refers to Lucilius, Persius, even Ennius and Varro, but never Juvenal. In the fourth century grammar of Diomedes this tradition prevails; he discusses the satire genre and mentions Lucilius, Horace and Persius, but not Juvenal (*Ars gram.* 3, = *GLK* I, 485). Apparently Servius, the famous Virgil commentator, must be given credit for the rise of interest in Juvenal's work in the fourth century. And this was probably due to the survival of just a single manuscript.³⁹ Few scholars have contributed much to the knowledge of the early Juvenalian text tradition since Ulrich Knoche. So I let him conclude on the fate of the *Satires* (Knoche 1940, 34): "Der Text des Dichters ist anfangs fast zwei Jahrhunderte lang vernachlässigt worden; ganz plötzlich, im Verlauf der bekannten Bildungsbestrebungen des 4. Jhts. u. Z. wird Juvenal ... wiederentdeckt".

And when finally new editions of the *Satires* came forth they were immediately popular.⁴⁰ But as far as I am able to judge, it was as a fierce and sincere social and political critic he was acknowledged and praised, not for his unreliable and ridiculous persona. There is little reason to trust the biographical details brought forward by the *vitae* from the fourth century and the *Codex Pithoeanus* (or the now lost inscription from Aquinum for that matter). But the writers of these *lives* and the scholiast maintain that Juvenal's criticism and attacks led to him being exiled. This strong tradition in late antiquity shows at least that they regarded this as possible from reading his satires, in other words they did not appreciate the parody of a created persona.

The question remains: Why this absolute silence in our sources on the *Satires* from the moment of writing until the fourth century? There are three possible answers: a) Literary taste—Juvenal and his satires were generally not appreciated at the time, but their quality was discovered later, b) coincidence—the sources transmitted to us are especially unrepresentative on this matter (all those mentioning and commenting on Juvenal are lost), or c) censorship—the *Satires* were not well known and widely circulated because

³⁹ Hightet (1954, 187): "But they [the manuscripts] all shared one very significant feature: they all stopped at the sixtieth line of Satire Sixteen. This can mean only one thing. It means that, when Nicaeus (if it was he) rediscovered and edited Juvenal's poems, most of the last satire had already been lost; and that there must have been *only one copy* of Juvenal's poems which was even partially complete, when they emerged from the long silence that enveloped them after the poet's death". Same thoughts in Knoche (1940, 46ff.), Cameron (1964, 370–1: "It seems hard to escape the conclusion that Niceus could only lay hand on one defective text of Juvenal in the whole of Rome") and Zetzel (1981, 237).

⁴⁰ On Juvenal's rise to fortune and popularity during the next centuries in the whole empire see Knoche (1940, 38ff.), Cameron (1964, 369ff.), Irmscher (1966, 443), Reynolds & Wilson (1968, 85), Zetzel (1981, 223).

their content would offend powerful people. I think we can rule out the first one. Satire is one of the most here-and-now genres there is. There is little reason to believe that readers in late antiquity should appreciate Juvenal's satire more than his contemporaries did. Like us they would miss out on certain points, references and ambiguities. Although literary taste may vary, we must assume that the quality of the *Satires* was recognised right a way. We cannot completely rule out b) coincidence, but as far as I can see we have no comparable examples of this. Some may seek an answer by making a sort of mixture of these solutions. I am, however, confident that point c) can be a prosperous trail to follow, and a thorough examination of it is very much needed.

Modern cultural theory obviously has a lot to offer a classical scholar; it will help us see problems, raise questions, make us aware of (super-)structures and (inter-)relations and look for significant details. Methods and theories developed with modern societies and cultures in mind, however, should be used with considerable care on its ancient counterparts. The process and the results of such usage should be critically examined. In this article I have pointed out several problems and short-comings of the application of the persona theory on Juvenal and Roman verse satire. I want to underline again that I am not questioning the need sometimes to keep the speaker apart from the author, and thus in a sense see him as a literary creation. There is of course in itself nothing wrong in calling such a speaker a *persona*, but there is no reason to take for granted that the speaker was defined once and for all as an unalterable dramatic character, especially not an untrustworthy figure in opposition to the author.⁴¹ In this paper I have not, however, presented any clear and explicit alternative, and there are obvious problems connected with the speaker in these satires still left to be examined and discussed. To spur such a discussion, let me hold that a conception of a much more flexible speaker-voice is needed. Since I do not think it can be regarded as a literary character, I see no need to demand that the speaker-voice should be consis-

⁴¹ To quote two scholars on the problem of distance between the author and the speaker regarding the concept of persona. A.C. Romano, who has adopted the persona theory, states (1979, 19): "The artist may adopt a *persona* to present more forcefully and more artistically a particular truth, a truth that need not be conflicting with his own feelings". Niall Rudd, who is more of a sceptic, reminds us that "the doctrine of the *persona* does not absolve us from using our intelligence" (1976, 169; chap. 6 "Theory: Sincerity and Mask"). Rudd goes on to point out that sincerity and persona are two opposite ways of approaching literary voices, but both with limitations and taken to extremes equally unfit. There are after all several examples of personal, sincere voices in Roman poetry, with no distance between the author and his speaker: Ovid's 'I' in *Tristia* 4.10; *Martialis* of *Epigr.* 1.1; Statius' *ego* in *Silvae* 5.3.

tent in every respect. The author may sometimes state his private opinion or share his own personal feelings, while at other times let loose a more exaggerating speaker. What we name this speaker-voice is perhaps less important, but hopefully narrative theory has a lot to offer a further discussion. Rather than creating dramatic mock-satirists, I firmly believe that a satirist foremost would be devoted to displaying subjects, conduct and people he finds blamable and thus appropriate to satirise. Hence the Roman satire can be a valuable source to many themes and topics. Juvenal has a lot to say on social and political issues of his contemporary Rome. Much that deserves to be taken seriously.

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University of Oslo
Department of History